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Abstract
This project deals with the ongoing importance of nations, cultures, and politics in the
modern world, and with the complex and layered relationships between them. Despite the
expanding phenomenon of globalization, which promises to open up borders and tear down
the boundaries between peoples, nations remain the most important actors in international
politics and nationalism continues to be a potent force throughout the world. This project
explores the significance of nations and cultures for politics, with special emphasis on the
importance of nationalism and nationalist theory in the twenty-first century. I argue that there
are significant gaps in the literature on republican political theory and on nationalism, and I
address these gaps by turning to the writings of Jean-Jacques Rousseau. Rousseau’s
philosophy uniquely combines nationalism with republican citizenship and participatory
democracy, and his perspective shares many commonalities with David Miller, a
contemporary nationalist thinker who combines the principle of nationality with republican
citizenship. I argue that the theories of Rousseau and Miller form the foundations of
republican nationalism; a unique strand of nationalist theory that is distinct from other
perspectives―and from liberal nationalism in particular―and should be treated as separate
in the literature. I seek to develop republican nationalism as a theoretical framework that
looks at the major questions in the literature from a novel perspective and provides new
solutions to some of the discipline’s most persistent problems. By identifying republican
nationalism as an approach that is firmly rooted in the wider traditions of republicanism and
nationalism, and by demonstrating that this approach is distinct from liberal nationalism and
other alternative perspectives, I hope to make valuable contributions to the literature and help
move the debate within nationalist theory forward. I conclude by emphasizing the continuing
relevance of nations, cultures, and politics in the modern world, and by stressing that
nationalism is likely to remain a potent force in world affairs. For this reason, it is still as
crucial as ever to treat nations and nationalism as serious subjects of academic study, and to
keep the debates currently taking place within nationalist theory moving forward.
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Preface
This project deals with the continuing importance of nations, cultures, and politics in
the modern world, and with the complex and layered relationships between them. Despite the
expanding phenomenon of globalization, which promises to open up borders and tear down
the boundaries between peoples, nations remain the most important actors in international
politics and nationalism continues to be a potent force throughout the world. Between
separatist movements in places like Quebec and Catalonia, the Kurdish struggle for a national
homeland and its implications for the already complex situation in the Middle East, and the
international tensions between powerful nations such as China and Japan, the concept of “the
nation” and the ideas and beliefs that accompany it still exercise immense influence over
real-world actions and decisions. This project explores the continuing relevance of nations
and cultures for politics, with special emphasis on the importance of nationalism and
nationalist theory in the twenty-first century.
Much has been written about nations and nationalism, and about the meaning of these
ideas for citizenship and democracy. Major questions on the subject include: Is nationalism
compatible with democracy, or do nationalist movements naturally gravitate towards
authoritarianism? Is nationalism inherently chauvinistic, or is it possible for nationalists to
reject militarism and endorse equal respect for other nations (and for minorities within their
own nations)? Can we keep matters of culture and nationality from biasing the political
process, or does politics always involve cultural and national elements? Does national
belonging still hold any value in the modern world, and is the value of political participation
intrinsic or instrumental? Moreover, could it be that the nation-state is already an outdated
concept, soon to be replaced by larger supranational bodies such as the European Union
(EU)? I tackle these familiar and much debated questions from a fresh perspective by
introducing a new theoretical approach which I call republican nationalism.
Republican nationalism is rooted in the works of Jean-Jacques Rousseau, who is a
central figure for this project because of his status as an influential thinker of the republican
political tradition and the father of modern nationalism. I argue that Rousseau’s philosophy
has been largely neglected in much of the contemporary literature on republicanism and
nationalism, and this has left both traditions with significant theoretical gaps. Rousseau’s
viii

approach uniquely combines nationalism with republican citizenship and participatory
democracy, and a closer study of his work provides valuable insight into these important
concepts. The second central figure for this project is David Miller, a contemporary
nationalist thinker who attempts to combine the principle of nationality with republican
citizenship in a way that shares many parallels with Rousseau. I argue that the works of
Rousseau and Miller form the foundations of republican nationalism, a unique strand of
nationalist theory that is distinct enough from other perspectives―and from liberal
nationalism in particular―to be treated as separate in the literature.
My goal is to develop republican nationalism as a theoretical framework that looks at
the major questions in the literature from a novel perspective and provides unique solutions
to many of the problems posed. I hope that by identifying republican nationalism as an
approach that is firmly rooted in the theoretical traditions of republicanism and nationalism,
and by demonstrating that this approach is distinct from liberal nationalism and other
alternative perspectives, I will be able to make valuable contributions to the literature and
help move the debate within nationalist theory forward. More research will be needed to
develop republican nationalism into the kind of serious approach to political decision-making
that liberal nationalism has become thanks to the groundbreaking work of liberal thinkers
like Yael Tamir and Will Kymlicka. Nevertheless, I hope that this project will serve as an
important first step in that direction by establishing republican nationalism as a distinct and
defensible theoretical framework.
Chapter 1 deals with nations and nationalisms; it provides working definitions for
“nation,” “nationalism,” and “nationalist theory” and gives an overview of the main debates
that have been taking place within nationalist theory over the past several decades. The
chapter identifies three distinct approaches to nationalism: ethnic nationalism, civic
nationalism, and cultural nationalism. The debate between civic and ethnic nationalism had
been the focus of nationalist scholarship for many years, but more recently many nationalist
thinkers have argued that the civic vs. ethnic divide is misleading because all nationalisms
have a fundamental cultural component. Cultural nationalism appears to be the framework
within which the debate in nationalist theory is currently taking place, but there is still a great
deal of diversity between theorists who identify as cultural nationalists. Liberal nationalism is
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the most prominent strand of cultural nationalism, but I argue that the writings of Rousseau
and Miller point towards a distinct republican alternative.
Because of the crucial role that republican political theory plays in developing the
concept of republican nationalism, Chapter 2 looks at the historical development of
republicanism. By identifying the major thinkers in the tradition and the distinct strands of
republicanism that have emerged over time, I hope to demonstrate that there is a significant
gap in the literature on republicanism concerning the role that culture and nationality play in
politics. While the contemporary debate in republican political theory has largely been taking
place between instrumental republicans on the one hand and civic humanists on the other, I
argue that there is a third strand of republican theory rooted in the works of Rousseau, who
makes an intrinsic connection between the national culture and participatory democracy.
Rousseau’s cultural approach to republicanism has been largely neglected by contemporary
republican thinkers, but it offers valuable insights into the important connection between
culture and politics, and between nationalism and democracy.
Due to Rousseau’s central importance for both republican and nationalist theory,
Chapters 3 & 4 take an in-depth look at his philosophy. Chapter 3 considers the significant
contributions that Rousseau has made to republicanism, while Chapter 4 argues that
Rousseau’s philosophy is fundamentally distinct from liberalism and cannot be subsumed
under the wider liberal umbrella (as thinkers like Joshua Cohen have attempted to do). I
contend that Rousseau is both a distinctly republican thinker and the founder of modern
nationalism; the fundamental connection that he makes between republicanism and
nationalism points towards a distinct strand of nationalist theory that I call republican
nationalism.
Chapter 5 defines the concept of republican nationalism through a comparison of
Rousseau’s writings and the works of David Miller. While there are notable differences
between the two, Rousseau and Miller embark on very similar projects; in fact, I argue that
Miller accepts the fundamentals of Rousseau’s republicanism, and that his theory amounts to
a sophisticated attempt to modernize Rousseau’s philosophy. Chapter 6 contrasts the liberal
nationalism of Yael Tamir and Will Kymlicka with republican nationalism. I aim to show
that the two approaches are sufficiently distinct to warrant separate classifications within
x

nationalist theory, and I identify six major differences between liberal and republican
nationalism in order to illustrate this point.
The final chapter (Chapter 7) restates my main claims and arguments, considers the
contributions that this project has made to the literature on republicanism and nationalism,
and addresses some important questions that proponents of republican nationalism will have
to grapple with in the future. I conclude by emphasizing the continuing relevance of nations,
cultures, and politics in the modern world, and by stressing that nationalism is likely to
remain a potent force in world affairs for the foreseeable future. For this reason, it is still as
crucial as ever to treat nations and nationalism as serious subjects of academic study, and to
keep the debates currently taking place within nationalist theory moving forward.
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Chapter 1
1

Nations and Nationalism
Our contemporary understanding of the “nation” and consequently of

“nationalism” developed as part of a complex and often turbulent process that took place
over many centuries. Historically nationalism has taken on a variety of diverse forms,
from left-wing emancipatory and anti-colonial nationalism to imperialist chauvinism and
fascism. While some aspects of nationalist theory can be said to date back to antiquity,
other aspects appear to be quintessentially modern. These and others circumstances have
made it difficult and often controversial to theorize about nationalism and its
implications, and the word itself continues to have different meanings to different people.
In this chapter, I consider the continuing relevance of nationalism in the modern world,
and I identify three primary theoretical frameworks within nationalist theory: 1) ethnic
nationalism, 2) civic nationalism, and 3) cultural nationalism. Ethnic nationalism
presupposes a common national identity based on ethnic ties, while civic nationalism
postulates a civic commitment to common political principles, practices, and institutions.
Neither purely civic nor strictly ethnic, cultural nationalism presupposes a common
public culture that is not defined by ethnic ties and yet requires more than a civic
commitment to common principles and practices. Cultural nationalism emphasizes the
importance of a common public culture for nations and their citizens; these citizens need
not belong to any particular ethnic, religious, or tribal group, but they do need to accept a
set of shared traditions, moral commitments, and responsibilities within the political
community. Ultimately, this chapter argues that cultural nationalism is the framework
within which the current debate about nationalist theory is taking place. I aim to clarify
the terms of this debate, and I argue that nationalism remains a potent force in the twentyfirst century.

1.1 What Is a Nation?
In On Nationality, David Miller identifiers five elements that distinguish
nationality from other collective sources of identity. These are: 1) national communities
are constituted by belief; their existence depends on a shared belief that its members
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belong together and on the common desire of those members to continue living together
in the future. 2) A nation is an identity that embodies historical continuity; the nation is a
unique form of association because it stretches backwards in the past and forwards in the
future, forming a distinct community of obligation between us, our ancestors, and our
descendants. 3) National identity is an active identity; national communities actively
work together to make decisions, achieve goals, and so on. 4) National identity connects
a group of people to a specific geographical location; every nation has a homeland and
either is or aspires to become a political community. 5) National identity demands that
the individuals who share it have something in common. Miller defines this commonality
as a set of characteristics that constitute a common public culture; this public culture goes
beyond mere political principles and represents a shared understanding about how a
group of people should conduct their life together. A common public culture should not
be so all-embracing that it destroys private subcultures, but it should have substantial
content and meaning for members of the national community.1 These five elements are
helpful to keep in mind when considering what constitutes a nation, and how the nation
differs from other forms of group association.
As human beings we are social creatures who live almost exclusively in
communities of some type, and the bonds that are created within these communities often
translate into a powerful sense of allegiance and belonging. It is nearly impossible to
imagine the individual as being completely independent of his communal context, and it
would be impossible to reduce human beings to atomistic individuals who exist prior to
society. As Neil MacCormick observes, “the truth about human beings is that they can
only become individuals―acquire a sense of their own individuality―as a result of their
social experiences within human communities. Thus ‘the individual’ is as much a product
of ‘society’ as vice versa. Even political individualism is a program for social
organization.”2 With this in mind, it is clear that studying the nation as one of the most

1
2

David Miller, On Nationality, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995), 22-27.

Neil MacCormick, “Nation and Nationalism,” in Theorizing Nationalism, ed. Ronald Beiner
(Albany: State University of New York Press, 1999), 189.

3

powerful forms of social organization in the modern world is an essential component of
studying human beings in general.
It is important not to confuse the nation with the state. According to Miller, the
“nation” is a community of people with an aspiration for political self-determination,
whereas the “state” refers to the set of political institutions that the nation seeks to
establish for itself.3 On the one hand, states are seen as legalistic and largely procedural
entities which, to paraphrase Max Weber, have a monopoly over the legitimate use of
force within their sovereign territory and seek to uphold laws and protect their citizens
from harm. On the other hand, to paraphrase Ernest Renan, nations refer to cultural
communities constituted by a form of popular consciousness rather than legal procedures,
including a shared sense of a common past and a present will to live together. It is also
important to differentiate between nationality and ethnicity: there are nations which have
been formed by a single and largely homogeneous ethnic group (e.g. Japan), and there are
also nations which were formed out of many different ethnic groups (e.g. United States,
Canada, and even France).4 As Neil MacCormick points out,
A nation is constituted by a relatively large grouping of people who conceive
themselves to have a communal past, including shared sufferings and shared
achievements, from which past is derived a common culture that represents a
form of cultural continuity uniting past and present and capable of being
projected into the future. This continuity is not a static one, but is in a sense
“organic.” The common culture, the common way of doing and living, the
common language (though nations need not be identified with a single language,
e.g., Switzerland), have changed over time, but the changes occur within and
make sense within an uninterrupted tradition, and stem from each generation’s
own choices, as distinct from having been imposed ab extra.5
Benedict Anderson famously argued that nations are “imagined communities” constituted
by a group of people who see themselves as members of a particular national community
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Miller, On Nationality, 19.

4

Ibid., 21.

5

MacCormick, “Nation and Nationalism,” 191.
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sharing a common history.6 Their understanding of this common history may include
unsubstantiated myths and fictitious accounts of historical events, but this does not take
away from the fact that the people in question hold these myths as important aspects of a
common history and tradition. Out of this tradition emerge a shared consciousness and a
sense of common identity that play a real and important part in the lives of the members
of a national community.7 Although nations may be imagined communities and although
they may often be grounded in less than accurate historical accounts, they are real
because they exist in the shared consciousness of their members and play a significant
role in the lives of those members. Every single day crucially important decisions with
major practical consequences are made based on our understanding of nations, both our
own nation and other nations which coexist alongside our own on the world stage.
Though nations may exist only in our consciousness, this consciousness still shapes our
actions and behaviours in meaningful ways. This means that nations and the complex
issues that surround them are and continue to be a part of our common reality.

1.2 What Is Nationalism?
In Nationalism: Five Roads to Modernity, Liah Greenfeld defines nationalism as a
source of individual identity that is located within a “people,” seen as the bearer of
sovereignty, the central object of loyalty, and the basis of collective solidarity. 8 Greenfeld
believes that nationalism forms the basis of the modern world, and she uses the word as
an umbrella term which includes the related phenomena of national identity (or
nationality) and consciousness, and collectivities based on these phenomena; i.e. nations.
Occasionally nationalism refers to the articulate ideology on which national identity and
consciousness rest, but nationalism is not necessarily a form of particularism.
Nationalism “is a political ideology (or a class of political ideologies deriving from the

6

See: Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of
Nationalism (Revised Edition), (London & New York: Verso, 2006).

1993), 3.

7

MacCormick, “Nation and Nationalism,” 192.

8

Liah Greenfeld, Nationalism: Five Roads to Modernity (Cambridge: Harvard University Press,
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same basic principle), and as such it does not have to be identified with any particular
community. A nation coextensive with humanity is in no way a contradiction in terms.”9
The concept of a nation coextensive with humanity is certainly controversial within
nationalist circles, but it speaks to the diversity of views that proponents of nationalism
hold. On the one hand, the nation might refer to a sovereign people, which presupposes a
political ideology that is not necessarily particularistic and is in fact inherently linked to
democracy. On the other, the nation might also refer to a unique people, which is a
particularistic conception and has the potential to become authoritarian. Nevertheless,
Greenfeld emphasizes that nationalism was the form in which democracy first appeared
in the world (embodied in the idea of the people as bearers of sovereignty); as such,
nationalism originally developed as democracy. In fact, democracy and nationalism are
“inherently linked, and neither can be fully understood apart from this connection.”10
Greenfeld’s major point is that nationalism defines modernity, and that the idea of the
“nation” forms the constitutive element of modernity. As such, modernity is defined by
nationalism, and not the other way around.11 National identity preceded the formation of
nations (the nation is a pre-political community), and it is nationalism which has made
the modern world, politically, what it is today.12 These are important points, and we will
return to them often in the coming chapters. In the following section, I consider the
importance of nationalist theory, its development and contemporary relevance.

1.3 What Is Nationalist Theory?
Nationalism can be understood as a system of ideas and beliefs that places a high
value on one’s attachments to the nation and national community. Some thinkers argue
that nationalism does not qualify as a distinct ideology, and critics are skeptical about any
form of nationalism being compatible with democratic values. According to Charles

9

Ibid, 7.

10

Ibid, 10.

11

Ibid, 18.

12

Ibid, 21.
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Taylor, however, critics of nationalism fail to adequately explain where nationalism gets
its moral thrust.13 Nationalism can foster a strong sense of solidarity between elites and
non-elites, rich and poor, peasants and intelligentsia; this is a real and politically
significant solidarity based in common nationality. Before the 18th century, society was
largely hierarchical and being a part of society meant belonging to a very specific
segment of it, such as being part of a guild or being subject to a Lord. And yet today, “I
stand, alongside all my fellow citizens, in direct relationship to the state that is the object
of our common allegiance.”14 This is an important point, and it speaks to the continuing
relevance of nationalism in the modern world. Having survived both communism and
imperialism, and in spite of globalization and the recent push towards supranational
organizations such as the EU, the nation-state remains the primary mode of political
organization in the modern world, and common nationality is perhaps the strongest
unifying force among human beings.
Benedict Anderson states that “unlike most other isms, nationalism has never
produced its own grand thinkers: No Hobbes, Tocquevilles, Marxes, or Webers.”15
Ronald Beiner believes that this is in part because unlike other theories, nationalism is
concerned with the particular: with distinct national contexts which shape each nation’s
unique worldview. The particular circumstances of any given nation are often (though not
always) so unique that they cannot be generalized into universal principles. The question
is whether we can construct a general account of obligations, rights, and prohibitions that
apply to all cases of nationalism, or whether different nationalisms are so diverse and
embedded within their own particular contexts that all attempts to generalize them are
futile.16 Furthermore, nationalism is an extremely diverse theoretical framework with
many different strands. Historically, nationalist movements pushing for independence

13

Charles Taylor, “Nationalism and Modernity,” in Theorizing Nationalism, ed. Ronald Beiner
(Albany: State University of New York Press, 1999), 223.
14

Ibid., 224.

15

Anderson, Imagined Communities, 5.

16

Yael Tamir, “Theoretical Difficulties in the Study of Nationalism,” in Theorizing Nationalism,
ed. Ronald Beiner (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1999), 68.
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from imperial and colonial powers have often been decisively left-wing, but the extreme
right-wing and fascist movements of the interwar period have also claimed a nationalist
legacy. As a result, nationalist claims are often viewed with suspicion, and theorists of
nationalism are forced to be on the defensive. Moderate forms of nationalism are
dismissed by critics as not constituting “real” nationalism, whereas “real” nationalism is
immediately labeled as harmful and dangerous.17 In fact, the excesses of some selfproclaimed nationalist movements have prompted critics to dismiss the very idea of
nationalism as a return to a primitive and pre-modern tribalism which has no place in the
modern world. Consequently, the question of whether nationalism is a modern or premodern idea has been the subject of intense debate over the last several decades. I already
mentioned Greenfeld’s take on the issue, but another compelling answer is provided by
Miller, who states that our sense of nationality is both modern and pre-modern; while the
sense of kinship and belonging to a community is not a modern idea, what is modern and
distinctive about nationalism is the idea of a body of people capable of acting collectively
and of conferring authority on political institutions. According to Miller,
Ideas of national characters and so forth were of long-standing. What is new is the
belief that nations can be regarded as active political agents, the bearers of the
ultimate power of sovereignty. This in turn was connected to a new way of
thinking about politics, the idea that institutions and policies could be seen as
somehow expressing a popular national will.18
Nevertheless, nationalism continues to be portrayed by critics as too sentimental, chaotic,
and irrational to form a cohesive theoretical framework. For some, nationalism represents
an emotional force that subverts reason and rational thinking, which makes it
incompatible with Enlightenment values and therefore dangerous.19 Proponents of
nationalism, including those attempting to construct a defensible academic theory of
nationalism, must answer this criticism.

17

Ibid., 71.

18

Miller, On Nationality, 30-31.

19

Tamir, “Theoretical Difficulties in the Study of Nationalism,” 69.
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Yael Tamir argues that defensible theories of nationalism can in fact be
constructed, and urges more scholars to contribute to the project.20 She states that:
A theory of nationalism must structure itself independently of all contingencies.
Its basis must be a systematic view of human nature and of the world order, as
well as a coherent set of universally applicable values.… [A] theory of
nationalism, like all other political theories, must be constructed in the abstract
but cannot be implemented outside of a particular context.21
According to Tamir, a theory of nationalism will include a particular set of descriptive
statements followed by normative claims focusing on the moral, social, and
psychological importance of national and cultural membership, which will in turn be
followed by an inventory of the means necessary to preserve it. The major points on
which nationalist theorists will disagree are: the nature of the relationship between the
nation and its individual members, the normative justifications for the existence of the
nation, and the political goals and aspirations that nationalism supports.22 Wayne Norman
agrees that there is a need to theorize nationalism, arguing that philosophers have an
important role to play in shaping nationalist studies in general. According to Norman, “a
normative theory of nationalism should be concerned with the nature of national
identities, the political attempts to forge them, the rhetoric and ideologies that are used in
such attempts, and the principles nationalists use to justify these kinds of politics; among
other things.”23 It is worth repeating that although nationalism is often referred to as “by
far the most potent ideology in the world,” it is also considered the only major political
ideology without a great theorist of its own. Anderson points out that the theorists of
nationalism are often puzzled by the discrepancy between the political power and vitality
of nationalism and its relative philosophical poverty and even incoherence.24 As

20

Ibid., 68.

21

Ibid., 82.

22

Ibid., 84.

23

Wayne Norman, “Theorizing Nationalism (Normatively),” in Theorizing Nationalism, ed.
Ronald Beiner (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1999), 57.
24

Anderson, Imagined Communities, 5.
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previously mentioned, Anderson claims that nationalism never produced its own grand
thinker such as Hobbes, Tocqueville, Marx, or Weber. Norman expands this list, adding
Rousseau, Kant, and Rawls to the list of theorists whose equivalent nationalist theory
lacks. While I support the call to develop nationalist theory into a more cohesive
theoretical framework, I disagree with the claim that nationalism lacks its own great
theorist. In the coming chapters I will argue that Jean-Jacques Rousseau is in fact the
grand thinker of nationalist theory and the father of modern nationalism. I also suggest
that Rousseau’s political philosophy forms the basis of a distinct republican strand of
nationalist theory which merits closer academic consideration in the future.

1.4 Civic vs. Ethnic Nationalism
For many years the central conflict within nationalist theory had been the debate
between civic and ethnic nationalism. Michael Ignatieff defines civic nationalism as the
belief “that the nation should be composed of all those―regardless of race, color, creed,
gender, language, or ethnicity―who subscribe to the nation’s political creed,” and he
understands the civic nation to be “a community of equal, rights-bearing citizens, united
in patriotic attachment to a shared set of political practices and values.”25 According to
Ignatieff, the civic nation is a community created by the free choice of individuals to
come together in order to uphold particular political values and practices. Civic
nationalism is based on the freely given consent of each member of the nation and it
looks at national belonging as a form of rational attachment. Civic nationalism is distinct
from ethnic nationalism, which holds that our deepest attachments are inherited rather
than chosen, and that the national community defines the individual rather than the other
way around.26 In this context, civic nationalism was portrayed as the “good” and
“rational” type of nationalism found in Western liberal democracies, whereas ethnic
nationalism was dismissed as the “bad” and “dangerous” type of nationalism prevalent in
non-Western states. The implication was that civic nationalism as defined by such

25

Michael Ignatieff, Blood and Belonging, (London: BBC Books, 1993), 6.

26

Ibid, 7-8.
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thinkers as Ignatieff and John Plamenatz constitutes the only defensible form of
nationalism, whereas all other forms of nationalism were automatically seen as irrational
and undesirable (ethnic, Eastern, dangerous).27
David Miller, Bernard Yack, Yael Tamir, and Will Kymlicka, among others,
challenge the rather simplistic claim that Western nations embrace civic nationalism
(which is good) while Eastern nations embrace ethnic nationalism (which is bad). Yack
states: “the characterization of political community in the so-called civic nations as a
rational and freely chosen allegiance to a set of political principles seems untenable to
me, a mixture of self-congratulation and wishful thinking.”28 This is because all
collective identities are in a constant process of development and interpretation, and even
if collective identities such as American, Canadian, or French are merely sites for
controversy and construction (as opposed to pre-determined and static identities), these
sites themselves are cultural artifacts that are inherited from previous generations. The
purely civic nation is a myth, because every nation consists of a contingent inheritance of
distinctive experiences and cultural memories that represent an inseparable part of its
national identity. Western nations such as the United States, Canada, and France are not
merely voluntary associations made up of individuals who are interested in upholding
certain political principles. Political loyalty cannot be reduced to a random association of
individuals held together exclusively by particular political values and practices because
every nation constitutes a pre-political community with a cultural “horizon” of shared
historical experiences and cultural memories.29 Furthermore, the purely ethnic nation is
also a myth, because it implies that national identity is constant and unchanging and that
members of the nation have no choice or input in the shaping of their national identity.
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Commenting on Ernest Renan’s famous statement that the nation is a “daily plebiscite,”
Yack states:
The nation may be a daily plebiscite for Renan, but the subject of that plebiscite is
what we will do with the mix of competing symbols and stories that make up our
cultural inheritance. Without a “rich legacy of memories” there are no communal
loyalties to be tested by consent. The myth of the ethnic nation suggests that you
have no choice at all in the making of your national identity: you are your cultural
inheritance and nothing else. The myth of the civic nation, in contrast, suggests
that your national identity is nothing but your choice: you are the political
principles you share with other like-minded individuals.30
Although many of its critics portray nationalism as a romantic and irrationalist theory that
emphasizes inheritance instead of choice and wants to bring the pre-political community
into politics, through the doctrine of popular sovereignty even classical liberalism implies
that citizens should think of themselves as forming a community that is prior to political
institutions. Locke’s famous distinction between the commonwealth and the community
implies that there is a people that are prior to the state, and that these people have the
right to limit the political powers of the state and even dissolve the government in
extreme circumstances. The fundamental idea behind this distinction is that political
institutions and the state may dissolve but the people and the community remain intact;
the very concept of a sovereign people forming a national community rests on an
understanding of the community as distinct from the state (which is merely a tool of selfgovernment). According to Yack, because they emerged within a specific historical
context even the quintessential liberal ideals of “individual rights and political freedoms
depend to a certain extent on contingencies and vagaries of shared memory and
identity.”31
Thus, while it would be inaccurate to conceive of the nation as a reflection of an
inherited and unchanging ethnic identity (all identities are dynamic and change over
time), it is also inaccurate to portray the nation as nothing more than a voluntary
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association of individuals brought together by a shared commitment to common political
principles, practices, and institutions (a purely civic nation). For one thing, liberal
principles have themselves developed within political communities with their own
inherited cultural identity. For another, even if a nation could be purely civic and based
solely on shared political principles, it is not necessarily true that this type of state would
be more desirable or tolerant. As the example of McCarthyism in the United States
illustrates, individuals can be excluded and discriminated against based simply on the fact
that they hold different political principles from the majority. In the end, it is important to
understand that every nation has its own unique cultural inheritance, and as Renan
suggested, the nation grows out of the choices we make within that inheritance. As such,
the state is always to some extent a product of pre-political culture and it cannot be
culturally and linguistically neutral.32 It is impossible to answer the myth of an
unchanging ethnic identity with a countermyth of a purely civic state.33 There is no such
thing as a purely political culture, and it is impossible to completely exclude each
nation’s distinct pre-political cultural inheritance from politics. This does not mean that
we do not have the ability to collectively shape and reshape our national identity over
time through an active political culture and vibrant civil society, but this is always done
within the particular cultural context we have inherited. As Yack concludes,
In the end, I believe Renan got it right. Two things make a nation: present-day
consent and a rich cultural inheritance of shared memories and practices. Without
consent our cultural legacy would be our destiny, rather than a set of background
constraints on our activities. But without such a legacy there would be no consent
at all, since there would be no reason for people to seek agreement with any one
group of individuals rather than another.34
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We need to move beyond the civic vs. ethnic divide because both options are inadequate;
both perpetuate myths of their own while neglecting the essential cultural aspect of
nationalism. In the next section, I take a closer look at the idea of cultural nationalism and
how it contributes to the debate surrounding nationalist theory and practice.

1.5 Cultural Nationalism
Both civic and ethnic nationalism fail to account for the cultural dimension that
plays a crucial role in the life of every nation. For this reason, the debate surrounding
nationalism has shifted focus towards cultural nationalism, examined in different ways by
such authors as David Miller, Yael Tamir, Will Kymlicka, Kai Nielsen, Bernard Yack,
and others. Nielsen asserts that nationality always involves a richer cultural component;
although they fail to recognize it, both civic and ethnic accounts of nationalism are forms
of cultural nationalism, but cultural nationalism itself need not be strictly civic or
ethnic.35 As Nielsen explains, “cultural nationalism defines the nation in terms of a
common encompassing culture,” but, according to Nielsen, the nature of that culture can
take many forms from nation to nation, including that of a liberal democratic culture.36
Therefore, the primary aim of nationalist movements is seen as the preservation and
promotion of the particular national culture they represent; their aim is not necessarily the
oppression of other cultures. According to John Dunn,
Cultural nationalism is in the first instance little more than valuing the existing
human social identity at a point in time when this has come to feel itself under
pressure. It is not necessarily culturally bigoted―committed to the infliction of its
own local cultural proclivities in a hegemonic fashion on the rest of the world.
Indeed, as Isaiah Berlin has eloquently insisted, the first great protagonist of
cultural nationalism, the German social philosopher Herder, took the view that it
was necessarily opposed to any such venture. Valuing the plurality of cultures and
languages, the subtle ecological variety and nuance of human practices, distinctly
for themselves, for their existent idiosyncrasy, rather than assessing their merits in
terms of their conformity with or deviation from some supposedly humanly
universal aesthetic or ethic, he refused to see hierarchy within the realm of
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cultures and insisted that, as structures of lived sentiment, they must instead be
accorded intrinsic value rather than appraised sternly from the bastion of a single
culture.37
Proponents of a purely civic nationalism such as Ignatieff ignore the significance of
national identity because they refuse to consider people’s attachment to culture.
According to Ignatieff, what matters is either political principles and practices (civic
nationalism) or ethnic descent (ethnic nationalism).38 Kymlicka believes that Ignatieff
commits an error when he labels Flemish and Quebecois nationalisms as ethnic in nature.
According to Kymlicka, “the Quebecois and the Flemish accept immigrants as full
members of the nation, so long as they learn the language and history of the society. They
define membership in terms of participation in a common culture, open to all, rather than
on ethnic grounds.”39 Even Western democracies such as the United States, Canada, and
France, which have been described as civic nations in the past, compel immigrants to
learn the language and history of the nation in order to integrate them into the common
culture. In fact, immigration laws illustrate quite clearly the role of culture in the politics
of nations. If a nation was constituted on purely civic grounds, it would be compelled to
accommodate every person who demonstrates a commitment to the specific political
principles and practices upon which that particular nation is founded, and it could not
impose any additional cultural requirements on those individuals. There is no modern
nation, Western liberal democracies included, that actively embraces every potential
immigrant who happens to accept a particular set of political principles.
What’s more, proponents of the myth of a purely civic nation tend to portray civic
nationalism as inherently good, peaceful, and democratic and contrast this with ethnic
nationalism, which must therefore be inherently bad, violent, and dangerous. However,
ethnic nationalism is not behind all nationalist conflicts in the world. Often it is civic
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nationalists who create conflict by forcibly trying to assimilate national minorities into a
single civic culture (e.g. the Kurdish minority in Turkey). In so doing, civic nationalists
are prepared to grant members of minority cultures equal citizenship and legal rights
under state law but they deny them a separate national identity. On the grounds that the
majority nation is non-ethnic and therefore inclusive, civic nationalist often attempt to
assimilate ethnic minorities against their will, as was the case with Native Americans,
Hawaiians, and Puerto Ricans in the United States. Furthermore, civic nationalism is not
necessarily democratic. Not all civic nations have been liberal democracies, and for much
of the 20th century ethnically diverse countries like Brazil and Argentina embraced a form
of civic nationalism by promoting a common national identity and citizenship status for
all citizens regardless of their diverse ethnic backgrounds while being governed by
military dictatorships.40
Cultural nationalists want to move beyond the civic vs. ethnic divide and they
offer a more nuanced understanding of national identity and nationalism, an
understanding which accounts for the importance of culture. Miller argues that a common
national culture “not only gives its bearers a sense of where they belong and provides an
historical identity, but also provides them with a background against which more
individual choices about how to live can be made.”41 Miller concedes that a person is
likely to be a participant in a number of other cultures alongside the national culture,
including family, class, ethnic group, and so on, which means that nationality is certainly
not the only cultural resource available to a person at any given time. Nevertheless,
national culture is an important resource that ought to be preserved by the state. As
Kymlicka explains, paraphrasing Yael Tamir’s views,
Being able to express one’s cultural identity is important for many reasons.
Cultural membership is a precondition of autonomous moral choices. Actions
performed in a cultural context are “endowed with additional meaning” because
they can be seen both as acts of individual achievement and as contributions to the
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development of one’s culture; and shared membership in a culture promotes a
sense of belonging and relationships of mutual recognition.42
Thus, a well functioning state rests upon a pre-political, or, more accurately, an extrapolitical sense of cultural belonging. As Miller indicates, common nationality is
significant because:
It provides the wherewithal for a common culture against whose background
people can make more individual decisions about how to lead their lives; it
provides the setting in which ideas of social justice can be pursued, particularly
ideas that require us to treat our individual talents as to some degree a ‘common
asset’, to use Rawls’s phrase; and it helps to foster the mutual understanding and
trust that makes democratic citizenship possible.43
Kymlicka emphasizes the importance of cultural belonging to individual well-being, and
conceives of the nation as a “societal culture.” According to Kymlicka, a societal culture
“provides its members with meaningful ways of life across the full range of human
activities, including social, educational, religious, recreational, and economic life,
encompassing both public and private spheres. These cultures tend to be territorially
concentrated, and based on a shared language.”44 However, even though extra-political
culture is an inevitable component of common nationality, this does not mean that the
content of said nationality should be set in stone. National identities and the culture that
surrounds them can and do change significantly over time, and this change should not be
seen as constituting the dissolution of those identities. Change is inevitable, and for
democratically-inclined nationalist thinkers in particular, it is important to ensure that
changes occur through a process of free and open deliberation between fellow citizens,
including immigrants and minorities.
In short, cultural nationalism moves beyond the overly simplistic civic vs. ethnic
divide, it emphasizes the inevitable connection between state and culture, and it asserts
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that there can be no purely political conception of the nation. Cultural nationalists argue
that there is nothing inherently fanatical or antidemocratic about nationalism, and many
suggest that nationalism is compatible with liberalism (Tamir, Neilsen, Kymlicka, and
others). The main point that these theorists make is that “all nationalisms are cultural
nationalisms of one kind or another. There is no purely political conception of the nation,
liberal or otherwise.”45

1.6 Current Debates within Cultural Nationalism
Despite accepting a common theoretical framework that stresses the connection
between politics and culture, cultural nationalists differ in their views. In the literature,
cultural nationalists have traditionally been divided into two camps: liberal nationalists
on the one side, and non-liberal (sometimes called communitarian or conservative)
nationalists on the other. Liberal nationalists such as Tamir and Kymlicka acknowledge
the importance of cultural belonging to individual well-being, and they endorse a “right
to culture” for all nations, including national minorities. They believe that the importance
of cultural belonging can be justified on purely individualist grounds; in line with liberal
principles, cultural belonging is seen as valuable because it improves the lives of the
individual members of a cultural group, provides them with a meaningful context for
making decisions, and so on. Moreover, liberal nationalists reject all collectivist versions
of nationalism which value the well-being of the nation as a whole over the well-being of
individuals.46 On the other hand, Bhikhu Parekh says that those cultural nationalists such
as Roger Scruton, generally described as non-liberal or conservative nationalists, believe
that nationality precedes the individual and that nations form spiritual and moral
communities.47 Unlike their liberal counterparts, conservative nationalists believe that the
source of political legitimacy lies not in individual consent but in the national will of the
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people as a whole. Furthermore, Parekh tells us that conservative nationalists see the
nation as the highest moral and political principle and believe that the integrity of the
nation must be preserved at all costs, even at the expense of such fundamental liberal
principles as freedom of speech and individual rights.48 Non-liberal nationalists tend to
believe that a shared national identity must be grounded in a common communal
conception of the good life, while liberal nationalists hold that the basis for a common
national identity must be a thinner and more diffuse sense of belonging, typically
consisting of a shared history, territory, language, and common public institutions.49
Kymlicka says that this constitutes a clear difference between liberal nationalism and
most conservative and communitarian theories, which advocate for a ‘politics of the
common good’ and reject the liberal nationalist conception of the good as too thin.50
Non-liberal nationalists do not believe that social unity can be sustained by such weak
bonds as shared principles of justice, or a thinned-out liberal nationalist conception of
national identity.51 As such, cultural nationalists remain largely divided into liberal
nationalists and non-liberal nationalists.
David Miller is a cultural nationalist who attempts to combine the principle of
nationality with republican citizenship. Miller’s goal is to “reassert the underlying values
of republican citizenship as a form of politics and nationhood as a form of political
identity, while simultaneously thinking about how to best implement these values in the
contemporary world.”52 Miller places himself inside the liberal nationalist camp, but as
Parekh points out, “although Miller is a liberal and wants the nation to be constituted
along liberal lines, he realizes that [liberalism and nationalism] might conflict, and then
he tends to privilege nationalism. Since the national culture gives a society its distinct
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identity, he insists that the state cannot and ought not to be neutral with respect to it.”53 I
believe that Miller’s work makes an important contribution to the current debate within
cultural nationalism, and this project seeks to build on many of his arguments. In
Chapters 5 in particular, I argue that Miller’s work is firmly rooted in the philosophy of
Jean-Jacques Rousseau, the theoretical father of modern nationalism, and I suggest that
although Miller identifies as a liberal nationalist, his work points towards a distinct
republican strand of cultural nationalism. Chapter 6 focuses on drawing out the rather
stark differences between the liberal nationalism of Tamir and Kymlicka on the one hand,
and Rousseau’s and Miller’s republican nationalism on the other. My aim is to show that
republican nationalism forms a distinct theoretical strand of cultural nationalism and
constitutes a defensible alternative to liberal nationalism. In the next chapter, I consider
republican political theory and the origins of republican citizenship (a central aspect of
Miller’s philosophy), before taking an in-depth look at the works of Jean-Jacques
Rousseau, the first modern thinker to combine republicanism with nationalism.
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Chapter 2
2

Republican Political Theory
In this chapter I define republican political theory, trace its historical

development, and identify the various distinct strands of thought that exist within the
republican theoretical tradition. I then go on to juxtapose republicanism with liberalism,
and I attempt to show that republican political theory offers a unique perspective on some
of the most important concepts in political theory, including freedom and political
participation. Finally, I discuss a specific strand of republicanism, which I refer to as
cultural republicanism, that is rooted in the works of Jean-Jacques Rousseau and that has
been largely neglected in contemporary republican literature. Contrary to many modern
republicans, including Hannah Arendt, Philip Pettit, Quentin Skinner, and Iseult
Honohan, I suggest that “extra-political” cultural values and national identity constitute
an important component of every political community, including a republican one. As
noted in the previous chapter, Honohan and others use the term “pre-political” to refer to
everything that lies outside of the formal domain of politics (including culture, tradition,
customs, national identity, and so on). Although these concepts have pre-political origins,
they also change over time, and they continue to change after political institutions are
established. Because these concepts still play an important role in the lives of citizens, a
more accurate way to describe them is “extra-political,” a term which encompasses both
the pre-political roots and contemporary relevance of culture and national identity.54 I
argue that it is impossible to separate certain aspects of extra-political culture from
politics, and I believe that a properly functioning republic rests at least to some extent on
an extra-political sense of common culture and nationality. As discussed in the previous
chapter, there is no modern community with a public culture that is exclusively political
and based on a purely civic commitment to common political principles, practices, and
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institutions. Political communities cannot be reduced to a random association of
individuals held together solely by common principles, practices, and institutions;
instead, every modern nation constitutes an extra-political community with a cultural
“horizon” of shared historical experiences and cultural memories.55 I argue that within
the admittedly diverse republican tradition there exists a body of work that takes this
connection between extra-political culture and politics seriously. This strand of thought,
henceforth referred to as cultural republicanism, is best expressed in the philosophy of
Rousseau, but it is also clearly present in the works of contemporary republican thinker
David Miller. In the sections that follow, I take a closer look at this largely neglected
strand of republican theory.

2.1 What Is Republicanism?
In the book Civic Republicanism, Iseult Honohan provides perhaps the most
comprehensive overview of the republican political tradition as a whole, tracing its
historical development and identifying the most important debates within the tradition.
She defines republicanism as a middle ground between the extremes in the liberalism vs.
communitarianism debate. According to Honohan, republicanism has a richer
understanding of political community than mainstream liberalism, but is less
homogenising and exclusive than nationalism and other forms of communitarianism.56
Honohan explains:
Republican politics is concerned with enabling interdependent citizens to
deliberate on, and realise, the common goods of an historically evolving political
community, at least as much as promoting individual interests or protecting
individual rights. Emphasising responsibility for common goods sets
republicanism apart from libertarian theories centered on individual rights.
Emphasising that these common goods are politically realised sets republicanism
apart from neutralist liberal theories which exclude substantive questions of
values and the good life from politics. Finally, emphasising the political
construction of the political community distinguishes republicans from those
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communitarians who see politics as expressing the pre-political shared values of a
community.57
Honohan defines republicanism as a very specific variant of communitarianism, one
which values citizenship, or membership in a political community, as “distinct from other
kinds of community based on pre-political commonality, of, for example, race, religion or
culture.”58 I take issue with Honohan’s claim that any political community can be
understood in strictly political terms, and I argue that every political community,
including a republican community, has an undeniable cultural component that cannot be
separated from politics. I will return to this point later, but first it is important to
understand the historical development of republicanism, the key thinkers that shaped the
tradition, and the distinct theoretical strands of republicanism that have emerged over
time. Civic Republicanism offers valuable insight into these questions.
Honohan notes that there is a great amount of diversity within the republican
political tradition, but she identifies four key themes that she believes run throughout the
tradition as a whole: a) civic virtue and the common good, b) duty of participation, c)
freedom, and d) recognition. These themes are defined and prioritized differently by the
various republican thinkers, which has led to the development of distinct strands of
thought within the republican tradition. Honohan believes that there are two dominant
approaches within republican theory: 1) instrumental republicanism, which sees
citizenship as a means to the end of preserving individual freedom rather than a
relationship or activity with significant intrinsic value, and 2) strong republicanism,
which emphasizes the intrinsic value of participating in self-government and realizing
common goods as citizens.59 The differences between these two approaches represent the
main division within the contemporary republican tradition and form the foundations for
the central debate between contemporary republican thinkers.
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Republicanism traces its roots to Aristotle, who believed that human beings are by
nature political and that they could fully realize this nature only through political
participation and taking an active role in shaping the laws that govern them. Aristotle
sees political participation as intrinsically valuable for realizing man’s nature and
potential. Freedom is instrumentally valuable in that it makes meaningful political
participation possible, but the primary goal is virtue and the realization of one’s nature.
Aristotle’s philosophy influenced the strong republican strand within republican political
theory; strong republicans see political participation as an essential component of “the
good life,” and some go even further, arguing that participation in civic activity
constitutes the highest realization of human nature.60
From Aristotle, the roots of republican political theory can be traced to Roman
statesman Cicero, who was himself influenced by Aristotle. Cicero emphasized the
importance of the mixed regime, the separation of powers, and the rule of law. His work
formed the basis for the instrumental republican strand within republican political theory,
which holds that republican freedom is not achieved through active political participation
but through living under just laws and fair institutions instead of the arbitrary will of
others. Citizenship for Cicero was not synonymous with active participation; rather,
citizenship refers to the equal legal status that every citizen is entitled to by law.
Although Aristotle and Cicero are described as antecedents of republicanism rather than
full-fledged republicans themselves, Aristotle’s emphasis on political participation and
Cicero’s emphasis on the rule of law played a major role in shaping republicanism and
the main division within the tradition. Ultimately, both thinkers stress the importance of
virtue and the public good over material and individual interests, and both hold that
freedom is not a natural human condition that limits the power of government; rather,
meaningful freedom is only made possible by the laws of a political community.
Moreover, freedom is not the ultimate goal but merely a means to attaining virtue and
pursuing the common good.61
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The political ideas of Aristotle and Cicero were rediscovered during the
Renaissance by a number of prominent Florentine republican thinkers, including Niccolò
Machiavelli. Machiavelli was among the leaders of a republican revival that was seen as
a reaction against the Christian theological approach to politics that dominated Western
Europe following the fall of Rome. J.G.A. Pocock calls this “the Machiavellian moment,”
a point in time when the republicans of Florence rejected the Christian emphasis on
happiness in the afterlife and looked to restore the Roman ideals of citizenship and civic
virtue to politics.62 Machiavelli famously rejects conventional Christian morality and
advances a new kind of morality, one that subordinates religion to politics and stresses
the importance of preserving the republic and the liberty it offers in this life. Machiavelli
emphasizes the need for military dynamism in preserving the republic, and he prioritizes
military and civic service over active participation in politics. While there ought to be
equal opportunity for all virtuous citizens to govern, the rulers will always be made up of
the virtuous elite rather than all the citizens collectively. It is important to note that at the
same time as Machiavelli is writing in Florence, the Venetian republic was developing a
separate commercial model of republicanism that focused less on military might and
expansion and more on the importance of commerce. Ultimately, Machiavelli’s revival of
republican ideals, including the rule of law, the mixed regime, and civic virtue, coupled
with the development of the Venetian commercial model of republicanism, had a
profound impact on the republican ideas of James Harrington and the wider Atlantic
tradition.
By the 18th century we see two distinct strands of republicanism take shape:
participatory republicanism and representative/institutional republicanism. The
participatory model of republican political theory is expressed in the works of JeanJacques Rousseau, who proclaims that meaningful freedom consists in democratic selfrule; in living according to laws we make for ourselves through direct political
participation. In order to be free, man must substitute natural freedom (pre-political
freedom or license) for civil and moral freedom, and he must substitute his corrupting
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dependence on individuals for the reciprocal dependence on the community as a whole.
According to Rousseau, moral freedom entails learning to overcome one’s narrow selfinterest in order to see beyond it and understand the common good. In order to be free in
the most meaningful sense, man must attain a level of “self-mastery” and take an active
part in collective will formation. As Honohan points out, for Rousseau “real freedom is
won only in political society, and exercised by collectively self-governing citizens.”63
Rousseau sees the ideal republic as a small moral community of responsibility
modeled on the family, and it is necessarily limited in size and scope. As Honohan
explains, “in the republic citizens are bound by a strong sentiment of patriotism, love of
their country, which is grounded in their dependence on the social whole. This
identification lies between selfishness and altruism. It is modelled on the close face-toface relations of the family: love for the motherland, and fraternity between citizens.”64
The ideal republic ought to be small because freedom diminishes with increased size; a
larger community cannot be as participatory, which opens the door for corruption through
representation and institutionalism. According to Rousseau, in order to overcome their
narrow self-interests in the name of the common good, the citizens of a republic must
possess a sense of shared destiny, a common history and culture, and close emotional
attachments to each other.65 This is what makes willing generally possible, and what
allows the general will to take shape. The larger a republic becomes, the harder it is for
citizens to relate to each other and pursue the common good at the expense of individual
self-interest and factional group interests. Thus, Rousseau’s ideal republic is small,
independent, and defensive in character, though he readily acknowledges that this ideal is
difficult to achieve in practice. This is in sharp contrast to both Machiavelli’s militaristic
expansionist republic and Harrington’s large commercial republic. According to
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Rousseau’s participatory model of republicanism, citizens are only free when they are
active participants in their own self-government.66 In addition, Rousseau’s republicanism
has a strong cultural component that emphasizes the importance of patriotism, fraternity,
solidarity, and the love of nation. This cultural aspect to Rousseau’s republicanism is
crucial for locating his specific brand of republicanism within the wider republican
tradition, and in the following section I discuss in greater detail the various strands of
republican political theory before examining the nature of Rousseau’s cultural
republicanism.
The second major model of republicanism is the representative/institutional
model, which was greatly influenced by Harrington and Venetian commercial
republicanism. Some of the American founding fathers, including James Madison, pick
up on this line of thought and argue that republican freedom should be defined in terms of
the security of life, liberty, and property, to be protected by a representative form of
government and the constitutional separation of powers. This particular understanding of
republican freedom allows republics to expand far beyond Rousseau’s small moral
community of responsibility, and the participatory vs. representative divide was a central
issue in the eighteenth century debate between the federalists and anti-federalists in the
newly independent American state, with the anti-federalists defending a small
participatory republic and the federalists favoring a large representative state.67 This same
divide is still at the heart of the debate between republican thinkers today, and keeping
these issues in mind will help us to identify and delineate the various distinct strands
within contemporary republican thought.

2.2 Republicanisms
Following the French Revolution, some argued that the republican ideas of
thinkers like Rousseau contributed to the revolution’s excesses, and many abandoned
republican political theory in favor of liberalism, a theoretical framework inspired by the
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writings of John Locke. During the twentieth century another republican revival takes
place in response to the perceived dominance of liberalism. The two strands of
republicanism most represented in contemporary republican literature are instrumental
republicanism and strong republicanism. For instrumental republicans, citizenship is seen
as a means of preserving individual freedom and not a relationship or activity with
intrinsic value. Strong republicans stress the intrinsic value of participating in selfgovernment and realizing common goods as citizens. Honohan identifies Hannah Arendt
and Charles Taylor as the most prominent contemporary proponents of strong
republicanism. As Honohan explains:
Reacting to totalitarianism and neutralist liberalism, [Arendt and Taylor] stress
the expressive dimension of politics, in which people seek not only to be treated
as legal and political equals, but to have the value of their projects and identities
confirmed in public. Arendt and Taylor justify the revaluation of political action
in three dimensions. They draw attention to the ways in which self-realisation
requires public recognition, they see freedom in positive terms as realised in
political action, and they reaffirm the role of politics in realising shared goods.68
Arendt argues that individual freedom and recognition can only be achieved through
political participation because political activity constitutes the highest expression of
human liberty. She stresses the importance of political action within a vibrant public
space, and she advocates for preserving the less structured area of action and debate that
forms the context within which the state acts and which has been eroded in contemporary
society. Unlike Rousseau, she rejects consensus-based politics and believes that the
political community should not be based on the moral sentiments. According to Arendt,
citizens should not be seen as an extended family but as independent individuals who
work together as colleagues. Citizens who share a common public space become a
political community; this community is not bound by a common identity or shared
cultural values, but rather by the strictly political concerns that arise from living in a
common world and participating in a shared public realm. Arendt disagrees with
Rousseau’s claims that citizens living together within a political community form a
common will, and she believes that rather than becoming part of a larger whole each
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citizen interacts independently with other citizens within the public space. As Honohan
points out, “those who share a public realm become a political community, in which
citizens are bound, not by common identity or shared cultural values, but by concerns
arising from living in a common world and by participation in a common public realm.
Against Rousseau’s claims, they do not come to form a common will, but face common
concerns and a common world.”69 I will challenge the assumption that citizens of a
political community need not be bound by a common identity and shared cultural values
later on in this chapter. Honohan notes that some problems with Arendt’s conception of
the political community include the fact that she overvalues political life by portraying it
as the highest fulfillment of human nature, and the fact that she assumes that since
political participation is an intrinsic good, it cannot also be considered an instrumental
good. In addition, she has an individualistic conception of political recognition and she
neglects the social and cultural dimensions of recognition.70
Charles Taylor considers himself to be a liberal perfectionist who wants to
promote the goods of freedom and self-rule in conformity with rights founded on
equality. Taylor sees modern civic republicanism as a specific strand of liberalism that
values participation in collective self-government as well as the realization of common
goods and individual freedom. Honohan notes that for Taylor, “freedom is a matter of
realising ourselves according to our most central purposes, not the absence of
interference. Thus politics is an arena for self-expression and public recognition of
identity and values, and not just a framework for maintaining order and just
distribution.”71 Taylor believes that social practices and the community that sustains them
are not merely instrumental to but also constitutive of individual identity. Taylor
addresses the problems in some of Arendt’s work by arguing that political participation
has both intrinsic and instrumental value; participation plays a role in the formation of an
individual’s identity, and it also provides an opportunity to achieve other important ends,
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such as preserving liberty within the political community. Due to the fact that culture
sustains identity and meanings for individuals, Taylor unlike Arendt believes that culture
should be given expression in politics. But unlike Rousseau, Taylor is not interested in
promoting a common national culture; instead, he advocates multiculturalism, stressing
that equal rights for individuals are not in themselves enough to satisfy the need for
cultural recognition. Taylor argues that the political community must at times abandon
neutrality in order to accommodate the claims of culture, and he believes that liberals
themselves have a particular vision of the good life which puts special value on freedom
and autonomy. Taylor argues that special value should also be given to recognition,
including the recognition of culture, because culture and other categories such as race and
gender play an important part in the formation of each individual’s identity. Taylor
criticizes what has been alternatively referred to as “negative freedom” or “freedom as
non-interference” by claiming that doing whatever one wants as long as that action does
not conflict with the law does not necessarily equate to freedom in the proper sense. For
instance, an alcoholic may be at liberty to legally buy alcohol and feed his addiction in
this way, but that does not mean that he is properly free. In fact, one could say that the
alcoholic is a slave to his addiction and the opposite of free. For Taylor and most strong
republicans, freedom presupposes the ability to act according to what one understands to
be their most important purposes, and this is best achieved through active participation in
the political community.72
Strong republicanism can be broadly defined as a political philosophy focused on
the idea of promoting a specific conception of the good life consisting in political
participation and civic virtue, as well as on fighting any sort of corruption that would
undermine these values. For strong republicans, civic virtue and active political
participation should be considered public goods which are intrinsically valuable for
human flourishing. Strong republicans claim that their understanding of civic virtue and
political participation is shared by the classical republican tradition; political freedom
requires citizens to share in the good life by embracing the public goods of civic virtue
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and active political participation. This conception defines freedom in terms of realization
rather than opportunity. Stemming from Rousseau’s belief that freedom lies in obeying
laws one makes for oneself, political participation is understood as the highest expression
of human freedom. Political freedom means realizing our highest purposes and attaining
recognition through politics, as well as realizing common projects and shared common
goods among citizens.73
The other major strand of contemporary republicanism is instrumental
republicanism, expressed in the works of Quentin Skinner, Philip Pettit, and Frank
Lovett, among others. Instrumental republicans argue that achieving republican freedom
does not require citizens to become anything in particular (self-realization) or take an
active part in creating the laws that govern them. While civic virtue and political
participation are instrumentally valuable for preserving liberty (the price of freedom is
eternal vigilance), Pettit argues that republican freedom is not properly defined as selfmastery but as “freedom from domination.” In an article entitled Neo-republicanism, coauthored with Frank Lovett, Pettit defines his neo-republicanism as a contemporary
public philosophy rooted in the classical republican tradition.74 According to Pettit and
Lovett, the three key concepts of neo-republicanism are:
First and most important is the conception of a free person as one who does not
live under the arbitrary will or domination of others. Second is the associated
conception of a free state as one that attempts to promote the freedom of its
citizens without itself coming to dominate them. And third is the conception of
good citizenship as consisting in a vigilant commitment to preserving the state in
its distinctive role as an undominating protector against domination. The aim of
the neorepublican research program is to rethink issues of legitimacy and
democracy, welfare and justice, public policy and institutional design, from
within the framework that these basic ideas provide.75
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Instrumental republicans argue that citizenship does not require direct participation or
expressed consent by the citizen body, but rather options for contestation (voicing
disagreement and criticism of the government). Instrumental republicans advocate a
constitution that establishes the separation of powers and the rule of law, and defines
good citizenship as a commitment to preserving the state in its role as an undominating
protector against domination. While the separation of powers and the rule of law have
been appropriated by the liberal theoretical framework, Pettit and other instrumental
republicans claim that their conception of citizenship is what makes their approach
distinctly republican.
Instrumental republicans claim to espouse a unique understanding of freedom that
sets them apart from both liberals and strong republicans. According to Pettit and Lovett,
strong republicans define freedom in terms of self-mastery and realization (freedom as
self-mastery, FSM), while liberals define freedom as the absence of direct interference by
outside forces on their ability to make free choices (freedom as non-interference, FNI).76
By contrast, or so it is claimed, instrumental republicans define freedom as the absence of
arbitrary power, whether it is actually exercised or not (freedom as non-domination,
FND).77 Thus, even when one’s choices are not interfered with directly, to be dependent
on the arbitrary power of another at any time is to lack freedom in the proper sense. For
instance, a slave with a benevolent master who does not interfere with the slave’s actions
directly may be considered free according to FNI, but the very fact that the arbitrary
power of master over slave exists in the first place would mean that the slave is not free
according to the standards of FND. While proponents of FNI see all laws as a form
restraint on freedom, proponents of FND hold that laws that are not arbitrary but reflect
the will of the people and are made in their interest do not restrain freedom but enlarge it.
This chapter will engage with four different conceptions of freedom, including the
aforementioned FSM, FNI, and FND, but also freedom as political autonomy or FPA,
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which Honohan identifies as the conception of freedom preferred by civic humanists like
her.78 The following table sums up the differences between these four conceptions:
Table 1: Four Conceptions of Freedom
Freedom as
Noninterference
(FNI)

Freedom as
Nondomination
(FND)

Freedom as
Political
Autonomy
(FPA)

Freedom as
Self-mastery
(FSM)

Freedom is the
absence of direct
interference by
outside forces
on one’s ability
to make free
choices
(espoused by
libertarians and
some liberals).

Freedom is the
absence of
arbitrary power,
whether it is
actually
exercised or
not. Even when
our choices are
not interfered
with directly, to
be dependent
on the arbitrary
power of
another at any
time is to lack
freedom in the
proper sense
(espoused by
instrumental
republicans like
Pettit).

Freedom
demands more
than simply
obeying laws
and being free
from
domination;
freedom
demands that
citizens have a
direct say in
shaping the
laws that
govern them
(espoused by
civic humanists
like Honohan).

Freedom requires
the kind of
participation
endorsed by
FPA, but
freedom also
requires selfmastery:
overcoming mere
appetites and
narrow selfinterests/factional
interests for the
common good.
FSM creates new
potentialities: it
allows citizens to
achieve their full
potential and
attain certain
goods as a
community that
they could not
attain
individually
(espoused by
cultural
republicans like
Rousseau).
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As the table demonstrates, treating FNI, FND, FPA, and FSM as four distinct conceptions
of freedom can be confusing. The four concepts can be further separated according to
Isaiah Berlin’s two concepts of liberty thesis, with FNI and FND classified as having a
negative conception of freedom (freedom from), and FPA and FSM classified as
embracing a positive conception of freedom (freedom to). As far back as 1967 Gerard
MacCallum tried to simplify such distinctions by arguing that discussions of freedom
always have a triadic relation and can be represented simply as “agent ˃ obstacle ˃ goal.”
Put another way, the [agent] is free from [obstacle] to do or be [goal]. As such, freedom is
always from something and to something, so it does not make sense to think of freedom
as being either positive or negative. MacCallum argues that both the “positive” and
“negative” concepts actually share the same concept of freedom, stating that “it would be
far better to insist that the same concept of freedom is operating throughout, and that the
differences, rather than being about what freedom is, are for example about what persons
are, and what can count as an obstacle to or an interference with the freedom of persons
so conceived.”79 MacCallum believes that the real debate is not about what “freedom”
means, but about the true identity of the agent whose freedom is being considered (is it
the individual, or the community, or the nation?), and what counts as an obstacle to our
freedom (which will depend on our definition of the agent). MacCallum’s formula
appears to simplify the concept of freedom and remove the confusing distinctions that
many theorists rely on, and yet “despite the utility of MacCallum's triadic formula and its
strong influence on analytic philosophers, however, Berlin's distinction continues to
dominate mainstream discussions about the meaning of political and social freedom.”80
As such, most of the contemporary theorists considered in this chapter continue to use the
language of positive and negative liberty, and they intentionally compare their own
conceptions of freedom to either FNI, FND, FPA, or FSM. For the sake of clarity and in
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order to engage with their arguments on their own terms, I will stick to the classifications
that they themselves are using.
Instrumental republicans like Pettit reject the view that political participation and
civic virtue are intrinsically valuable aspects of a particular vision of the good life and
consider them to be merely instrumentally valuable for securing and preserving political
liberty, understood as independence from arbitrary rule. FND does not require the
realization of any particular purpose on the part of the citizen; it requires only the absence
of something, namely, the absence of dependence on arbitrary power or domination. This
is different from “positive” conceptions of freedom, which hold that freedom in the
proper sense can only be achieved through the realization of certain purposes (selfrealization). Honohan separates the positive freedom of a specific type of strong
republicanism that she refers to as “civic humanism” from freedom as self-mastery; she
claims that civic humanists like her believe in freedom as political autonomy (FPA), and
she distinguishes FPA from what she considers to be the “more communitarian”
understanding of freedom embodied in the works of Rousseau (freedom as self-mastery,
FSM). I want to point out that there is no inherent connection between communitarianism
and FSM, and although Honohan uses this comparison in an attempt to differentiate her
own view from FSM, trying to equate the two leads to more confusion. Having said that,
Honohan argues that autonomy cannot be fully realized in politics, but neither can it be
fully realized outside of politics. For this reason, autonomy needs a political expression,
and personal autonomy must extend to political autonomy. FPA requires citizens who are
engaged in politics to follow purposes that they can endorse as their own, in the sense
that they have a real say in shaping them. Political participation is a necessary aspect of
freedom; FPA demands more than simply obeying laws and being free from domination,
it requires citizens to have a direct say in shaping those laws.81 As Michael Sandel points
out, “I am free insofar as I am a member of a political community that controls its own
fate and is a participant in the decisions that govern its affairs… the republican sees
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liberty as internally connected to self-government and the civic virtues that sustain it.”82
Honohan juxtaposes FPA with Rousseau’s understanding of freedom as self-mastery,
claiming that while FPA requires citizens to contribute to shaping collective social
practices, it does not follow Rousseau in his attempt to extend autonomy to the level of
society by positing a unitary, corporate subject. According to Honohan:
If participation and freedom are to be connected, it must be in some way that
maintains personal freedom in individual lives while allowing for collective selfgovernment. To leave room for personal freedom, a more positive conception of
freedom cannot be based on a fixed account of human nature, or require citizens
to act according to a pre-determined ranking of goals and purposes. It cannot
define political activity as the highest good of a human life, nor assume that there
is a unitary common good of society. If autonomy is a matter of acting according
to goals a person can endorse, someone cannot be ‘forced to be autonomous’ by
being coerced into behaving in a certain way, though he may perhaps be
prevented from acting in ways that would further reduce his autonomy in the
future. Political equality is central to the idea of freedom as participation in
collective self-government.83
Rousseau’s vision of freedom, which he calls civil and moral freedom, differs from FPA
because it requires self-mastery, and because it can only be achieved within a political
community with a shared national identity and conception of the good life. This
conception of the good represents a shared moral consensus between citizens, one that is
shaped by the national culture and held up as the ideal that the society should strive for.
As such, citizens are guided towards pursuing this good through laws, mores, and a
comprehensive moral education.
The debate between instrumental republicans and strong republicans is an ongoing one, with both sides claiming to represent the legacy of the classical republican
tradition. In his book Republicanism: A Theory of Freedom and Government, Pettit
develops his instrumental vision of republicanism and defines instrumental republicanism
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as the public philosophy that embodies the classical republican tradition.84 In so doing, he
almost completely ignores the important contributions that thinkers like Aristotle and
Rousseau have made to republican political theory, and many strong republicans take
serious issue with his claims. The main debate within contemporary republican theory
has been taking place between instrumental republicans like Pettit and those strong
republicans like Honohan who refer to themselves as civic humanists, but who also tend
to dismiss what they consider to be “more communitarian” versions of strong
republicanism. Nevertheless, I contend that along with instrumental republicanism and
civic humanism there exists another strand of republican theory that needs to be
considered more carefully; I am referring to cultural republicanism, a distinct strand of
republican theory rooted in the works of Rousseau. Cultural republicanism is the least
prominently represented in the literature, and it is often dismissed by both instrumental
republicans and civic humanists for being dependent on the existence of a shared extrapolitical culture. In Chapter 3 I draw out this cultural strand of republican political theory,
but first I take a closer look at the debate between republicanism and liberalism,
including the liberal critique of republicanism. By considering how the different strands
of republicanism compare to the liberal theoretical framework we will gain a better
understanding of what each unique strand has to offer, and how they ultimately compare
to each other.

2.3 The Republicanism vs. Liberalism Debate
As previously mentioned, instrumental republicans such as Skinner, Lovett, and
Pettit believe that their version of republicanism most closely represents the classical
republican tradition, and they tend to dismiss thinkers like Aristotle, Rousseau, Arendt,
and Taylor as proponents of civic humanism, a classification that they believe is distinct
from republicanism. Pettit says that FNI, which he claims is the dominant liberal
conception of freedom, was first developed by Thomas Hobbes. Pettit claims that for
Hobbes freedom is the absence of interference, and this type of freedom can be
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maximized even in conditions of extreme domination. Thus, though a slave might be
dependent on the arbitrary power of his master, as long as the master is benevolent and
does not interfere directly with the actions of the slave, the slave is free. On this view,
laws are seen as interferences with liberty, but they are interferences which exist to
prevent more potential interferences by other parties. Laws are a necessary evil; law is
seen as a restriction on freedom, but a restriction that is preferable to the alternative of
anarchy. As such, freedom exists only inside the realm where law does not intrude.85
Pettit believes that this conception of freedom lost prominence in the 18th century as the
republican conception of freedom as non-domination gained in popularity (Pettit
classifies Harrington and Locke as proponents of FND), but that FNI was successfully
revived again by William Paley and Jeremy Bentham. Pettit argues that FNI has
continued to be the dominant conception of freedom ever since, and it is only now being
challenged once again by those seeking to revive the republican concept of FND.86 Pettit
defines non-domination as the condition under which individuals live in the presence of
others but at the mercy of none, and he claims that FND constitutes the “supreme
political value” of the republican tradition.87 FND allows citizens to live without
uncertainty about arbitrary interference in their lives and protects citizens from
subordination and undue influence by the rich and powerful. Pettit and virtually all
republican thinkers believe that in order to make meaningful freedom possible there have
to be limits on material inequality in a republican society; broadly speaking, republicans
tend to accept Rousseau’s maxim that “no citizen should be so rich as to be capable of
buying another citizen, and none so poor that he is forced to sell himself.”88 However,
republican thinkers interpret this maxim in different ways, and more will be said about
Rousseau’s own views on the limits of material inequality in Chapter 3. For now it is
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important to note that Pettit sees FND as an instrumental primary good, or something that
every individual has an instrumental reason to want regardless of what else they may
want. According to Pettit, it is not enough to rely on the reciprocity of individuals as this
may lead to unequal results; FND is a political goal that the state should actively advance
for all of its citizens. In his defense of FND, Pettit dismisses the concept of freedom as
self-mastery (FSM). He argues that the participatory ideal of active citizenship is not
feasible in the modern world, and he claims that the prospect of each citizen being subject
to the will of all is “scarcely attractive.”89 As such, the state must not seek to actively
promote FSM because FND is enough. Pettit and other instrumental republicans maintain
that FND is a superior conception of freedom to both the “liberal” FNI and the various
conceptions of freedom promoted by strong republicans (civic humanists and cultural
republicans). Instrumental republicans believe that FND represents the conception of
freedom of the classical republican tradition, but this claim faces criticism not only from
other republicans, but also from liberals.
Liberal critics of republicanism such as Robert E. Goodin and Alan Patten
consider instrumental republicans like Skinner and Pettit to be revisionists of
republicanism, and they argue that it is debatable whether instrumental republicanism is
the appropriate interpretation of the classical republican tradition. Goodin’s first major
criticism is that there is no meaningful disagreement between the instrumental
republicanism of Skinner and Pettit and the liberalism of someone like John Rawls; in
fact, Rawls believed that instrumental republicanism was perfectly compatible with his
own form of liberalism. Furthermore, Goodin claims that FND is not a unique conception
of liberty because this allegedly “liberal” conception of liberty as non-interference taken
to its logical conclusion of securing FNI for the future would amount to essentially the
same thing as FND.90 While some liberal theorists may have been negligent in their
theoretical formulation of FNI, in practice the two conceptions of liberty amount to the
same thing: the separation of powers, the rule of law, and civic virtue. Goodin’s second
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criticism is that instrumental republicanism does not offer a different vision of citizenship
and public service from liberalism. Republicanism is not unique in its call for more
deliberation, as non-republican arguments for more deliberation have been made by a
number of thinkers, including Rawls and Jurgen Habermas. In fact, Rawlsian liberalism
places special emphasis on the importance of deliberation and civic virtue for preserving
a free liberal society. Although instrumental republicans and liberals may make different
claims about the origins of rights, or the relationship between liberty and law, according
to Goodin it all amounts to the same thing in practice. Rawlsian liberalism does not
appeal to pre-political rights that individuals posses in the state of nature, but rights that
come out of a democratic community concerned with fairness. As such, laws are
grounded in fairness and aim to protect rights and liberties, not restrain them in the
Hobbesian sense.91
Goodin ultimately concludes that there is no meaningful difference between
Enlightenment liberalism and the instrumental (Goodin calls it “liberal”) republicanism
of someone like Skinner and Pettit (autonomous individuals with natural rights working
together for common interests), and he sees no advantage in employing the language of
republicanism instead of the established terminology of liberalism to advocate what
amounts to the same thing in practice. At the same time, he argues that the “more
communitarian” strands of republicanism “prioritize the public over the private as part of
their program of deprioritizing rights and restoring public duty and responsibility to the
center of the political stage” and maintain that individual agency is a function of
collective identity, which Goodin believes are ideas that should be dismissed as
dangerous.92 While both liberals and instrumental republicans believe that political
decisions are shaped and reshaped by public conversation and are not extra-political,
cultural republicans like Rousseau believe in the possibility of an extra-political ethical
consensus. Ultimately, Goodin argues that this “communitarian” approach is not feasible
in modern heterogeneous and pluralist political communities, arguing that while
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instrumental republicanism is compatible with and essentially indistinct from liberalism,
“communitarian” forms of republicanism ought to be rejected outright. Goodin is
applying the label “communitarian” to refer to strong republicans, including civic
humanists and cultural republicans. Others like Alan Patten do the same thing, but I do
not think that the “communitarian” label is particularly useful in this context
(communitarianism is distinct from republicanism), and I will continue to use
instrumental republicanism, civic humanism, and cultural republicanism to refer to these
three distinct strands of republican theory.
Alan Patten concurs with Goodin that there are no meaningful differences
between the instrumental republicanism of someone like Skinner and contemporary
liberalism. He claims that the liberal critique of republicanism, which holds that
republicanism ignores the inherent plurality of human ends and values by presuming that
there is some single good that is good for everyone, has largely succeeded. However,
today we have revisionist republicans such as Skinner and Pettit who embrace “negative”
liberty but hold that active citizenship is an instrumental good that contributes to the
preservation of a free society.93 While he maintains that the instrumental republican
critique of liberalism fails because it is in fact perfectly compatible with contemporary
liberalism (FNI and FND amount to the same thing, political participation and civic
virtue are important for liberals as well as republicans, and so on), Patten believes that
real differences do exist between liberalism and the “communitarian” republicans such as
Taylor, but he asserts that liberals are right to reject the arguments of strong republicans.
Taylor believes that liberals fail to recognize that “patriotism” is a condition for the
preservation of a free society. Furthermore, as Patten observes, “Taylor's point seems to
be that the maintenance of liberty requires that individuals view citizenship not merely in
instrumental terms, but as a good in itself, which is shared with others, and which is
integral to their identities and self-understandings.”94 Nonetheless, Patten claims that
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Taylor’s view is still instrumental as he defends the importance of public service and
civic virtue for society, but does not defend citizenship as an integral part of the good life.
Patten also claims that while a liberal patriotism (sometimes referred to as constitutional
patriotism) may play an important role for maintaining a free society, a non-liberal
patriotism tied to particular historical institutions, traditions, culture, language, and/or
ethnicity (extra-political factors) may in fact serve causes that threaten liberty.95 As such,
Patten believes that liberals should resist claims that some type of non-liberal patriotism
is required for preserving freedom as this would amount to appeasing injustice in the
name of culture, and deprioritizing the right over the good.96
Although instrumental republicans like Pettit may answer such criticisms by
repeating their claim that FND is a richer conception of freedom than FNI, and by
arguing that republican citizenship and civic virtue require more contestation than
currently exists in contemporary liberal democracies, it is questionable whether such
responses justify the existence of instrumental republicanism as a theoretical framework
separate from liberalism, or whether instrumental republicanism amounts to a restatement
of values that fit within the existing liberal framework. And while it can be argued that
instrumental republicanism appears to be perfectly compatible with liberalism, strong
republicans like Honohan, Taylor, and David Miller challenge the Rawlsian concept of
reasonable pluralism, which states that comprehensive doctrines (moral, religious, and so
on) about constitutional essentials and basic rights should be kept out of public
deliberation. This is because certain comprehensive doctrines, cultural attachments, and
religious beliefs are constitutive of an individual’s identity, and excluding such
fundamental beliefs from deliberation would not reduce conflict in society but rather
alienate the individuals in question from society as a whole by denying political
expressions to their most cherished thoughts and beliefs. Taylor would argue that the
state must at times abandon neutrality in order to address pressing cultural claims; respect
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for individual rights is not enough if these rights do not take into account cultural
recognition and other factors that may be constitutive of an individual’s identity. On this
view, liberty in the proper sense requires more than the absence of restraint; liberty
requires the realization of one’s highest purposes and the political recognition of one’s
fundamental thoughts and beliefs. But as I hinted at earlier, among the strong republicans
there remains a further distinction between civic humanists like Arendt, Taylor, and
Honohan on the one hand, and cultural republicans like Rousseau on the other. In the
following section I take a closer look at this distinction.

2.4 Strong Republicans: Civic Humanism vs. Cultural
Republicanism
I have addressed the distinction between instrumental republicanism on the one
hand and strong republicanism (civic humanism and cultural republicanism) on the other.
I will now contrast the civic humanism of Iseult Honohan with what she considers to be a
“more communitarian” version of republicanism, and one which she rejects. This version
is best expressed in the works of Rousseau and I refer to it as cultural republicanism. In
explaining her own understanding of republican political autonomy, Honohan claims that
“the substance of republican politics is based on interdependence (rather than
commonality), is created in deliberation (not pre-politically), emerges in multiple publics
to which all can contribute, and is not definitive but open to change.”97 In so doing, she
tries to distinguish her own conception of republicanism from the republicanism of
Rousseau, who stresses the importance of establishing a moral community of citizens
with a shared conception of the public good and a common national identity and culture
(Honohan refers to this as “pre-political” culture, which she differentiates from civic
culture formed through the political process alone. I use “extra-political” instead).
Honohan suggests that on the republican view, cultural claims, much like moral claims,
must be subject to debate and deliberation; not all identities and cultures receive equal
political recognition, as not all cultures and identities are equally conducive of personal
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autonomy. Republican recognition refers to individuals gaining a civic or political
identity as politically autonomous citizens deliberating on the conditions of their common
life. As such, political activity constitutes an important part of the individual’s identity.
However, Honohan argues that:
[The] contemporary articulation of republican politics does not mean directly
establishing the shared values of an existing cultural community, since the values
embodied are subject to the filter of deliberation, are politically constituted and
contestable. Since the republic does not embody pre-political cultural values,
republican recognition should be distinguished from a communitarian
establishment of a package of shared values or conceptions of the good life.”98
A cultural republican like Rousseau would agree with Honohan that cultural and moral
claims are subject to debate and deliberation, and that they are contestable. However,
cultural republicans do believe that every republic embodies extra-political elements
(national identity and culture, traditions and customs, language, and so on) and that we
can and should embrace a democratic and moral consensus in the form of a shared
package of values and conceptions of the public good.
Referring back to the previous chapter, cultural republicans like Rousseau join
with cultural nationalists in arguing that there is no such thing as a purely political
culture, and that it is impossible to clearly separate each nation’s distinct extra-political
cultural inheritance from politics. This does not mean that we do not collectively shape
and reshape that cultural inheritance over time through debate and deliberation, but this
debate always takes place within the particular cultural context that we have inherited.99
Honohan believes that citizens can create an independent political culture through civic
institutions and through the act of participation and deliberation, a political culture that
does not embody extra-political culture, identity, beliefs, traditions, and customs of the
society in question. In the previous chapter we established that although all collective
identities are in a constant process of development and interpretation, a purely civic
community with an exclusively political culture is impossible. Every political community
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consists of a contingent inheritance of distinctive experiences and cultural memories that
represent an inseparable aspect of its collective identity. Nations such as the United
States, Canada, and France are not merely voluntary associations made up of individuals
who are interested in upholding certain political principles, or whose only commonality
lies in their active participation in politics. Political loyalty cannot be reduced to a
random association of individuals held together exclusively by particular political values,
institutions, and practices because every nation constitutes an extra-political community
with a cultural “horizon” of shared historical experiences and cultural memories.100 Every
community has its own unique cultural inheritance, which means that the political
community is always to some extent a product of extra-political culture and it cannot be
culturally and linguistically neutral. Cultural republicans accept David Miller’s assertion
that a properly functioning political community rests upon an extra-political sense of
common culture and nationality. According to Miller, common nationality is significant
because:
It provides the wherewithal for a common culture against whose background
people can make more individual decisions about how to lead their lives; it
provides the setting in which ideas of social justice can be pursued, particularly
ideas that require us to treat our individual talents as to some degree a ‘common
asset’, to use Rawls’s phrase; and it helps to foster the mutual understanding and
trust that makes democratic citizenship possible.101
Will Kymlicka also emphasizes the importance of cultural belonging to individual wellbeing, and he conceives of the national political community as a “societal culture.”
According to Kymlicka, a societal culture “provides its members with meaningful ways
of life across the full range of human activities, including social, educational, religious,
recreational, and economic life, encompassing both public and private spheres. These
cultures tend to be territorially concentrated, and based on a shared language.”102 The
type of culture that Miller and Kymlicka are referring to is more than a purely civic
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culture formed solely through political institutions, active citizenship, and deliberation.
They recognize that the common culture of each political community has important extrapolitical celements, such as a shared language, cultural values, customs, and traditions,
and that these components play a significant role in shaping the political culture of each
community. As such, it is impossible to say where extra-political culture ends and where
political culture begins, as Honohan attempts to do. Furthermore, although cultural
republicans accept that extra-political cultural values and shared conceptions of the good
are subject to debate and revision as part of the deliberative process, cultural republicans
argue that there is still assumed to exist at any given time a substantive consensus on
what constitutes the cultural values of society and its conception of the public good. For
cultural republicans, the role of the political community is not to keep these values and
conceptions of the good out of politics; rather, the community is justified in actively
promoting them through public institutions and policies. This view will be addressed in
greater detail in Chapters 5 and 6 as part of my discussion of republican nationalism, a
concept that combines cultural republicanism and nationalism. For now, it is enough to
note the difference between Honohan’s attempt to separate extra-political culture and
nationality from the political process, and the cultural republican view that this cannot be
done.
Honohan also points out that the republican conception of recognition places
considerable importance on the attitudes, relationships and mutual obligations between
citizens, as opposed to the liberal tendency to emphasize the contractarian agreement on
common procedures, institutions, and a pragmatic coexistence.103 Honohan believes that
while liberals take an association of strangers and communitarians take the family as the
model for the political community, republicans see their fellow citizens as colleagues;
separate, diverse, and relatively distant individuals whose involuntary interdependence
creates common concerns and the possibility of addressing them together (the colleagues
model of citizenship). As Honohan notes, “on this analogy citizens may be relatively
distant and different from one another, have no close emotional engagement, but yet
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recognise the commitments entailed in a valuable relationship, thicker than the civility
between strangers but of a kind different from friends and family.”104 Honohan considers
this particular conception of citizenship to be quintessentially republican, as opposed to
liberal or communitarian. However, we know that some of the thinkers who most
profoundly influenced republicanism, including Aristotle and Rousseau, conceived of
citizenship as more than a relationship between colleagues; for Aristotle, the relationship
between citizens was based on friendship, and for Rousseau it was modeled on the family.
Thus, it appears that Honohan commits the same error as Pettit; in order to paint
republicanism as a whole in a particular light, she discounts the views of some of the
most important theorists in the tradition. Rousseau would accuse Honohan of neglecting
the importance of sentiments in tying the political community together, sentiments which
are a prerequisite for establishing a society in which citizens are capable of overcoming
their narrow self-interest in the name of the common good.
Honohan believes in promoting a political patriotism over what she calls ethnic
and cultural nationalism. She claims that the love of country must be synonymous with
the love of liberty attained through the republic, because republicans are concerned with
self-determining and self-governing citizens, not with nations or cultures. She argues that
culture can be taken into account in politics without making a common national culture
the basis of a political community, and she sees nationalism as a form of
communitarianism that is based on a “pre-political” (extra-political) identity. Whereas
cultural nationality is based on a perceived commonality of extra-political culture or
history, for Honohan republican citizenship is based not on extra-political commonality
but on the political recognition of multiply generated independencies, and on the
interaction that takes place within the framework of a state. Honohan says that in a
republican state there are no cultural restrictions on membership, and if there are common
cultural values they are the outcome of political interaction, provisionally embodied and
open to change. According to Honohan:
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The republican conception of citizenship outlined here is closer to that of a liberal
nationality, in which citizenship is defined in terms of membership of a shared
public culture, rather than a deeper culture or ethnicity. But it is still distinct from
it, since republican citizenship rests fundamentally on the possibility of selfgovernment of those who share a common fate rather than on specifically
articulated public values.105
In stark contrast to Honohan’s view, cultural republicans make a common national
identity and culture the basis of the political community (as is evident in Rousseau’s
Constitution for Corsica and Government of Poland), and they hold that while loving
liberty and the laws is important, the love of country must also be synonymous with the
love of nation. Honohan acknowledges that it has been argued that, in practice,
individuals will recognize the importance of republican citizenship only if it is rooted in
some type of common culture. Essentially, “the argument is that in large modern states,
in which people cannot personally identify with others, citizens’ virtue, or active
participation, supporting the common good and accepting the degree of redistribution
which republican politics requires, depends on their being able to share certain sentiments
and identity, or at least to give priority to a shared public culture.”106 On this account, the
nation is the necessary foundation for the republican community. Miller believes that
“nationality gives people the common identity that makes it possible for them to conceive
of shaping their world together.”107 In this regard, Miller’s view is in line with
Rousseau’s, who also believes that only a common national identity can create the bonds
necessary for establishing a community of virtuous republican citizens capable of seeing
beyond their individual interests and embracing the common good. For Rousseau, the
common good consists of actively promoting the kind of civic virtue and citizen character
that ensures the development of a spirit of fraternity, solidarity, and reciprocity, which is
made possible only by the strong social bonds of a national community.
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Nevertheless, Honohan argues against rooting republican citizenship in a common
culture and nationality because modern nations are by and large not ethnically
homogeneous nation-states. As we live in a diverse and pluralistic world, Honohan
believes that giving precedence to an existing common public culture will be
advantageous for some and exclusive or even oppressive to others. It is important to note,
however, that while cultural republicans clearly root republican citizenship in a common
national culture, they are not actually advocating for the establishment of ethnically
homogeneous nation-states that are open only to members of one particular ethnicity or
culture. What they want is the promotion of a shared national culture that includes all of
the diverse ethnicities and subcultures which already exist within the modern state, and
yet still forms an encompassing national identity that all citizens can embrace. While
citizens may belong to various ethnic, cultural, or territorial groups, and while they
should be free to maintain those ties, they should also be willing to embrace a common
national culture that transcends sectional identities and unites the citizens into a single
national community (for more on this, see Chapters 5 and 6). Honohan maintains that
republican solidarity should be understood as a commitment to the people with whom we
are interdependent within the political community, and that it should not be defined in
terms of either liberal institutions and political principles, or loyalty to a nation, whether
ethnic, cultural, or civic. According to Honohan, “sharing a common fate may often be
enough to motivate support for policies which aim at the common good without there
needing to be a deeper sense of belonging together, which a shared national identity
would involve.”108
Moreover, in claiming that the interdependence of the citizens’ fate and future
ought to constitute a sufficient foundation for the political community, Honohan goes so
far as to raise the possibility of a “republican cosmopolitanism” that allows for multiple
sovereignties and more porous boundaries, referencing the European Union (EU) as a
potential example of this new type of community. A republic which does not depend on
pre-existing and extra-political cultural commonalities would provide a model for future
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transnational political communities, and the EU is the most vivid modern example of
attempting to establish the institutions of government at levels other than the nation.
Honohan argues that, like the relationships between colleagues, the relationships and
obligations of republican citizens can be more permeable and extensive than those
between the members of a single common culture.109 Thus, Honohan offers the
possibility of a cosmopolitan citizenship emerging from the bottom up, “through the
development of increasing webs of relationships or ranges of overlapping economic,
environmental and cultural interdependencies, rather than depending on the prior
existence of a world-state or based on a priori principles of a universal humanity.”110 She
concludes that the recognition and special obligations of citizens are rooted in
interdependence rather than commonality, cultural identity, or feelings of attachment, and
that instead of having to choose between nationally based obligations and cosmopolitan
obligations, “we should think of people as having responsibilities in irregularly extending
and overlapping networks in which citizenship rather than nationality constitutes one of
the most important frameworks.”111
This is what Honohan calls the republican conception of citizenship (colleagues
model of citizenship), and she contrasts this model with what she believes to be two
polarized alternatives; the liberal model (capable of extension but too thin), and the
cultural nationalist model (demands commitment at the cost of excluding or oppressing
non-members). And yet by calling her colleagues model of citizenship the republican
conception of citizenship, she again ignores the friendship model of citizenship of
Aristotle and the family model of citizenship of Rousseau. Rousseau argues that loving
one’s fellow citizens as members of an extended family (as opposed to treating them like
colleagues), loving the community, and loving the nation constitute the prerequisites for
establishing the rule of the general will (for more on this, see Chapters 3 and 4). As such,
his ideas were crucial to the development of our modern understanding of national
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identity and culture, and his philosophy provided the moral justification for nationalism.
In the Constitution for Corsica, Rousseau declares: “Every people has or ought to have a
national character, and if it lacks one it would be necessary to begin by giving it one.”112
He believes that a common national identity has intrinsic value, and that this identity
helps shape citizens into virtuous members of the republic. Furthermore, Rousseau
stresses that a proper republican state should be defensive in character, limited in size,
and that it must remain autonomous and sovereign. Rousseau would never have endorsed
Honohan’s views about a “republican cosmopolitanism” with multiple sovereignties and
porous borders akin to those of the EU. Aside from the bureaucratic complexities and
democratic deficits of the EU, Rousseau would have seen such supranational projects as
dangerous infringements on the sovereignty of the republic and as threats to the
preservation of its distinct national character. Moreover, as Catherine Frost argues:
Transnational democratic institutions have turned in disappointing results when it
comes to capturing the loyalty or allegiances of the multinational populations they
serve (Kymlicka 2004: 257-61). Such institutions may be established, and often
with the best of intentions, but representation cannot be imposed on a population.
In the absence of a pre-existing frame of reference that reflects this structure, a
multinational or transnational representational order is unlikely to have much
meaning or legitimacy for a population. And at present any transnational or
multinational frameworks that exist (such as the European Union, for instance)
are weak as compared to national ones (Kymlicka 2004: 258; Murphy and Harty
2003: 186). While they may present a more pluralist alternative to nationalism,
then, these new political forms may also reduce the representational resources a
population can bring to bear on its political and cultural life.113
As we can see, the views of a contemporary civic humanist like Honohan are very
different from a cultural republican like Rousseau, and also from other contemporary
republican thinkers like Miller. Just like Rousseau, Miller believes that the virtues
required by republican citizenship can be cultivated only within the borders of a nationstate, and a common national identity and public culture are essential for producing the
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kind of solidarity that is needed for a system of inclusive deliberative democracy to take
shape.114 A common public culture should not be so all-embracing that it destroys private
subcultures, but it should have substantial content and meaning for members of the
national community.115 Consequently, Miller posits that “political communities should as
far as possible be organized in such a way that their members share a common national
identity, which binds them together in the face of their many diverse private and group
identities.”116 Although Honohan and others tend to classify them as “communitarian,”
republicans like Miller rightly resist the label because it does nothing to clarify the debate
within republicanism, and I argue that Miller’s theories fall within a distinct cultural
strand of republicanism that is rooted in the works of Rousseau. Cultural republicanism
differs from both instrumental republicanism and civic humanism, but it remains an
integral part of the wider republican tradition. In the next chapter, I take a closer look at
Rousseau’s specific brand of republicanism and how it relates to our modern
understandings of democracy, culture, and nationalism.

114

Miller, On Nationality, 5.

115

Ibid, 22-27.

116

Ibid, 188.

52

Chapter 3
3

Rousseau’s Republicanism
In this chapter I address some misconceptions about Rousseau’s political

philosophy and its relationship to the French Revolution and beyond. I then go on to
consider Rousseau’s cultural republicanism and I identify his most important
contributions to republican political theory, including his notions about the two social
contracts and the problem of inequality, as well as his understanding of the people as
sovereign, the general will, and the moral republic. In Chapter 4, I argue that Rousseau is
both a distinctly republican thinker and the father of modern nationalism, and that his
unique brand of republicanism has important implications for contemporary debates in
nationalist theory.

3.1 Addressing Misconceptions: Rousseau and the French
Revolution
Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1712-1778) left a lasting legacy on republican political
theory and on the wider discipline of political science. The influence of his ideas can be
seen in the works of such diverse thinkers as Kant, Wollstonecraft, Hegel, Marx, Rawls,
and Derrida. Rousseau’s ideas are said to have inspired the ideals of the French
Revolution, and it is believed that Robespierre carried a copy of Rousseau’s Social
Contract everywhere he went. Consequently, liberal thinkers from Benjamin Constant to
Isaiah Berlin have suggested that the excesses of the French Revolution (including the
Terror) have their roots in Rousseau’s work. Further still, some have suggested that the
brutal totalitarian movements of the 20th century can be traced back to Rousseau’s
philosophy. As J.S. Maloy observes:
Rousseau's efforts to develop an account of moral economy have supplied much
of the ammunition over the years for those who have charged that Rousseau's
politics are essentially "totalitarian.” The dangers of trying to realize an antique
conception of virtue under modern conditions were flagged as early as 1819 in
Constant's famous speech on "ancient" and "modern liberty." But the twentieth
century added Nazism and Stalinism to Jacobinism on the list of horrors for which
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Rousseau could be blamed. The question of moral psychology was paramount in
all this, for Rousseau was considered to have advocated just the sort of tampering
with human nature which the totalitarian regimes of mid-century had tried to
instantiate.117
To use Constant’s terminology, Rousseau is known for defending “ancient” liberty which
defines citizenship as a moral obligation to actively participate in politics, and which
requires self-realization and considerable self-sacrifice with regards to the citizen’s time
and energy. This is distinct from “modern” liberty, which is defined primarily in terms of
equal legal status, the rule of law, and freedom from undue interference by
government.118 Although the “totalitarian thesis” in Rousseau has largely been
discredited among committed students of his work, the residue of totalitarianism still
hangs over discussions of Rousseau in lecture halls and seminar rooms of twenty-first
century universities. The underlying assumption is always that “Rousseau did indeed
defend, in the name of the radical alteration of human character, authoritative and
robustly transitive mechanisms of psychological influence and control.”119 Rousseau
argued for the regulation or redirection of natural inclinations or passions, but he did not
advocate wholesale psychological transformation (a defining characteristic of totalitarian
regimes).120 As noted in the previous chapter, Rousseau did believe in freedom as selfmastery (FSM) and in channeling the passions in constructive rather than destructive
ways. Nevertheless, Rousseau condemned all forms of authoritarian rule by a single
person or group of people, argued for a profoundly democratic society in which all
sovereign power rests in the general will of the people, and insisted that all individuals
must be treated as autonomous moral agents. As such, I interpret Rousseau’s philosophy
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to be not only incompatible with but directly opposed to all types of totalitarian rule. A
careful study of Rousseau’s work must begin with this basic understanding.
There is little doubt that Rousseau’s republican ideals had a profound influence on
the French Revolution, but it is important to address some of the misconceptions
regarding this influence. Contrary to claims that the actors of the French Revolution were
attempting to faithfully implement Rousseau’s theoretical principles in practice, François
Furet points out that “the revolutionaries were quite unfaithful to the Social Contract:
between 1789 and 1800, they devoted all their energy to founding a representative
government, the very type Rousseau had declared intrinsically corrupt, since the will of
the people could not be transferred and therefore could not be represented.”121
Revolutionaries like the Abbé Sieyès argued that the unenlightened masses did not
possess sufficient virtues of citizenship to take a direct and active part in governing, and
his solution was the representation of the less enlightened by the more enlightened. He
proclaimed that “without alienating their rights, citizens may delegate their exercise,” a
statement that appears contrary to the principles of the Social Contract. The institutions
that were established during the French Revolution were “obviously incompatible with
Rousseau’s insistence in the Social Contract on the formation of the law by the general
will.”122 Furthermore, Rousseau cannot be blamed for the fact that the French
revolutionary period was so receptive to an absolutist conception of sovereign power.
The reality is that prerevolutionary France was also the France of absolutism; the
revolutionaries carried over the tradition of absolute sovereignty in France from
monarchy into republicanism. Tocqueville demonstrated that the absolute monarchy of
prerevolutionary France “constituted in itself a first revolution that was in itself a
necessary condition for that of 1789,” and as Furet observes, France’s “experience of
absolutism led directly to a unitary concept of sovereignty. Experience and the habits it
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bred were surely more compelling than the effects of reading the Social Contract―which
had hardly been a best-seller.”123
For more than two centuries critics have tried to implicate Rousseau’s ideas in the
excesses of the French Revolution and the terrible crimes that took place during the
Terror. Robespierre, the leader of the Jacobins, is often portrayed as a zealous follower of
Rousseau and his actions are presented as the inevitable consequence of trying to
implement Rousseau’s ideas in practice. Jacob Talmon went so far as to directly blame
Rousseau’s philosophy for the rise of that he calls “totalitarian Messianic democracy,”
claiming that “Rousseau's ‘general will’, an ambiguous concept, sometimes concocted as
valid a priori, sometimes as immanent in the will of man, exclusive and implying
unanimity, became the driving force of totalitarian democracy, and the source of all its
contradictions and antinomies.”124 While Rousseau’s republican ideals, including his
notions about the two social contracts, the people as sovereign, the general will, and the
moral republic, appealed to many of the revolutionaries, it would be academically
dishonest to blame Rousseau’s ideas for the actions of the revolutionaries, or to hold him
responsible for the Revolution’s failings. The revolutionaries, including Robespierre, had
their own agendas, and in pursuing them they did not hesitate to disregard Rousseau’s
fundamental ideas and principles. A close study of his work shows that Rousseau would
not have condoned the excesses of the Revolution and, as Allan Bloom argues,
“Rousseau would… certainly have disapproved of Robespierre.”125 In fact, it was widely
understood that Rousseau had neither predicted the Revolution nor anticipated the
bloodshed that followed, to say nothing of condoning it. As William Doyle writes: “It is
hard to imagine either Voltaire or Rousseau reveling in the events which, from only
eleven years after their deaths, were often so glibly attributed to their influence.
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Robespierre, as proud a disciple as any of the Enlightenment, declared: ‘Political
writers… had in no way foreseen this Revolution.’”126
Although Robespierre paid lip service to Rousseau’s notion of popular
sovereignty (the people as sovereign) in the early years of the Revolution, after expelling
the Girondins from the National Convention, Robespierre “would unceasingly defend the
national representation against any popular intervention, and his notion of the dictatorship
of public safety, which he exercised by virtue of powers granted by the Convention and
only the Convention, no longer resembled in any way the ideas of the Social
Contract.”127 Furthermore, even if Robespierre had been genuinely committed to
Rousseau’s ideals in principle, his methods were obviously incompatible with Rousseau’s
philosophy and Rousseau himself would surely have condemned them. Rousseau stressed
that the general will could not be represented by any one man or committee of men and
he abhorred political factionalism; as such, the mass executions of the Terror, conducted
without due process and carried out as a means to the end of eliminating perceived
opponents of the Jacobin faction, would have shocked Rousseau. And while the
revolutionaries were certainly aware and respectful of the republican writings that
Rousseau produced in an era dominated by political absolutism, they never attempted to
directly follow his political formulas during the course of the Revolution. Nevertheless,
Rousseau’s work remains a critical tool for evaluating the successes and failures of a
Revolution that was inspired by the same spirit of freedom and equality that he first
brought to life in his writings.

3.2 The Two Social Contracts and the Problem of Inequality
In this section I discuss the lasting importance of Rousseau’s ideas about the two
social contracts and the problem of inequality. I emphasize that these aspects of
Rousseau’s philosophy are firmly rooted in republican political thought, and that they
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make an important contribution to republicanism. When I say “the two social contracts,”
I am referring to the fact that Rousseau distinguished between the current social contract
(which Hobbes and Locke sought to explain and defend in their own different ways, and
which Rousseau believed to be illegitimate and therefore immoral), and the new social
contract proposed by Rousseau (which is the subject of his Social Contract, and which he
believed to be legitimate and therefore moral).
According to Rousseau, those like Thomas Hobbes who claim that the state of
nature is one of violence and competition, and who then go on to draw conclusions about
the nature of the social contract based on this view, do not go back far enough. In the
Discourse on Inequality, Rousseau contends that before the development of society man
led a simple and peaceful way of life. The differences that set man apart from all the
other creatures was his unique ability to consciously share in his own operations, as well
as his capacity for self-improvement. Unlike animals, understood by Rousseau to be
ingenious machines of nature governed solely by instinct, man is a creature governed by
free will. All animals are born with amour de soi, a self-regarding love of self that is
independent of the opinions of others, but it is man’s free will and capacity for selfimprovement that gives him the unique ability to act against his natural instincts. It is his
free will and the ability for self-improvement (perfectibility) that distinguishes man from
other animals and eventually leads him to develop complex and interdependent social
relationships with other human beings that go beyond the mere instinct for selfpreservation. Out of these complex social relationships we see the eventual development
of pre-political societies (communities of people who live together but have not yet
established formal political institutions or laws), and the formation of these permanent
communities ultimately gives rise to what Rousseau calls amour-propre (an artificial love
of self that is dependent entirely on the opinion of others). Rousseau explains:
Amour-propre must not be confused with the love of self [amour de soi]: for they
differ both in themselves and in their effects. Love of self [amour de soi] is a
natural feeling which leads every animal to look to its own preservation, and
which, guided in man by reason and modified by compassion, creates humanity
and virtue. Amour-propre is a purely relative and fictitious feeling, which arises in
the state of society, leads each individual to make more of himself than any other,
and is the real source of the ‘sense of honour.’ This being understood, I maintain
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that, in our primitive condition, in the true state of nature, amour-propre
not exist.128

does

Amour-propre is synonymous with narrow self-interest, selfishness, vanity, and
an extreme dependency on the opinions of others (we see ourselves through the eyes of
others, and our own identity depends on what others think of us). According to
Rousseau, as men in the state of nature become more social, they begin to compare
themselves to others, become mindful of their opinions, and develop a sense of pride that
often degenerates into jealousy and rivalry. Amour-propre, this uniquely human
characteristic, becomes the source of all the inequality and corruption in society as men
engage in endless competition over property, honour, and power, thereby becoming
selfish, petty, and ruthless creatures. Simply put, amour-propre is the root cause of all the
vices in civil society and the primary source of injustice in the modern world. In
Rousseau’s view, natural man is self-regarding and compassionate; when Hobbes spoke
of the “state of nature” that was a state of war of all against all, he was not talking about
man in his natural state, but about the social man already corrupted by the negative
effects of amour-propre. Hobbes fails to see the state of nature as it was before prepolitical societies were formed, and he also fails to acknowledge the universal principle
of compassion which governs natural man. Rousseau says:
There is another principle which has escaped Hobbes; which, having been
bestowed on mankind, to moderate, on certain occasions, the impetuosity of
[amour-propre], or, before its birth, the desire of self-preservation, tempers the
ardour with which he pursues his own welfare, by an innate repugnance at seeing
a fellow creature suffer. I think I need not fear contradiction in holding man to be
possessed of the only natural virtue, which could not be denied him by the most
violent detractor of human virtue. I am speaking of compassion, which is a
disposition suitable to creatures so weak and subject to so many evils as we
certainly are: by so much the more universal and useful to mankind, as it comes
before any kind of reflection; and at the same time so natural, that the very brutes
themselves sometimes give evident proofs of it.129
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As men begin comparing themselves to others in society, they begin competing for
wealth, esteem, and property (private property itself being the primary cause of material
inequality in the modern world), and they also begin exploiting each other for their own
private advantage. As the state of pre-political society becomes a state of war, those who
had amassed great wealth and property by exploiting their fellow man find their ill-gotten
riches constantly threatened by the poor masses who know that the rich have no
legitimate claim to their unequal wealth; the rich are nothing more than usurpers of the
fruits of the earth, which belong equally to all. Rousseau famously states:
The first man who, having enclosed a piece of ground, bethought himself of
saying This is mine, and found people simple enough to believe him, was the real
founder of civil society. From how many crimes, wars, and murders, from how
many horrors and misfortunes might not any one have saved mankind, by pulling
up the stakes, or filling up the ditch, and crying to his fellows: Beware of listening
to this imposter; you are undone if you once forget that the fruits of the earth
belong to us all, and the earth itself to nobody.130
Rousseau argues that this constitutes “the first step towards inequality, and at the same
time towards vice.”131 Eventually, the rich minority decided to protect their own unequal
wealth from the poor majority by creating political institutions which, under the guise of
preserving order and security, secured the usurpations of the rich against retaliation from
the poor. With that, the first (and current) social contract was established.
Just as he rejects Hobbes’ account of human nature, Rousseau disavows Locke’s
take on private property. Rousseau argues that free and equal people would never consent
to the great inequalities of wealth that characterize modern society. For Rousseau, the
social contract that Locke describes in effect justifies and defends class divisions,
exploitation, and large inequalities in wealth because Locke is primarily concerned with
the “rational and industrious man” and his “right” to protect his property from both the
king and the poor masses. Rousseau is concerned with all citizens, and while he believes

130

Ibid, 76.

131

Ibid, 81.

60

that private property is justified within reason, he asserts that for a republican society to
remain free and democratic, there have to be firm limits on material inequality.132
As noted in the previous chapter, Rousseau tells us that no citizen ought to be
wealthy enough to buy another, or so poor as to have to sell himself. 133 In the Discourse
on Political Economy, he emphasizes that “it is therefore one of the most important
functions of government to prevent extreme inequality of fortunes; not by taking away
wealth from its possessors, but by depriving all men of means to accumulate it; not by
building hospitals for the poor, but by securing the citizens from becoming poor.”134 Firm
limits on material inequality are necessary in order to allow all individuals to achieve
their full potential as citizens; meaningful democratic citizenship is impossible for those
who are so poor that they depend entirely on others for their very survival. Rousseau
distinguishes between two types of inequality: the first is natural inequality, which
includes disparities in physical strength, intellectual capacity, age, and health. The second
is moral inequality, which is an artificial form of inequality that arises only in society.
Whereas natural inequality is simply the way things are by nature, moral inequality is
socially constructed and can be either just or unjust. Rousseau believes that as far as
moral inequality is concerned, citizens ought to be distinguished based on their
contributions to society; social privileges should not be distributed to all citizens
indiscriminately, but to each according to his deserts. According to Rousseau,
“distributive justice would oppose this rigorous equality of the state of nature, even were
it practicable in civil society; as all the members of the State owe it their services in
proportion to their talents and abilities, they ought, on their side, to be distinguished and
favoured in proportion to the services they have actually rendered.”135 Although he is a
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strong proponent of meritocracy, Rousseau concedes that some degree of material
inequality is bound to exist within society (he does not believe in complete equality of
outcome or in abolishing private property), but he argues that material inequality, being
entirely manmade, can be either justified or unjustified. As Frederick Neuhouser
explains, “in saying, for example, that the state’s goal should be to bring the extremes of
rich and poor ‘as close together as possible,’ Rousseau acknowledges that absolute
equality in ‘power and riches’ is too severe a demand (SC, II.11.ii). Thus, the mere
artificiality of inequality does not imply that it is unjustified; its artificiality merely means
that it is appropriate for normative questions regarding its legitimacy to be raised.”136
Rousseau stresses the importance of limiting material inequality in society
because excessive dependence on others destroys freedom; those who are very poor will
be forced to do things to survive that they may never have done under other
circumstances, and those who are very rich will be able to use their wealth to gain undue
influence over others. Neuhouser correctly notes that according to Rousseau, equality is
instrumentally valuable for freedom because material inequality greatly exacerbates the
dependence of citizens on others; inequality is derivative of freedom in that too much
inequality threatens freedom. 137 As Neuhouser states,
That Rousseau condemns economic inequality because of its consequences is
made clear in his discussion of the constraints that considerations of freedom
place on inequality, especially in his well-known claim that the general will has
two principal aims—freedom and equality—and that equality (in wealth and
power) is such an aim because “freedom cannot subsist without it” (SC, II.11.i.).
Here Rousseau states unambiguously that we should seek economic equality
because (and only when) it threatens social members’ freedom.138
Material inequality is acceptable only in so far as it does not threaten the fundamental
interests of any citizen, including his freedom and the basic social conditions of his well-
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being. As such, the legitimate republic (once established by the new social contract) has
both the right and the obligation to set policies that ensure that material inequality will be
limited in this way. It must be stressed, however, that the specific type of freedom that
Rousseau is interested in promoting is freedom as self-mastery or FSM, which requires
citizens to be ruled by laws that they make for themselves. Neuhouser does an excellent
job of connecting Rousseau’s understanding of freedom and equality to his emphasis on
the importance of participation, stating:
If laws—even good laws—are to avoid being a source of domination, they must
actually be made by those subject to them. Because legislation must be a
collective enterprise, I can determine the laws that govern me only by actively
participating in a democratic process in which those laws are made. As a citizen, I
determine for myself what I am to do only insofar as I am an active member of
the group that literally makes the laws that govern all of us. Moreover, my
participation in that process must be sufficiently substantial that the claim that the
laws issue from me—from an us that incorporates me as an active participant—is
not merely a hollow slogan, even when some of the laws that emerge from that
process diverge from my opinion of what our collective ideals and interests
require us to do. This is why participatory democracy is not a peripheral feature
of Rousseau’s vision of the legitimate republic; it is, rather, essential to avoiding
domination in such a republic, and on this issue his differences from traditional
republicans could hardly be starker. Rousseau agrees with them that “law that
answers systematically to people’s . . . interests . . . does not compromise people’s
liberty,” but only on the further condition that those laws are, in a robust sense,
collectively issued by the very people subject to them.139
Rousseau holds that we must have firm limits on material inequality in order to
make meaningful democracy possible. This satisfies the first requirement of FSM, which
states that citizens must have a direct say in shaping the laws that govern them (see table
in Chapter 2). The other requirement of FSM is that citizens must learn to overcome their
mere appetites and narrow self-interests in the name of the common good, and setting
firm limits on material inequality is also fundamentally important for this second
requirement. David Lay Williams explains:
Perhaps the most pernicious effects of economic inequality, for Rousseau, are
wrought on the soul. Tremendous wealth, on his reasoning, enfeebles the
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conscience. We social animals are always driven to distinguish ourselves, to
prove ourselves better than others. This is not always socially destructive, insofar
as distinction is granted for the right reasons – namely, civic and sociable
behavior. Society, however, has increasingly not only rewarded distinction with
wealth, but made wealth a distinction worthy of respect. Where this happens,
one’s status owes not just to one’s wealth per se, but to one’s wealth relative to
the poverty of others. Rousseau worried that in the most unequal societies, the
rich would acquire a “pleasure of dominating” that renders them “like those
ravenous wolves which once they have tasted human flesh scorn all other food,
and from then on want only to devour men.” Against a mind degraded in this way,
addicted to the pleasure of domination, no appeal to justice, fairness, or any other
value we like to think defines us, can have any effect; and no just society can
stand on such foundations.140
In sum, equality is instrumentally valuable for Rousseau because it makes FSM possible.
Although we cannot eliminate it completely, in the legitimate republic established by the
new social contract we must set firm limits on material inequality in order to ensure that
all citizens have the ability to fully express their freedom through self-realization and
political participation. A civil society which fails to live up to these standards is
illegitimate; in allowing excessive material inequality it denies freedom in the fullest
sense and is in effect governed by the principle of “might makes right.”
Rousseau declares that civil society in its current form fails to live up to the
aforementioned standards, and that the social contract as it exists today is illegitimate
because it “irretrievably destroyed natural liberty, eternally fixed the law of property and
inequality, converted clever usurpation into unalterable right, and, for the advantage of
the few ambitious individuals, subjected all mankind to perpetual labour, slavery, and
wretchedness.”141 Simply put, those who currently rule over the people do not have
legitimate authority. This is because the current social contract formalizes and
institutionalizes the law of the strongest, a condition it was originally designed to remedy.
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It is a contract into which mankind entered unwittingly and under false pretences. On that
basis, Rousseau declares the current social contract null and void, and he sets out to
establish a new, legitimate contract that has the moral and political authority to govern
man.

3.3 The People as Sovereign, the General Will, and the
Moral Republic
Having argued that the current social contract is illegitimate because it is founded
upon arbitrary force and therefore has no moral basis, Rousseau sets out to develop a new
legitimate social contract founded upon morals and reciprocity. According to Rousseau,
“society must be studied by means of men, and men by means of society. Those who
want to treat politics and morals separately will never understand anything of either of the
two.”142 For Rousseau, politics is not merely about security or private property, it is about
morality. It is worth noting that both Hobbes and Locke saw their own visions of political
sovereignty as moral visions, but Rousseau rejects their claims, arguing instead that the
social contracts they described were illegitimate and therefore immoral. Conceding that it
is no longer possible for man to return to the state of nature, Rousseau wants to find a
way to bring diverse groups of individuals together in civil society and turn them into a
sovereign people in a way that would end the unequal dependence of men on each other
(such as the dependence of the poor on the rich, and vice versa) and replace it with the
reciprocal dependence of each individual on the whole. This new contract must somehow
ensure that each man gives himself to all and yet remains as free as before.
In the Social Contract, Rousseau seeks to establish legitimate sovereign authority,
and he does so by providing what he believes to be the only moral foundation for
sovereignty―the general will. As G.D.H. Cole observes:
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Rousseau’s purpose in the Social Contract is to show that the ‘sovereign’―the
people, considered collectively as a body with the authority to lay down
absolutely binding law for each of its members ―has a moral claim on our
allegiance that stems from our having (whether actually or in thought) given
ourselves to its authority without reservation. This supposes that we are so
completely members of the state to which we all owe allegiance that there is no
competing moral authority in our lives; and Rousseau gave great offence to his
contemporaries by relegating religion to a subordinate role in the political system,
and doing everything possible to remove the possibility of conflict between our
duties to God and our duties to the ‘sovereign’.143
By relegating religion and other competing moral authorities to a subordinate role in
politics, Rousseau follows in the classical republican tradition of Machiavelli, who
famously divorced civic from Christian values. In fact, J.G.A. Pocock claims that
“Rousseau was the Machiavelli of the eighteenth century,” adding that “as with
Machiavelli, it took time to discern the extraordinary strength of intellect which kept
Rousseau a major classical theorist in the humanist succession.”144
When I say “the people as sovereign,” I am referring to Rousseau’s belief that the
general will cannot be represented, and that all citizens are therefore obliged to take an
active part in creating the laws that govern them. According to Rousseau, the true
sovereign is neither a ruling class nor the formal institutions of the state, but the citizen
body as a whole. The people govern through the general will; a will that is indivisible and
always aims at the common good. To be a citizen of a community governed by the
general will requires overcoming one’s narrow self-interest in the name of the common
interest―overcoming one’s particular will in the name of the general will (FSM). The
particular will is defined as being solely concerned with what is in each individual’s
private interest, even if said interest can only be satisfied at the expense of the community
as a whole. Conversely, the general will always considers what is in the common interest
of the community and holds that what is best for the whole is ultimately best for the
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individual, who is an intrinsic part of that whole. It is this general will―this enlightened
part of ourselves that aims only at the common interest―that pulls us up by our chains
and forces us to be free; forces us to reciprocate the virtues, duties, and responsibilities of
our compatriots; forces us to be citizens.
Rousseau’s republicanism distinguishes itself from the instrumental
republicanism of someone like Machiavelli (and contemporary instrumental republicans
like Pettit and Skinner) by its strong emphasis on morality and the good. I use the term
“moral republic” to refer to the society that Rousseau hopes to establish through the new
and legitimate social contract that he proposes because, according to Rousseau, all other
political communities are illegitimate and therefore immoral; they merely
institutionalized the principle of “might makes right” and thus failed to promote
meaningful freedom for their citizens. For Rousseau, only a republic ruled by the general
will is a moral republic. It is important to note that Rousseau is not merely interested in a
well-armed and stable republican state that can protect its citizens from foreign invasion
and tyranny. Rather, he wants to establish a strong republic with a firm moral grounding.
He seeks not only the formation of stable political institutions, but also to reform the
moral character of citizens and to synthesize civic duty and pragmatic notions of the
common good with the classical pursuit of morality and justice. Rousseau insists that
strict laws alone cannot instill proper morals into the citizens of a republic; laws ought to
draw their force from proper morals, not the other way around. Furthermore, citizens
should not only observe but love the laws as an embodiment of good morals and civic
virtue. Rousseau references Ancient Sparta, where “laws and morals [manners],
intimately united in the hearts of the citizens, made, as it were, only one single body.”145
According to Rousseau, the only proper laws are laws which are derived from proper
morals and from the noble values of the citizens themselves. Unlike Machiavelli,
Rousseau asserts that no laws, no matter how noble, can bring prosperity to a society that
has already embraced vice. Good laws and strong armies are not sufficient to secure the
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continued existence of a political community; promoting good morals is just as
important. What this means for Rousseau is simple: citizens must do more than merely
abide by the laws of the state; rather, they must actively strive to become better people, to
pursue self-realization and self-overcoming, and to learn to put the common good before
their own private interests. Furthermore, they must take an active part in creating the laws
that govern them through direct political participation. In essence, republican citizens
must embrace FSM, which requires genuine moral and civic virtue; for Rousseau, the
good man and the good citizen are one and the same.
Rousseau sees the general will as a shared moral consensus that all citizens strive
to establish, and this will alone constitutes sovereignty. The general will establishes a
moral and collective body, le moi commun (the public person), which Rousseau defines
as “a form of association which will defend and protect with the whole common force the
person and goods of each associate, and in which each, while uniting himself with all,
may still obey himself alone, and remain as free as before.”146 Rousseau explains:
At once, in place of the individual personality of each contracting party, this act of
association creates a moral and collective body, composed of as many members
as the assembly contains votes, and receiving from this act its unity, its common
identity, its life and its will. This public person, so formed by the union of all
other persons, formerly took the name of city, and now takes that of Republic or
body politic; it is called by its members State when passive, Sovereign when
active, and Power when compared with others like itself. Those who are
associated in it take collectively the name of people, and severally are called
citizens, as sharing in the sovereign power, and subjects, as being under the laws
of the State.147
Rousseau declares that the moral republic must be governed by the people directly, i.e. by
the general will of the people, because only the general will aims at the common good of
all. Joshua Cohen tells us that “in strikingly spare, intense prose, [Rousseau] gives us a
picture of a free community of equals, a social-political world in which individuals realize
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their nature as free by living together as equals, giving the laws to themselves, guided in
those lawgiving judgments by a conception of their common good.”148 This is a complex
concept, and Rousseau’s critics often claim that it is difficult to determine the general
will in practice. Furthermore, critics argue that it is equally difficult to determine whether
the general will ultimately aims at the common good. After all, is it not possible for a
large group of people to collectively decide to plunge the state into war and chaos? Is it
not possible for the general will to become destructive and harmful for society as a
whole?
Rousseau holds that the general will is always right and always tends to the public
advantage because “undertakings which bind us to the social body are obligatory only
because they are mutual; and their nature is such that in fulfilling them we cannot work
for others without working for ourselves.”149 For Rousseau, the only human law that is
worthy of obedience is the law we make for ourselves. The general will presupposes a
reciprocal agreement between citizens who share common interests; in making political
decisions, we ourselves must submit to all of the conditions we impose on others. At the
heart of this moral project lies the idea of self-overcoming, or the ability and willingness
of the citizen to move past his narrow self-interests in order to grasp, understand, and act
upon what is in the common interest. This capacity for willing generally constitutes a
new kind of freedom; a freedom which moves beyond the satisfaction of mere appetites
and allows us to make genuine moral choices. This is a form of human rationality clearly
distinct from the strictly self-regarding calculation of personal benefit. Humans are
uniquely free because they can choose to resist their appetites and attain a level of selfrealization that allows them to serve a good greater than themselves. This is what makes
human beings unique among all living creatures; for Rousseau, self-realization and selfovercoming in the name of the common good constitute the most meaningful form of
human freedom (FSM).150 The ability to will generally allows citizens to achieve their
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full potential as human beings and accomplish feats that would have been impossible
outside of the moral republic. In other words, citizens of the moral republic have at their
disposal unique choices and opportunities that they would not have anywhere else. In line
with the republican understanding of the relationship between freedom and laws, citizens
of the moral republic are more free than other men; by overcoming the inclination to only
satisfy their mere appetites at the expense of everything else, citizens stop being slaves to
their appetites and become free in the most meaningful sense. As Bloom explains,
“obedience to the general will is an act of freedom.”151 In submitting himself to the rule
of the general will, the citizen commits himself to the pursuit of the common good; the
good of society as a whole, and by extension, the good of each individual member of
society. In obeying the general will man obeys only himself. As Rousseau outlines in the
Social Contract, “each of us puts his person and all his power in common under the
supreme direction of the general will, and, in our corporate capacity, we receive each
member as an indivisible part of the whole.”152 Only through this reciprocal moral
commitment can citizens manage to simultaneously live in civil society and yet still
remain free by the standards of FSM.
It is important to note that the general will is not the sum of particular wills. The
particular will of each citizen represents the private interest of said individual; it does not
take the common good of the community into consideration, and it is often directly
opposed to it. By contrast, the general will represents the shared (or general) interest of
the republic as a whole, including the common good of all the members of the
community. I will use an example to demonstrate the distinction between a particular and
general will: a wealthy citizen studying to become a doctor may feel that it is in his
particular interest for medical school tuition rates to be raised to a point where most other
people are unable to afford them. If this were the case, the wealthy citizen would have
less competition in the job market and would likely have his pick of prestigious medical
positions due to a lack of other qualified candidates. However, although it would benefit
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the wealthy citizen in the short-term, the tuition hike would eventually lead to a reduced
quality of medical care and a dangerous shortage of qualified doctors in the community.
This would have profoundly negative long-term effects on the community as a whole
and, inevitably, on the wealthy citizen himself, on the members of his own family, on his
descendents, and so forth. As such, it is clear that the tuition hike in question is
incompatible with the common good and is therefore contrary to the general will.
It is also important to note that the general will is not necessarily unanimous,
although for a will to be general the votes of all citizens must be counted.153 Rousseau
explains:
There is often a great deal of difference between the will of all and the general
will; the latter considers only the common interest, while the former takes private
interest into account, and is no more than a sum of particular wills: but take away
from these same wills the pluses and minuses that cancel one another, and the
general will remains as the sum of the differences.154
Put simply, the general will is the will that remains once particular wills are canceled out,
and this general will always aims at the common good, never at the particular good of
individual parts at the expense of the whole. Although narrow self-interest may at times
cloud the judgment of individual citizens, thereby leading them to will particularly rather
than generally, in the majority of cases citizens of the moral republic will be able to
recognize the general will. Referring back to the tuition hike example, a few wealthy
citizens studying to become doctors may still support the tuition hike for selfish reasons,
but a society which encourages the kind of self-realization and self-overcoming that
Rousseau advocates is unlikely to have many individuals who are so blinded by
selfishness that they would push for policies that are sure to cause great harm to the entire
community in the long run (and, ultimately, to themselves).
The general will is indivisible, and because it is indivisible an act of the sovereign
is not the convention between a superior and an inferior but a convention between a body
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and its parts. Rousseau argues that the sovereign cannot be represented and must be made
up of all the citizens collectively, while the executive branch of government, which is
made up of representatives, must serve only as an intermediary between the sovereign
and its subjects, executing the laws enacted by the sovereign while preserving civil and
political liberty. For Rousseau, the government and the sovereign are two distinct
concepts. Government officials are mere officers of the people and not its masters; they
must be accountable to the sovereign at all times. The fact that the sovereign cannot be
represented means that all of the citizens collectively constitute the sovereign power, and
hence they must all participate in the democratic process. As Cohen notes:
Sovereign authority lies in effect in the shared understanding of the common
advantage in which the interests of each are taken into account. This is the force
of Rousseau’s remark that the sovereign is not a determinate individual or a
determinate collection of individuals, but a “collective being” (SC2.I.2.), a we that
is constituted by a collection of persons who share an understanding of the
common good and accept the authority of that common good in matters of
collective decision, not a collection united in submission to a single will.155
It is clear that Rousseau’s political vision of sovereignty is one of participatory
democracy, a system in which all citizens take an active part in governing themselves
(the people as sovereign). But this system can exist only within the moral republic, where
the principle of “might makes right” has been rejected in the name of morals and
reciprocity. Furthermore, the rule of the general will cannot be established unless the
citizens learn to overcome their narrow self-interest in the name of the common interest.
In the following section I argue that, according to Rousseau, citizens must learn to
overcome their narrow self-interest and become free in the most meaningful sense (FSM)
by embracing the balance of loves.

3.4 The Balance of Loves: Amour de soi, Amour-propre,
and Compassion
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How can republican citizens come to will generally, rather than simply pursue
their own private agendas? They do so by setting aside narrow self-interests and
committing themselves to the common good of society as a whole. We arrive at the
general will by equating the fate of all our fellow citizens with our own individual fate,
and the common good of all citizens with our own individual good. In short, we wish
unto others as we wish unto ourselves. That said, there are two essential preconditions
that must be satisfied for the general will to take shape. The first precondition is to
rediscover a sense of amour de soi in the face of the corrupting influence of amourpropre; we must find a healthy balance between our natural self-regarding love and our
social love of self that is dependent on the opinions of others. In the Discourse on
Inequality, Rousseau tells us that in the state of nature amour de soi (the self-regarding
love of self) leads every animal to look to its own preservation. However, while in
animals amour de soi simply amounts to the natural instinct for self-preservation, in
human beings it takes on a larger role; according to Rousseau, amour de soi “guided in
man by reason and modified by compassion, creates humanity and virtue.”156 Thus,
natural man’s uniquely advanced sense of reason coupled with compassion is able to
guide and modify man’s amour de soi into a quintessentially human quality which creates
humanity and virtue. The rise of society and the birth of amour-propre corrupts man and
turns his gentle natural passions into hateful artificial ones; as such, the key difference
between natural man and the social man is “that the savage lives within himself, while
social man lives constantly outside himself, and only knows how to live in the opinion of
others, so that he seems to receive the consciousness of his own existence merely from
the judgment of others concerning him.”157 If the social man has any hope of overcoming
the negative consequences of amour-propre (and Rousseau thinks he does, otherwise the
entire project of the Social Contract would be meaningless), the social man must first
rediscover some sense of amour de soi. Although it is impossible to return to a state of
nature where amour de soi reigns supreme and amour-propre is nonexistent, the social
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man must learn to “step back” from the web of dependencies cast by amour-propre in
order to critically assess them. As long as social man receives, as Rousseau says, “the
consciousness of his own existence merely from the judgment of others,” he will be
unable to conceive of himself outside the mingled web of amour-propre; he will identify
completely with what others think of him, and he will see himself solely as others see
him. Such a man could not possibly break through the corrupting influence of amourpropre and rediscover his humanity and virtue, because he would be completely unable to
look beyond the paradigm of amour-propre. The first step must be to rediscover a sense
of amour de soi, which amounts to the realization that I as a human being have intrinsic
worth, and that this intrinsic worth is independent of the opinions of others, of the social
relationships that bind me to others, of the public roles I adopt, and so forth. In the state
of nature this sense of intrinsic worth, coupled with a natural sense of compassion, is the
whole story of man. However, in civil society I have social relationships and both public
and private roles and obligations that I cannot hope to escape entirely. Nevertheless, once
I realize that those social bonds are not the entirety of my existence and that my worth as
a human being does not depend on the opinions of others, I am able to “step back” from
amour-propre, critically assess its consequences, and channel the passions associated
with it in more positive and constructive ways. I am able to discern which effects of
amour-propre are justified and which are not, how much moral inequality is just and how
much is unjust, which social expectations are reasonable and which are unreasonable, and
so on.
In book 2 of Emile, Rousseau tells us that amour-propre, despite its many
negative effects, is not intrinsically good or bad; it becomes good or bad “only by the
applications made of it and the relations given to it.”158 In Emile in particular, Rousseau’s
task is to avoid the negative effects of amour-propre by raising his pupil according to
nature and removing him from the opinions and judgments of society until reason, the
guide of amour-propre, becomes fully developed. As noted previously, in civil society
reason gives way to rational prejudices and overshadows our natural compassion,
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allowing for the development of excessive amour-propre. Rousseau believes that if his
pupil can remain uncorrupted by the depravity of modern society for long enough to
develop a sense of reason independent of the negative effects of amour-propre, he can
rediscover a sense of amour de soi and lead a life of virtue despite the corruption of civil
society. In other words, by remaining uncorrupted for long enough to realize that he as a
human being possesses intrinsic worth independent of the opinions of others, Emile can
tame (though not completely eliminate) his amour-propre by rejecting its excesses and
channelling its passions in a more constructive direction.159 This means that although
amour-propre is the source of the corruption of modern man, it can also have a positive
and constructive character. In fact, Rousseau believes that within a political community
made up of citizens who are capable of reforming their character and embracing FSM “all
of the advantages of the natural state would be united with those of the civil state, and
freedom which keeps man exempt from vices would be joined to morality which raises
him to virtue.”160
In his book Rousseau, Nicholas Dent notes that amour-propre is not inherently
competitive and aggressive, although it often takes on these characteristics within modern
society. In fact, if amour-propre was always and inevitably destructive, the fact that we
cannot hope to eliminate amour-propre in modern society would make it pointless for
Rousseau to have written the Social Contract in the first place.161 Dent emphasizes the
role of compassion in taming amour-propre in order to arrive at a healthy balance of
loves between amour-propre and the rediscovered sense of amour de soi. Dent defines
the role of compassion in Rousseau as that of “the mainspring for a more humane and
productive basis for moral union between people.”162 Compassion is for Rousseau the
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sole natural virtue, and out of compassion flow all of the social virtues; although
compassion has been silenced by excessive amour-propre within modern society,
compassion can also give birth to a more benign amour-propre that allows us to have a
positive regard for others while still respecting ourselves.163 For Rousseau compassion
refers to more than mere pity, and so “even benevolence and friendship are, if we judge
rightly, only the effects of compassion, constantly set upon a particular object: for how is
it different to wish that another person may not suffer pain and uneasiness and to wish
him happy?”164 Thus, natural compassion does not stop at hoping that others won’t suffer
unnecessary harm; we also wish for others to be happy, and our social virtues, such as
benevolence and friendship, are the effects of compassion set upon a particular object. As
Rousseau points out:
It is then certain that compassion is a natural feeling which, by moderating the
violence of love of self in each individual, contributes to the preservation of the
whole species. It is this compassion that hurries us without reflection to the relief
of those who are in distress: it is this which in a state of nature supplies the place
of laws, morals, and virtues, with the advantage that none are tempted to disobey
its gentle voice.165
Compassion moderates “the violence of love of self in each individual,” and while it
comes naturally and pre-reflectively in the state of nature where it is “obscure yet lively,”
in the state of society where there is excessive amour-propre compassion is “developed
yet feeble.”166 This means that the social man still has a sense of compassion, but it has
been silenced by amour-propre. In order to successfully moderate the negative effects of
amour-propre, the next step after rediscovering a sense of amour de soi must be to
discover anew the sole natural virtue: the virtue of compassion.
With amour de soi alone, we have a regard for ourselves but not necessarily for
others; in the state of nature where amour-propre is nonexistent man has no love for the
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public good. Conversely, with excessive amour-propre we come to possess the kind of
vanity and selfishness that prevents us from seeing the public good. Essential for the
balancing of these two extremes is our natural compassion; compassion is what allows us
to overcome the corrupting influence of amour-propre and lift ourselves out of the greed
and vanity of modern society and into a union of reciprocal regard with our fellow
citizens that goes beyond the solitary existence of natural man. Even in the state of
nature, compassion compels us to help our fellow human beings who are in need. As
such, compassion leads us to look beyond merely our own self-preservation and teaches
us to have a positive regard for others. In his analysis of Emile, Dent does an excellent
job of expounding this view. As Dent points out,
Compassion, spontaneously shown and not used to trap, control or patronise,
elicits gratitude as its natural response and by that the compassionate person is
thanked and cherished by the one they have helped. A union of mutual regard and
esteem is established, created by these interconnections of feeling and concern.
Thus it is that another can have a place in our life but without at once being
experienced as presenting a challenge and confrontation.167
This union of mutual regard and esteem that arises out of compassion takes on a new
importance once man leaves the state of nature and establishes the permanent
relationships of a civil society. We know that compassion is the only natural virtue, and
that all social virtues flow out of compassion, but compassion can also be silenced by
excessive amour-propre that exists in civil society. Rousseau believes that once he has
rediscovered a sense of amour de soi, the social man must next learn to channel his
natural compassion in a way that will give rise to a more benign form of amour-propre;
with the help of compassion, man must lift himself out of the egoism of civil society and
into a union of reciprocal regard with his fellow citizens.168 In order to accomplish this
task, Rousseau wants to turn man’s natural compassion from a particular other or a
particular group of others to the political community as a whole; our natural compassion
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must be directed towards the bond generated by a shared pride in country and nation. In
short, we must direct our natural compassion towards the national community.
Here we arrive at the intrinsic link that Rousseau makes between republicanism
and nationalism, a relationship which will be thoroughly examined in the following
chapter. For now, it is important to note that the bond which Rousseau wants to foster
must go beyond particular attachments to certain people or groups (factionalism), but it
cannot extend beyond the national community; the bonds that bind us to wider regional or
global communities are too thin to become meaningful objects of our compassion.
Moreover, the development of a common language is critical to the project of directing
one’s natural compassion towards the nation as a whole; a common language allows
people to join together and pursue common purposes as a community. As Anne M.
Cohler points out, “a language which embodies men’s passionate concern for each other,
men’s pity [compassion], can be used to call the people speaking it to a common pity
[compassion] for their common existence. They can come freely to a common opinion
and common activity.”169 Once a common language is established by members of a
community, they no longer act merely in terms of animal self-preservation; their common
language brings them closer to each other and allows them to feel the kind of compassion
for one another that would have been impossible in the state of nature. As such, Rousseau
believes that the moral republic must be founded on the nation; the state must be rooted
in the sociability and compassion of the nation, rather than the defense of property or
anything along those lines.170 As Cohler notes, “different languages and their
accompanying customs are the specific characteristic of nations, and they permit men to
use their capacity both to feel pity [compassion] and to make standards, their most
specifically human characteristics.”171 For Rousseau, the only way to establish the new
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and legitimate social contract which is grounded in morals and reciprocity is to direct our
natural compassion towards the national community.
Compassion plays the crucial role of balancing our natural love and our selfish
love; compassion allows us to moderate our amour-propre and to channel it in more
constructive ways, while at the same time keeping our rediscovered sense of amour de
soi connected to the community and to the public good. Compassion is the key to finding
the proper balance of loves so that we will not seek either to exploit others for our own
selfish ends or to abandon society altogether and pursue a life of solitude; compassion
allows us to become both, good men and good citizens. This ambitious project requires a
significant amount of self-realization and self-overcoming on the part of each citizen; the
moral republic requires citizens to rediscover a sense of amour de soi, direct their natural
compassion towards the nation, and overcome their narrow self-interests and the excesses
of amour-propre in the name of the common good.
As I hinted at earlier, one of the preconditions for establishing the political
community ruled by the general will is a shared national character and strong love of
country, to which citizens owe not only their lives, but also the morality of their actions
and the love of virtue. According to Rousseau, it is within one’s country that man “learns
to struggle with himself, to conquer himself, to sacrifice his interest to the common
interest,” and thus, without one’s country, man would never attain virtue, morals, or
meaningful freedom.172 Rousseau emphasizes that in order to achieve the balance of
loves needed for willing generally, we must forge strong social bonds of shared pride in
country and nation, and a sense of common identity, history, and destiny. We need a
shared sense of common life with our fellow citizens, and this is why Rousseau stresses
the importance of patriotism, shared customs, public education, and civil religion; his aim
is to sustain the unity of society under laws addressed to the common good.173
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3.5 Rousseau’s Republicanism and Democracy
Rousseau’s emphasis on freedom as self-mastery on the one hand, and on a shared
national identity and love of nation on the other, clearly distinguishes his brand of
republicanism from instrumental republicanism and civic humanism. Some readers of
Rousseau have a habit of intentionally downplaying his commitment to FSM and the love
of nation, while others have rightly referred to Rousseau as the founder of a distinct brand
of republicanism, as well as the father of modern nationalism. I will discuss the
connection between Rousseau’s cultural republicanism and nationalism in the next
chapter, but for now it is enough to note that Rousseau’s vision of the moral republic
reflects a conception of sovereignty that is more directly democratic than that of
contemporary liberal democracies. One of Rousseau’s biggest contributions to republican
political theory is his conception of a more democratic sovereign; the people as
sovereign. According to Rousseau, sovereignty cannot be divided or represented, it takes
shape through the general will of the citizens themselves, and it stands as the source of all
moral authority and legitimacy within the political community. No political thinker prior
to Rousseau succeeded in justifying on moral grounds why a citizen of a democratic state
ought to obey laws which he considers contrary to his self-interest; it was Rousseau who
revealed to us that beyond the narrow particular wills of mankind lies an enlightened will
that requires overcoming oneself and committing oneself to the common good. As Bloom
outlines:
Only Rousseau found the formula for that, distinguishing self-interest from moral
obligation, discerning an independent moral interest in the general will. He
discovered the source of moral goodness in modern political principles and
provided the flag democracy could march under. So, at least, it was understood.
Regimes dedicated to the sole preservation of man do not have the dignity to
compel moral respect.174
Rousseau conceives of a political community that is fundamentally democratic in
character, and his contributions to both republican political theory and the democratic
tradition would come to influence everyone from Alexis de Tocqueville to contemporary
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proponents of deliberative and radical democracy. He leaves us with the inescapable
feeling that our own representative political systems are missing something fundamental,
and that they fail to deliver on the liberty and equality they promise. In the next chapter, I
take a look at what distinguishes Rousseau’s unique brand of republicanism from
liberalism, and I examine the fundamental connection between Rousseau’s republicanism
and nationalism.
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Chapter 4
4

Is Rousseau a Liberal? Comparing Cultural

Republicanism and Liberalism
I begin this chapter by distinguishing between Rousseau’s unique brand of
republicanism and various forms of liberalism. I then go on to address the misconceptions
that some liberal thinkers appear to have about Rousseau’s political philosophy, before
examining the inherent link that Rousseau makes between republicanism and
nationalism. My argument is that while Rousseau’s unique brand of republicanism shares
some commonalities with liberal theory, other aspects of his philosophy make it
sufficiently distinct from liberalism to merit consideration as an altogether separate
perspective.

4.1 Political Neutrality and Perfectionism
When it comes to the relationship between politics and conceptions of the good,
liberals can be roughly divided into two camps: neutralists and perfectionists. Stephen A.
Gardbaum argues that among contemporary liberals there exists a divide between liberal
neutralists and liberal perfectionists, and that most contemporary liberals have largely
accepted the principle of state neutrality toward conceptions of the good. 175 This political
neutrality goes beyond purely procedural concerns and represents a substantive
conception of state neutrality regarding theories of what is valuable in life. As Gardbaum
explains, “according to this view, the state must remain neutral not only with respect to
religious conceptions and ways of life, as the establishment and free exercise clauses are
often taken to mandate, but also with respect to, and among, secular conceptions.”176
Liberal neutralists defend the principle of neutrality of justification, which holds that the
state must justify its actions without assuming the superiority of one conception over
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others. And while many contemporary liberals tend to defend substantive state neutrality
as both descriptively and normatively valid, some republican critics of liberalism accept
the descriptive claim of neutrality while openly criticizing modern liberalism at the
normative level, arguing that liberal neutrality represents a shallow political ideal. In
contrast to liberal neutrality, some forms of “republicanism [hold] that the ends of
government should be richer and more extensive; in particular, the state should promote
the primacy of public over private life and inculcate civic virtue among its citizens.”177
Nevertheless, Gardbaum argues that it is the content of the good pursued, rather than the
mere desire to pursue the good, that truly distinguishes liberals and their critics (including
republicans).
One of the most prominent contemporary liberal perfectionists is Joseph Raz, and
in The Morality of Freedom he famously offers a liberal foundation for a political
morality. Raz believes that while it is important that governments do not abuse their
power or infringe on individual liberties by unduly interfering in the lives of citizens,
governments are also justified in acting to actively promote individual freedom.178 Raz
identifies two related views often embraced by modern liberal neutralists: the first is that
governments ought to be blind to the truth or falsity of moral ideals or conceptions of the
good, and the second is that governments must be neutral regarding different people’s
conceptions of the good. According to Raz, both of these views “are inspired by the
thought that people are autonomous moral agents who are to decide for themselves how
to conduct their own lives and that governments are not moral judges with authority to
force on them their conceptions of right and wrong. That is why anti‐perfectionism is
often regarded as being a doctrine of political freedom.”179 Anti-perfectionists believe
that implementing and promoting ideals of the good life, even when these ideals are
worthy in themselves, is not a legitimate role of government; government action ought to
be neutral regarding ideals of the good life. As such, “the doctrine of political neutrality
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advocates neutrality between different conceptions of the good,” and Raz associates
political neutrality with the work of such liberal thinkers as Nozick and Rawls.180
However, Raz believes that Rawls and others who argue for political neutrality ultimately
fail to establish their case, and that they are too quick to assume a connection between
neutrality and autonomy. According to Raz, “political neutrality, conceived of as the
exclusion of ideals, prevents governments from acting for reasons, which appeal to
conceptions of the good, whether valid or invalid. Such a position relies on an elusive
distinction between one part of morality, the good, and another, the right.”181 Raz argues
that the traditional autonomy-oriented understanding of individual freedom leads to a
“moralistic” doctrine of political freedom (one that is based on the moral value of
individual liberty).182
Raz’s view is perfectionistic in that he believes that governments in liberal
societies ought to actively promote the ideal of personal autonomy as an essential
element of the good life. Raz describes the ideal of autonomy as follows:
Autonomy is an ideal of self‐creation, or self‐authorship; it consists in an agent's
successful pursuit of willingly embraced, valuable options, where the agent's
activities are not dominated by worries about mere survival. Autonomy in its
primary sense is to be understood as the actual living of an autonomous life;
autonomy in its secondary sense is to be understood as the capacity to live
autonomously. To be autonomous, agents have to meet three conditions: they
must possess certain mental capacities, they must have an adequate range of
valuable options, and they must enjoy independence from coercion and
manipulation. Autonomy should be distinguished from self‐realization, as
autonomous persons may choose not to realize their capacities. Autonomy itself,
in an environment that supports autonomy, is not similarly optional, as living
autonomously is the only way of flourishing within an autonomy‐supporting
environment.183
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Raz distinguishes his understanding of personal autonomy from the idea of selfrealization, which is so crucial for FSM, but he nonetheless states that living in an
environment that supports autonomy cannot be merely optional in liberal societies;
governments cannot be neutral about autonomy and they must actively promote and
foster an autonomy-supporting environment. Raz believes that once we embrace the ideal
of autonomy, we become morally committed to pluralism; in order to provide citizens
with an adequate range of valuable options, we must endorse moral pluralism.184 Raz’s
objective is to demonstrate that a powerful argument in support of political freedom is
derivable from the value of personal autonomy, and to show that liberalism can be
founded on the perfectionistic ideal of personal autonomy. As Raz explains:
The moral outlook the implications of which we have explored is one which holds
personal autonomy to be an essential element of the good life. We saw that such a
morality presupposes competitive pluralism. That is, it presupposes that people
should have available to them many forms and styles of life incorporating
incompatible virtues, which not only cannot all be realized in one life but tend to
generate mutual intolerance. Such an autonomy‐valuing pluralistic morality
generates a doctrine of freedom. It protects people pursuing different styles of life
from the intolerance which competitive pluralism has the inherent tendency to
encourage, and it calls for the provision of the conditions of autonomy without
which autonomous life is impossible.185
It is worth noting that contemporary liberal neutralists like Ronald Dworkin are
also concerned with moral ideas; in fact, Dworkin argues that political neutrality grows
out of an ethical commitment.186 Dworkin believes that since the government must treat
all citizens as equals, and since those citizens disagree in their conceptions of the good
life, the government fails to treat citizens equally if it prefers one conception of the good
over another. For Dworkin, the constitutive morality of liberalism is “a theory of equality
that requires official neutrality amongst theories of what is valuable in life.”187 As such,
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liberal neutralists differ from liberal perfectionists not in that they disregard morality
altogether, but in that their ethical commitments lead them to draw different conclusions
about the legitimate role of government.
Gardbaum states that “the structure of the general argument for political
perfectionism (whether of the liberal or nonliberal variety) is as follows: (a) one way of
life is better than others; (b) as a result, the state should promote it.”188 While this
statement is a bit misleading in that liberal perfectionists like Raz believe that personal
autonomy is an essential element of the good life rather than a substantive conception of
the good in and of itself, Gardbaum’s distinction between propositions (a) and (b) is
useful for differentiating between liberal perfectionism and neutralism. Several versions
of liberalism, including those associated with Locke, Kant, and Mill, confirm that
proposition (a) has no particular political implications and is not necessarily antiliberal.
Furthermore, Kant and Mill, who argued that personal autonomy represents a superior
way of life, also affirmed proposition (b); they held that the state should actively promote
this particular conception of the good. In order for the state to do so, Kant and Mill
believed that “the state must remain neutral with respect to all other particular values, for
autonomy requires that the individual freely choose her ends and not be coerced into
them.”189 In his book J. S. Mill, Dale E. Miller notes that while Mill is an advocate of
permissive neutrality, which forbids coercing people into adopting certain forms of life
and avoiding others, unlike Rawls or Dworkin he is not an advocate of persuasive
neutrality, which forbids the state from advocating certain forms of life over others. As
Miller observes, for Mill “society in general and the state in particular can actively
encourage people to choose temperate and productive ways of living. It can even
encourage them to develop their higher faculties and cultivate their individuality.”190
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If we take John Stuart Mill as an example, we can say that he is a liberal
perfectionist because he believes in the superiority of the ideal of personal autonomy, and
because he argues that the state must promote this ideal. Furthermore, while Mill opposes
coercing people into adopting certain forms of life and avoiding others, he holds that the
state can actively encourage citizens to choose productive ways of living over
unproductive ones, and he also believes that the state can foster the development of the
citizens’ higher faculties, thereby cultivating their character. In this sense Mill can be
distinguished from liberal neutralists, who believe that the state should be excluded from
the duty to promote any particular way of life over another.191 But how does Mill’s
perfectionism, which we have classified as liberal, differ from other forms of
perfectionism? Gardbaum contrasts Mill’s liberal perfectionism with the communitarian
perfectionism associated with MacIntyre and Sandel, noting that “communitarianism
advances the ‘communal’ way of life as better than (or rationally superior to) the ‘liberal’
and clams that, as a result, politics should be structured to promote it.”192 Although this
applies specifically to “communitarianism,” we can say that the distinction also applies to
Rousseau’s republicanism. Liberal perfectionism distinguishes itself from communitarian
and republican perfectionism by the content that it assigns to the rationally superior way
of life; liberal perfectionists may advocate the promotion of the moral ideal of personal
autonomy while republican perfectionists advocate the promotion of the moral ideals of
participation and civic virtue. As Gardbaum explains, “communitarians and liberal
perfectionists disagree only about the content of the better way of life, and not about the
role of politics or the relationship between politics and morality. The political
communitarian sees in the liberal perfectionist not moral emptiness, but moral error.”193
Ultimately, both liberal perfectionists like Mill and republican perfectionists like
Rousseau may readily concede that whether or not we can identify a way of life that is
inherently better than others, people in society will in fact continue to espouse different
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views about the good. However, a commitment to neutrality does not necessarily follow
from this reality. Perfectionists, both liberal and republican, “can claim that this diversity
of beliefs is precisely why the state has the affirmative duty to foster rationally superior
ways of life. Without the state’s help and guidance, people left to their own devices will
not be in a position to lead the most valuable life available to them.”194 A version of this
argument, which emphasizes the essential educational and moral role of political
institutions, is explicit in Mill’s Considerations on Representative Government and
Rousseau’s Considerations on the Government of Poland.195 In the following section, I
compare the political perfectionism of Mill to that of Rousseau in order to gain a better
understanding of the differences between liberalism and Rousseau’s republicanism.

4.2 Mill vs. Rousseau: Contrasting Liberal and Republican
Perfectionism
Although there is great diversity among liberal thinkers, for the sake of clarity I
will continue to use the example of Mill’s liberal perfectionism and compare it directly to
Rousseau’s particular brand of republicanism. Because Mill is a perfectionist whose
arguments have notable parallels with Rousseau’s, comparing Mill and Rousseau will
help us clarify the distinction between Rousseau’s cultural republicanism and liberalism.
Mill has a clear vision of the content of the good life: it consists of preserving and
promoting personal autonomy in order to enable individuals to develop their higher
faculties and cultivate their citizen character by choosing their own path in life, making
their own decisions, and interacting freely with others on a fair and equal basis.
According to Mill, preserving the good of individual liberty represents utility in the
largest sense and intervention for the sake of preserving this good and the benefits it
provides to the individual and to society as a whole is sometimes justified. Mill’s vision
of the good life remains a liberal vision, but it is clearly a moral and perfectionistic
vision.
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Without neglecting the importance of reason and intellectual faculties which are
so central to Mill, Rousseau is nevertheless primarily concerned with the sentiments.
Rousseau believes that the passions lie at the heart of good citizenship and the cultivation
of proper character, arguing that without the passions we would be bad citizens; although
the passions can have a negative influence on our behaviour, they can also be channeled
in constructive ways that engender civic virtue. J. S. Maloy argues that Rousseau
ultimately seeks to reform human nature in order to create noble and virtuous citizens in a
world that has been corrupted by the negative effects of amour-propre.196 As Maloy
points out, “in line with the best ancient examples of statesmanship, and in self-conscious
opposition to modern practice, Rousseau constantly emphasized the role of moeurs
(‘mores’ or ‘morals’) in shaping political outcomes.”197In fact, his deep concern with
moral psychology and his emphasis on the importance of recovering virtue have
“garnered Rousseau recognition as a precursor of a ‘formative project of republican
politics’ meant to endow citizens with the civic traits appropriate to self-government.”198
Rousseau stresses that the domain of moeurs merits as much attention from statesmen as
the domain of law; while laws regulate conduct, it is moeurs that regulate attitudes and
dispositions.199 As Maloy observes, “to the extent that conduct depends on disposition,
then, moeurs are the most fundamental element of politics.”200 Hence, since moeurs are
prior to laws and institutions, they play a crucial role in developing citizen character and
fostering civic virtue. In the Discourse on Political Economy, Rousseau famously
proclaims: “Make men, therefore, if you would command men: if you would have them
obedient to the laws, make them love the laws.”201
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Rousseau saw disposition and customs as central to fostering civic virtue and
proper citizen character, and he “sought to repair the moral fiber of the modern state and
to shore up its longevity.”202 As noted in the previous chapter, Rousseau believes that
citizens must rediscover a sense of amour de soi in the face of the corrupting influence of
amour-propre and, by directing their natural compassion towards the nation, channel
their amour-propre in more positive and constructive ways. According to Rousseau, in a
political community made up of citizens who are capable of reforming their nature and
character “all of the advantages of the natural state would be united with those of the civil
state, and freedom which keeps man exempt from vices would be joined to morality
which raises him to virtue.”203
Rousseau believes that narrow self-interest engendered by excessive amourpropre harms the public good, and he holds that political authority must rest with the
general will of the citizens. The general will refers to the enlightened will of the people
that “is always for the common good”; the rule of the general will amounts to the “rule of
justice.”204 In the Social Contract, Rousseau maintains that “the general will alone can
direct the forces of the State according to the end of its institution, which is the common
good.”205 Because citizens corrupted by the passions of excessive amour-propre are
incapable of seeing beyond their narrow self-interest and willing generally, in order to
establish proper political institutions we must reform the character of the citizens
themselves. In the Discourse on Political Economy, Rousseau contends that “the mainspring of public authority is in the hearts of the citizens, and that nothing can replace the
morals in sustaining government”206 For Rousseau, justice has to be reciprocal, and in
order for citizens to look beyond their narrow self-interest for the sake of justice, the
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citizens must have favorable dispositions. Thus, favorable dispositions must prevail
among the citizens if the state is to be ruled by the general will (rather than the particular
will of either a ruling elite or a self-interested majority). The citizens must be disposed to
embrace the general will, for when “the people is seduced by private interests … the
public deliberation will be one thing, and the general will another thing entirely.”207 As
Maloy points out, “it was imperative that [the citizens] refuse to see the freedom of
fellow citizens sacrificed to factional or private interests: fraternity and solidarity are
central to Rousseauvian civic virtue.”208 Like Mill, Rousseau stresses the importance of
cultivating a specific citizen character and a “civic ethos,” but Rousseau places much
more emphasis on fostering fraternity and solidarity than Mill does. Mill believes that
preserving individual liberty and fostering a public environment of open factionalism and
contestation leads to the cultivation of strong citizen character and ultimately to the
greatest happiness, whereas Rousseau puts more emphasis on cultivating a citizen
character that fosters solidarity as part of a shared moral consensus.209
Much like Mill, Rousseau believes that human moral dispositions are shaped
environmentally, and thus we ultimately need to create a social environment that nurtures
morality and civic virtue. With this in mind, Rousseau identifies specific social
institutions which can foster favorable dispositions among citizens and cultivate citizen
character, including: 1) a public education system that rears children “in common in the
midst of equality,” and nurtures pupils in the spirit of solidarity, 2) public spectacles
which promote a sense of solidarity and regulate behaviour through public scrutiny, 3) a
civil religion which promotes loyalty and commitment to the greater good, 4) strictly
defensive citizen militias which require that all citizens be prepared to defend the nation
against foreign invaders, and 5) a self-organized civil society, such as the civil “circles”
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of Geneva, which engage in independent discussion and criticism of the government.210
As such, we can see that Rousseau is deeply concerned with moral reform, channelling
the passions in more constructive directions, and cultivating virtue and a specific type of
citizen character. As Maloy observes, the moral “transformation” that Rousseau
advocates is “neither radical or deep in nature, nor invasive, coercive, or violent in
method”; rather, Rousseau wants to foster favorable dispositions among citizens and
cultivate a civic ethos that “redirects amour-propre from pursuing personal exploitation
to positive public enterprises.”211
Rousseau’s republicanism is perfectionistic in that it seeks to cultivate a specific
type of citizen character for the sake of promoting a particular conception of the good.
Despite claims to the contrary, Rousseau’s vision of the good is not incompatible with a
democratic society, but his understanding of democracy rests on the premise that a moral
consensus among citizens is possible, and that the purpose of the political process must
be to arrive at this consensus. As such, citizens must not approach the political process
with the intention of promoting their own narrow self-interest at the expense of the public
interest; rather, they must be committed to promoting the public interest and the common
good in the spirit of solidarity and reciprocity. Rousseau believes that this spirit of
solidarity and reciprocity can arise only within the relatively small republican
community, and Rousseau’s vision of the good is rooted in strong social bonds of shared
pride in country and nation, and a sense of common history and destiny. Over the years
some liberals have tried to place Rousseau’s theories within the liberal camp, and in so
doing they deliberately downplayed what they refer to as the “more communitarian”
strands within Rousseau’s work. Joshua Cohen acknowledges that he himself had been
guilty of this prior to 1999, but he now concedes that the strong emphasis on social
solidarity and national attachment in Rousseau’s work cannot be ignored (even though
Cohen himself finds these aspects of Rousseau to be “unattractive”).212 Ultimately, I
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argue that Rousseau is not a liberal; rather, he is the founder of a unique strand of
republican political theory which I refer to as cultural republicanism, and which is
distinct from liberalism.
In the previous chapter I mentioned that, for Rousseau, there are two
preconditions for establishing a society ruled by the general will. These preconditions
are: (1) citizens who embrace freedom as self-mastery (FSM) and are able to rediscover a
sense of amour de soi while using their natural compassion to channel amour-propre in
more constructive ways, and (2) a shared national identity and a strong love of country
that engender fraternity and solidarity. In endorsing FSM as the preferred conception of
freedom, Rousseau distinguishes himself from Mill (and contemporary liberal
perfectionists like Raz) by embracing self-realization as a central aspect of the good life.
As noted earlier, the ideal of personal autonomy that liberal perfectionists like Raz
endorse is distinct from the idea of self-realization because autonomous individuals may
choose not to realize their capacities, whereas for Rousseau a citizen who fails to
embrace FSM is not fully free. Rousseau also condemns factionalism; unlike a political
community governed by the general will, societies governed by competing factions such
as political parties are unjust because they split the general will and turn the political
process into a struggle between competing particular wills. Factionalism and partisanship
are inherently unjust for Rousseau; in the Social Contract he famously states that “it is
therefore essential, if the general will is to be able to express itself, that there should be
no partial society within the State, and that each citizen should think only his own
thoughts.”213 Factionalism entails advantaging some at the expense of others, and
Rousseau believes that the more divided the citizens become, the farther away they are
from justice. The content of Rousseau’s vision of the good life is therefore unique to his
particular brand of republicanism; unlike Mill, whose understanding of the good entails
preserving and promoting personal autonomy along with pluralism and contestation in
order to enable individuals to develop their higher faculties and properly cultivate their
citizen character, Rousseau’s conception of the good entails promoting FSM (including
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self-realization), a shared moral consensus, and a spirit of solidarity and reciprocity made
possible by the strong social bonds of a national community. Although Mill and
Rousseau both espouse perfectionistic theories which allow for political institutions to
play an important role in cultivating proper citizen character and in establishing the kind
of political and social environment that is most conducive to advancing the good, they
ultimately disagree about the specific content of the good, and about the best strategy to
promote it.
For a liberal perfectionist like Mill, the good consists of preserving and promoting
the ideal of personal autonomy in order to enable individuals to develop their higher
faculties and cultivate their citizen character by choosing their own path in life, making
their own decisions, and interacting freely with others on a fair and equal basis. This
ultimately increases happiness by leading to the improvement of individual character and
to the progress of society as a whole. To promote this good, society must remain neutral
with regard to all other particular values in order to foster an environment of pluralism
and contestation which allows for individuals to freely choose their ends without being
coerced into them. It is free choice and the diversity of opportunities that makes character
development and social progress possible, and so neutrality about other ideals is in this
case only a means to the end of advancing the ideal of autonomy.
For Rousseau, political participation and a shared national identity hold intrinsic
value and are therefore fundamental elements of the good life; moreover, the public good
consists of promoting FSM and the kind of citizen character that ensures the development
of a shared moral consensus and a spirit of solidarity and reciprocity made possible by
the strong social bonds of a national community. Political and social institutions must
strive to nurture the development of this moral consensus, rather than promote the kind of
pluralism and partiality that are so important for Mill. That is not to say that Mill neglects
the importance of community, or that Rousseau rejects the value of autonomy. Mill is
certainly concerned with fostering a public spirit and with nurturing a commitment to
community, and Rousseau sees political autonomy (each citizen thinking only his own
thoughts) as essential for the general will to take shape. The difference is simply that Mill
views liberty in terms of free choosing among diverse options, which allows individuals
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to determine the best choice, thereby improving their own character and advancing the
good, while Rousseau views liberty as self-realization and believes that advancing the
public good requires the development of a shared moral consensus.214 Rousseau’s moral
republic makes meaningful moral and civic freedom possible because it enables citizens
to will generally, but the ability to do so presupposes a different type of freedom
(freedom as self-mastery).215 Rousseau’s understanding of FSM enables citizens to move
beyond the mere satisfaction of appetites and allows them to make genuine moral
choices; rather than making decisions based on their own self-interest (which does not
constitute a “moral” choice), they are able to look beyond their own private good and
make decisions based on the common good (which constitutes a “moral” choice). This is
because certain moral choices are only available within the community ruled by the
general will, and citizens of other political communities do not have the same sets of
choices available to them. Because citizens of other communities cannot look beyond
their own self-interest, they are always competing with their fellow citizens rather than
working together to achieve ends greater than themselves. As a result, citizens of other
communities fail to develop the kind of solidarity that is needed for a more efficient
pursuit of the common good. Without a shared moral consensus and the fraternity and
solidarity it engenders, certain common goods will forever remain out of reach for the
citizens of other communities. As they do not live within a moral community that is
governed by laws that they have made for themselves, and as they have not attained
freedom as self-mastery (as opposed to some other conception of liberty), these citizens
are unable to achieve their full potential as human beings (self-realization). These citizens
are not free in the most meaningful sense of the word because those who are incapable of
looking beyond their narrow self-interests continue to be slaves to their appetites; their
options are limited to self-interested pursuits and political factionalism, and so the unique
possibilities that the collective pursuit of the common good offers are denied to them.
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4.3 Liberal Misrepresentations of Rousseau’s
Republicanism
To further emphasize the distinction between Rousseau’s republicanism and
liberalism, I will examine Joshua Cohen’s Rousseau: A Free Community of Equals.
Cohen is a student of John Rawls, and in his book on Rousseau he rightly points out that
Rawls was influenced by Rousseau’s ideas. In fact, Cohen states that “[Rawls] once said
in passing that his two principles of justice could be understood as an effort to spell out
the content of the general will.”216 With this in mind, Cohen tries to trace the
development of some of Rousseau’s most important ideas through thinkers like Hegel
and Kant all the way to Rawls and his political liberalism. While Cohen’s book provides
meaningful insights into Rousseau’s work, there are some important points of
disagreement between my own understanding of Rousseau’s philosophy and Cohen’s
reading. Namely, Cohen claims that Rousseau can be read as philosophically liberal and
sociologically communitarian, arguing that “the social compact itself and the conception
of a free community of equals do not establish strong communitarian demands of
solidarity: those demands are part of Rousseau’s political sociology of a free community
of equals.”217 The implication here is that liberals can accept those aspects of Rousseau’s
political philosophy which they find compelling, while distancing themselves from his
communitarian sociology, which is less compelling because it imposes demanding
conditions of civic solidarity as preconditions for a “free community of equals.”218 As
Cohen points out, “convictions about the possibility of a free community of equals need
some story about civic solidarities. If Rousseau’s is too narrowly confining, an alternative
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is needed.”219 I argue that Cohen is mistaken in his attempt to separate Rousseau’s
philosophy, which he claims is “liberal,” from his sociology, which he labels
“communitarian.” These two aspects of Rousseau’s work cannot be considered
separately, and any attempt to do so amounts to selectively picking and choosing
individual parts of his philosophy, even when this is incoherent. My argument is that
Rousseau is a cultural republican whose philosophy and sociology form a single,
comprehensive, and unified body of work.
One of the lynchpins of Cohen’s argument is the following claim:
Rousseau’s political ideal of a free community of equals has a strongly liberal
cast: it is founded on values of individual self-love and freedom, justified through
a compact among individuals conceived of as free and equal, aimed at advancing
the basic interests of individuals, concerned to establish relations of equality
under law, and it requires that equal citizens give priority in politics to their
common good. The arguments are secular; the only reason for the exercise of
political authority is public utility; there is no trace of an organic conception of
society; nor is authority designed to serve the cause of human perfection.220
There are several problems with this statement. When Cohen says that Rousseau’s
political ideal of a moral republic has “a strongly liberal cast,” he is actually saying that
the specific parts of Rousseau’s work that he deliberately chooses to focus on are not
incompatible with liberalism. Furthermore, when he calls the arguments “secular” he is
ignoring Rousseau’s considerable emphasis on the importance of civil religion. When
Cohen claims that “the only reason for the exercise of political authority is public utility”
he is ignoring the fact that Rousseau’s understanding of morality is not utilitarian, 221 and
when he says that authority is not designed to serve the cause of “human perfection,” he
is telling a half-truth. If by “human perfection” Cohen is referring to an abstract notion of
perfection, then he is certainly right; human beings are inherently imperfect creatures, as
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Rousseau readily acknowledges. However, if by “human perfection” Cohen is referring
to the perfectibility of citizens, then his argument is simply wrong (as Rousseau’s
endorsement of freedom as self-mastery and his emphasis on self-realization
demonstrates). Cohen deliberately downplays the importance of a substantive idea of the
good in Rousseau in order to make his philosophy more compatible with that of Rawls,
emphasizing instead how both thinkers believe in according equal consideration to
individual members of the political community.222 Cohen goes on to claim that Rousseau
does not seem to count the cultivation of human capacities and self-realization as part of
a common good to be promoted through collectively authorized laws and regulations.223
This is a half-truth. Self-realization and self-mastery may not be “part” of a common
good to be promoted, but they form the first of two necessary preconditions for
recognizing the common good and willing generally in the first place. Only those
individuals who embrace FSM and learn to fully realize themselves as citizens to the
extent that they are able to overcome their narrows self-interests are capable of
understanding the common good and willing generally. Furthermore, these citizens must
take an active part in creating the laws that govern them. Without such citizens, a
political community ruled by the general will is impossible. Without self-realization and
self-mastery, Rousseau’s moral republic is unattainable.
The second necessary precondition for recognizing the common good and willing
generally is a shared national identity and strong love of country that engender fraternity
and solidarity. This is an aspect of Rousseau’s thought that Cohen finds “unattractive,”
and which he tries to separate from other more appealing concepts (separating “liberal”
philosophy from “communitarian” sociology). Again, this cannot be done. We know that
Rousseau says: “Every people has or ought to have a national character, and if it lacks
one it would be necessary to begin by giving it one.”224 Hence, he believes that a shared
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national identity is intrinsically valuable and necessary because the national character
shapes citizens into virtuous members of the republican nation. In Emile he proclaims:
O Emile, where is the good man who owes nothing to his country? Whatever
country it is, he owes it what is most precious to man―the morality of his actions
and the love of virtue. If he had been born in the heart of the woods, he would
have lived happier and freer. But he would have had nothing to combat in order to
follow his inclinations, and thus he would have been good without merit; he
would not have been virtuous; and now he knows how to be in spite of his
passions.225
Rousseau goes on to say that it is only within his country that man “learns to struggle
with himself, to conquer himself, to sacrifice his interest to the common interest. It is not
true that he draws no profit from the laws. They give him the courage to be just even
among wicked men. It is not true that they have not made him free. They have taught him
to reign over himself.”226 As is often the case with Rousseau, these few passages alone
speak volumes about his unique brand of republicanism. First, we see that national
identity and the love of country are not something secondary in Rousseau; they are not an
afterthought in the form of a “communitarian” sociology designed to prop up a “liberal”
philosophy. We see that a shared national identity and the love of country are not merely
instrumentally valuable for the purpose of sustaining stable political institutions; rather,
they are also intrinsically valuable because they shape the character of citizens, teach
them to be moral and free, and allow them to attain the kind of self-realization that
enables them to will generally and perceive the common good. As such, a shared national
identity and love of country are a necessary precondition for establishing the moral
republic; without this precondition the general will cannot express itself. Second, these
passages from Emile also point us back to the first precondition―freedom as selfmastery. Rousseau tells us that a man born in the woods would be happy and free by
standards of the state of nature, but he would not be virtuous. Without his national
community, man would never learn to overcome his passions, to struggle with himself
and conquer himself, to sacrifice his interest for the common interest. Such a man would
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be incapable of seeing beyond his own private interest and understanding the public
good; he would be incapable of willing generally. Lastly, in these passages Rousseau
reveals that natural freedom is not the most meaningful form of freedom. He tells us that
although natural man is free by the standards of the state of nature, the national
community and its laws make him freer still because they make meaningful freedom
possible. What is meaningful freedom? Meaningful freedom requires more than license,
more than non-interference, and more than non-domination; it requires man to “reign
over himself,” to overcome his narrow self-interests and attain virtue (which couldn’t
exist without self-overcoming). Meaningful freedom is freedom as self-mastery (FSM).
And so we see the two preconditions coming together, each requiring the other: without
attaining FSM through self-realization and self-overcoming, the general will cannot
express itself, and without a shared national identity and a love of country to guide our
amour-propre towards the public good, there can be no FSM. The two preconditions are
interconnected, and without both of them there can be no “free community of equals,” at
least not according to Rousseau. Since it is therefore impossible to separate Rousseau’s
“liberal” philosophy from his “communitarian” sociology, it is clear that Cohen must
either acknowledge that he is merely picking and choosing those aspects of Rousseau’s
thought which he finds attractive while unduly dismissing the less attractive ones, or he
must abandon hope of making Rousseau’s philosophy compatible with Rawlsian
liberalism.227
Nevertheless, Cohen claims that his book is attempting to give a genuine and
holistic account of Rousseau’s philosophy, which he believes is closer to liberalism than
most people realize. Unfortunately, he makes several errors in his representation of
Rousseau’s ideas. Cohen says that “the interest in self-development appears not to play
any role in Rousseau’s account of the common good.”228 This is clearly wrong, because
while Rousseau does not give specific ways of developing ourselves as part of the content
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of the common good (for instance, he does not say that the common good demands that
all citizens learn Latin), he does believe that self-development in the sense of selfrealization and self-overcoming constitute a necessary precondition for understanding the
common good and actively pursuing it. Regarding the notion of a social association
regulated by the general will, Cohen states:
The ideal is a political community―a we, a people―unified by a shared
understanding of the common good defined in terms of the common interests of
the members, and a shared willingness on the part of the citizens to place
considerations of the common good above other considerations, and in particular
considerations of personal advantage, with well-founded confidence that the
society conforms to their understanding. It is a free community of equals: a
community because of the shared allegiance to the common good; a community of
equals because the content of the idea of the common good reflects a commitment
to treat other members as equals by giving their interests equal weight along with
one’s own; and a free community of equals because the members, assumed to
endorse the common good as the basis for legitimate law, have their own will as a
rule.229
Here Cohen is talking about a shared allegiance to the common good, an equal regard for
fellow citizens, and freedom in the sense of self-rule. There is nothing wrong with these
three points as such, but Cohen fails to recognize the common thread that runs through all
of these concepts: freedom for Rousseau means FSM, which is a demanding conception
of freedom that requires self-overcoming and self-realization, and this freedom, along
with a shared national identity and love of country, constitutes a necessary precondition
for establishing the community ruled by the general will in the first place. According to
Cohen, “solving the fundamental problem [of living under a sovereign without giving up
one’s freedom] requires a political community regulated by a shared understanding of the
common good. Only then, in the society of the general will, can people both be assured
the protection of their person and goods, and express the freedom that belongs to their
nature.”230 Cohen seems to believe that the “communitarian” aspects of Rousseau’s
thought are merely strategies that he employs in order to preserve and sustain the society

229

Ibid, 58-59.

230

Ibid, 60.

101

of the general will once it has already been established, and can be thought of as separate
from his “liberal” philosophy which establishes this society in the first place. Cohen does
not seem to understand that these “communitarian” aspects, including a shared national
identity and love of country as well as self-realization and self-overcoming, form the
necessary preconditions for the initial establishment of the society of the general will. It
is true that people can fully express the freedom that belongs to their nature once the
society of the general will has been established, but this freedom (in the form of FSM)
must be there to begin with, otherwise citizens would be incapable of willing generally.
Cohen also says: “under conditions of social interdependence, we can express our nature
as free and thus achieve moral freedom only if we have a general will, and having such a
will constitutes civic virtue. And that is to say that virtue, which is possible for us, is also
required for realizing our nature.”231 But the general will does not take shape in just any
given society under any given conditions: Rousseau clearly tells us that it requires
citizens who are free in the most meaningful sense (FSM), have a shared national identity
and culture, and love their country and its laws. We can fully express our moral freedom
only if we have a general will, but in order to have a general will we must have achieved
FSM and been part of a national community to begin with.
Regarding the necessary conditions for having a general will, Cohen says:
Because having a general will requires giving equal weight to the interests of each
citizen, people will only develop a general will if their conditions are
fundamentally equal, whatever the differences in the particular circumstances. In
the earlier discussion of “motivational complements,” I sketched the background
conditions of the formation of a general will, indicating how reciprocity,
generalized compassion, and the sense of self-worth might all come to support an
allegiance to the general will, assuming appropriate institutional conditions―in
particular, conditions in which we are regarded as equals and experience others as
such.232
All of this is accurate, but it is not the whole story. Cohen only gives us part of the story
in order to stay true to his narrative, claiming that for Rousseau “justice commands
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reciprocity, not saintly self-sacrifice.”233 Throughout the book, Cohen tries to move away
from the demanding preconditions Rousseau establishes for forming the society of the
general will. Cohen wants to separate the “more attractive” aspects of Rousseau’s work
from the “less attractive” ones, including the need for self-realization and selfovercoming (overcoming mere appetites and private interests in the name of the common
good), and for a shared national identity and strong love of country. The reason for his
strategy is simple: most liberals have an aversion towards the kind of self-realization and
self-overcoming that FSM calls for, and for the strong national bonds (including a shared
national identity) that are indispensible to Rousseau. Cohen wants to reconcile
Rousseau’s work with Rawlsian liberalism, and so he chooses to focus on equality,
reciprocity, compassion, and self-worth, while sweeping FSM and a shared national
identity under the rug. Unfortunately, by doing so he fails to give us the whole story
about Rousseau’s republicanism. We certainly need equality, reciprocity, compassion,
and self-worth, but these are fully embraced only by those individuals who attain FSM
and live inside a national community of fiercely patriotic citizens. Without these
preconditions, a society ruled by the general will would be impossible, because the
citizens would be incapable of overcoming their narrow self-interests and willing
generally in pursuit of the common good. That, at least, is what Rousseau believes. In
Chapters 5 and 6 I argue that the community ruled by the general will also presupposes a
shared moral consensus about conceptions of the good, a point that both Rawls and
Cohen would surely reject in their own work, but a point that Rousseau endorses when he
implies that political participation and a shared national identity constitute necessary
elements of the good life.
In Rousseau and Nationalism, Anne M. Cohler makes it clear that, for Rousseau,
national compassion is a prerequisite for the general will, and that the nation is the
foundation of the social contract. Cohler states that “the basis of a government or the
social contract is a certain kind of opinion, an attachment of the men in a political order
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to the whole, grounded in their national similarities.”234 Rousseau asserts that the sole
way to improve public morals and make men virtuous is to make them love their country,
stating: “It is certain that the grandest miracles of virtue have been produced by love of
one’s country: this agreeable and lively sentiment that joins the force of amour-propre to
all the beauty of virtue, giving it an energy which, without disfiguring it, makes of it the
most heroic of all the passions.”235 Loving one’s country and sharing a common national
identity with one’s fellow citizens allows individuals to turn their particular wills towards
the common good, and to replace individual self-interest with the common interest. For
Rousseau, the national community is unique and our attachment to it holds special value:
attachments to one’s family or faction are too narrow, and attachments that go beyond the
nation, such as an attachment to all of mankind, are too broad to sustain a community
ruled by the general will. As such, only passionately patriotic citizens can hope to
establish the rule of the general will, for it is “patriotic intoxication which alone can raise
men above themselves, and without which freedom is only a vain word and legislation
only an illusion.”236 Liberals like Cohen and Rawls may disagree with Rousseau on this
point, but if they choose to abandon the non-liberal preconditions that Rousseau imposes
on his moral republic (including FSM and a shared national identity), then they must
acknowledge that they are abandoning some of the most fundamental aspects of
Rousseau’s philosophy. We cannot separate these preconditions from Rousseau’s work
without losing the entire spirit of his philosophy, and we cannot selectively choose only
those of his ideas which we find attractive while ignoring the others in order to
(mis)represent him as a liberal. I have argued that while Rousseau’s philosophy shares
some common principles and concerns with liberalism, his cultural republicanism
constitutes an altogether different perspective. Cohen’s interpretation of Rousseau is
incomplete, and therefore incoherent. In the following section, I discuss the fundamental
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connection between Rousseau’s republicanism and nationalism. It is important to note
that some liberals also identify as nationalists, and liberal nationalism is a vibrant
theoretical strand within contemporary nationalist theory. Nonetheless, in Chapter 6 I
compare and contrast what I refer to as republican nationalism (a distinct strand of
nationalism inspired by Rousseau’s philosophy) with the liberal nationalism of Tamir and
Kymlicka. My argument is that republican nationalism constitutes a separate strand of
nationalist theory, and that it represents a defensible alternative to liberal nationalism.

4.4 Cultural Republicanism and Nationalism
In Chapters 2 and 3 I argued that Rousseau made an important contribution to the
republican theoretical tradition, and that his philosophy constitutes a distinct strand of
republican theory which I refer to as cultural republicanism. Rousseau’s cultural
republicanism emphasizes two important preconditions that the political community must
satisfy in order to establish the rule of the general will. The republic must consist of (1)
citizens who embrace FSM and are capable of rediscovering a sense of amour de soi
while using natural compassion (directed toward the national community) to channel
their amour-propre in more constructive ways, and (2) citizens who have a shared
national identity and a strong love of country, which engender fraternity and solidarity.
At this point I want to argue that along with being an important thinker of the republican
tradition, Rousseau is also the philosophical father of modern nationalism. Perhaps the
single most comprehensive account of the intrinsic connection between Rousseau’s
republicanism and nationalism is Cohler’s aptly named Rousseau and Nationalism, and I
will pay special attention to it in this section.
According to Cohler, “Rousseau was the chief founder of the doctrine of
nationalism”237 and “the first true nationalist.”238 Marc F. Plattner states that “the thinker
perhaps most commonly identified as the key source of the nationalist idea is none other
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than Jean-Jacques Rousseau.”239 Hans Kohn claims that Rousseau “provided the modern
nation with its emotional and moral foundations” and prepared “the modern basis” of
“the identification of nation and state.”240 A 1939 volume by the British Royal Institute of
International Affairs states: “The importance of Rousseau’s thought in the development
of the idea of nationalism can hardly be exaggerated…. Rousseau provided the
theoretical foundations upon which alone the nationalism of the nineteenth century could
be built.”241 Rousseau’s emphasis on the importance of a distinct national character and
the love of country as prerequisites for establishing a society ruled by the general will
laid the foundation of the modern understanding of national identity. Rousseau’s
philosophy provides nationalism with a moral justification that continues to appeal to
nationalist thinkers well into the twenty-first century. Plattner argues that “whatever
Rousseau’s deepest intentions or hopes for the political future of Europe may have been,
without question his thought played a crucial role in laying the foundations of modern
nationalism.”242 All of the national independence movements and revolutionary struggles
that came after him owe their philosophical roots to Rousseau. Furthermore, Plattner
suggests that Rousseau may not only be the founder of modern nationalism, but also of
modern internationalism, which is fundamentally defined by the nation-state system
which Rousseau helped create. According to Plattner:

One might say that modern nationalism, unlike the patriotism of the ancient city,
does not necessarily entail harshness to foreigners. Indeed, a Georgian political
thinker, Ghia Nodia, has argued that “the idea of nationhood is an idea of
membership in humanity” and points out that the United Nations, based on the
principle of respect for national sovereignty, is the first political organization to
embrace virtually the whole world. Thus it may not be so paradoxical as it first
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appears that Jean-Jacques Rousseau might be viewed simultaneously as a founder
of both modern nationalism and modern internationalism.243
Rousseau defines nations as groups of people who live together and share a
common language, as well as common habits and manners.244 According to Rousseau,
the movement of men from the state of nature to civil society takes place gradually and is
made possible by certain characteristics that are unique to mankind. In the state of nature
men are independent and self-sufficient, and they come into contact with other members
of their species only when driven to do so by necessity (e.g. the need to procreate).
However, men are eventually compelled by various circumstances, including the
particularities of territory and climate, to come together and form pre-political
communities (permanent settlements which lack formal political institutions). Life in
these communities leads to the formation of a common language, as well as shared
customs and manners, resulting in the development of an unconscious sociability
grounded in these pre-political similarities. Over time these groups develop a distinct
character and culture, as well as strong social and communal bonds. Rousseau believes
that these pre-political communities come to constitute what we now think of as nations,
and so through his account of the state of nature “Rousseau has made it theoretically
possible to find a prepolitical sociability on which nations could be based.”245 According
to Rousseau, within every community language must develop before politics. A
community of individuals who decide to live together must first form a nation constituted
by a common language and customs rather than by politics.246 Once groups of people
beyond the family unit are forced to live together by physical circumstances stemming
from natural divisions of the land, the concentration of resources in particular areas, and
so forth, they begin to form nations. As Rousseau states: “Men, who have up to now been
roving in the woods, by taking to a more settled manner of life, come gradually together,
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form separate bodies, and at length in every country arises a distinct nation, united in
character and manners, not by regulations or laws, but by uniformity of life and food, and
the common influence of climate.”247 Thus, the external circumstances which compel
men out of the state of nature lead them to form nations with their own distinct national
character and culture.
In his understanding of what constitutes a nation, Rousseau extends the term to
include all groups of people that can be distinguished by a unique language and distinct
customs and manners. In his discussion of southern languages in particular (languages
that formed in milder climates, such as in Southern Europe), Rousseau praises them for
embodying a passionate concern for other members of the nation. Rousseau believes that
while the harsh climate forced northern peoples to develop languages which are closely
tied to their self-preservation, southern peoples lived in less dire circumstances and were
thus able to develop more colorful and passionate languages that allowed them to appeal
to common purposes extending beyond bare survival. For this reason, Rousseau feels that
men in southern nations in particular have all the distinguishing characteristics of men;
rather than acting merely in terms of animal self-preservation, they created a language
that brought them closer to each other and allowed them to feel the kind of compassion
for one another that would have been impossible in the state of nature. One need not
necessarily accept Rousseau’s distinction between northern and southern languages to
understand the point that he is making about the importance of a common language for
establishing the kind of communities that make allegiance to a shared national identity
possible. As Cohler points out, “different languages and their accompanying customs are
the specific characteristic of nations, and they permit men to use their capacity both to
feel pity [compassion] and to make standards, their most specifically human
characteristics.”248 Rousseau would argue that any legitimate political community must

247

Jean-Jacques Rousseau, “Discourse on the Origins of Inequality,” 81. Emphasis on “nation” is

my own.
248

Ibid, 124-125. Note: I feel that the word “compassion” is a better translation of Rousseau’s
pitié than “pity,” which is Cohler’s preferred term. As noted in Chapter 3, for Rousseau pitié denotes more
than what is commonly understood as “pity” in English.

108

be founded on nations, because, as noted earlier, the mutual regard and compassion
required for the general will to take shape is only possible within nation-states.
While the type of generalized compassion that exists in political communities first
developed within nations, it has since been overwhelmed in modern society by amourpropre, which takes the form excessive competitiveness, greed, and vanity. As we know
from the Discourse on Inequality, the development of amour-propre ultimately led to the
establishment of an illegitimate social contract through which the rich tricked the poor in
order to preserve their unequal property. Rousseau claims that this is the nature of the
social contract described in various ways by Hobbes and Locke, a social contract which
formalized the principle of might makes right and “converted clever usurpation into
unalterable right.”249 However, Rousseau’s ultimate goal is to establish a new, legitimate
social contract that is grounded in morals and reciprocity, and that institutionalizes the
rule of the general will. In order to achieve this, Rousseau believes that the state must be
founded on the sociability and compassion of a nation, rather than the defense of
property.250 A group of individuals living in a national community develop pre-political
similarities, including a common language and shared customs and manners (a national
identity and culture), which provide them with the common ground for morality and the
capacity to act collectively as a group. In book 1 of the Social Contract, Rousseau says
that the fundamental problem of the entire work is to find a form of association in which
each man “while uniting himself with all, may still obey himself alone, and remain as
free as before.”251 The conclusion he reaches is that the association in question can only
be the nation (sub-national associations are too narrow, supra-national associations are
too broad), and that the political institutions of the political community ruled by the
general will must be built around the nation. As Choler indicates:
Can men both preserve themselves and express their freedom? To preserve
themselves, men must come together and act according to a single standard. To
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be free, a man must act according to a standard that he has prescribed for himself.
To be free together, a group of men must all act with respect to a single standard
to which they have all agreed.252
This single standard emerges to a sufficient extent only within the nation (shared national
identity and culture, moral consensus on conceptions of the good), and so in order for the
social contract to be legitimate and for man to remain free even within civil society, the
political community must be grounded in the national community.
Once nations have been formed, it becomes necessary to give these nations
legitimate political institutions. In the Constitutional Project for Corsica, Rousseau
advises the Corsicans to form the type of government that has the least costly
administration, requires the smallest number of official categories, and has the shortest
chain of command. According to Rousseau, this “is in general the republican and in
particular the democratic state.”253 Here Rousseau distinguishes his preferred brand of
republicanism, which is participatory and hence democratic, from more institutional and
aristocratic versions of republicanism.254 He then goes on to tell the Corsicans that every
people ought to have a unique national character, and that love of country is the best
foundation for establishing lasting political institutions. Rousseau asserts that “the best
motive force of a government is love of the fatherland and this love is cultivated along
with the fields.”255 Thus, we see a direct connection between Rousseau’s cultural
republicanism and nationalism: the government formed by the legitimate social contract
must be republican and democratic, but it must also be grounded in the nation. In
Considerations on the Government of Poland, Rousseau directly links love of country
with republican virtue and freedom, and he argues that only citizens who love their
country can sustain strong republican institutions. Rousseau tells the Poles that they must
direct the passions of their citizens towards the love of country, because “loving the

252

Cohler, Rousseau and Nationalism, 141.

253

Rousseau, “Corsica,” 127.

254

Historically, republicanism was not synonymous with participatory democracy. For example,
the republicans of Rome (such as Cicero) and of the Renaissance (such as Machiavelli) were not democrats.
255

Rousseau, ”Corsica,” 156.

110

fatherland, they will serve it out of zeal and with all their heart. With this feeling alone,
legislation, even if it were bad, would make good Citizens; and it is never anything but
good citizens who make up the force and the prosperity of the State.”256 He praises the
Poles for having survived as a nation despite having been conquered by more powerful
states throughout their history. In so doing, Rousseau makes it clear that the Poles
constitute a pre-political nation with commonalities that can endure various forms of
political rule, including rule by foreign powers. He then tells the Poles that the only way
to secure the stability of their state for the future “is to establish the Republic so much in
the hearts of the Poles that it continues to exist there in spite of all its oppressors’
efforts.”257
Rousseau advises the Poles to establish national institutions which will preserve,
cultivate, and further develop their distinct national character. He indicates that political
institutions must be grounded in the nation, but he also acknowledges that the national
identity and culture are subject to change; once national institutions are established, they
have an important role to play in shaping and guiding the development of the national
character. According to Rousseau, “national institutions are what form the genius,
character, tastes and morals of a people; what make it itself and not another, what inspire
in it that ardent love of the fatherland founded on habits impossible to uproot, what make
it die of boredom among other peoples in the bosom of delights of which it is deprived in
its own.”258 From this we can see that Rousseau believes in building on a pre-existing and
pre-political group, the nation, but he does not claim that the political institutions built
around the nation are going to leave it unchanged. In fact, as Cohler observes:
To build a political order on a nation alters the nation irrevocably. Even
systematic expression of the pre-existing opinion would alter it, and Rousseau
proposes more than this in the development of passionate attachment to a political
order that did not previously exist. It seems, therefore, that Rousseau expresses
both the opinion of later nationalists that political order ought to be built on
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nations and a further opinion, which they never publicly admit, that this building
will make radical changes in the nations.259
Rousseau wants the Poles to ground their new republic in the Polish nation, but he also
wants them to establish social institutions that will encourage an attachment to the new
national political order, including public education taught by citizens and intended for
fostering a common national spirit, bestowing public honors on those who contribute
most to the nation, and ending the luxury and privilege enjoyed by the nobles. The
ultimate goal of all social institutions is to make the citizens passionately attached to the
political order, which is grounded in their common membership in the nation.260
Rousseau asserts that the people will not form a strong attachment to their
political institutions without a public education. The citizens must be taught from a very
young age to identify with the country as a whole instead of seeing the world solely
through the lens of individual self-interest. This type of national education is not only
desirable for Poles but for all free men, and it is absolutely necessary in a republican
society. As Rousseau explains:
It is education that must give the national form to souls, and direct their opinions
and their tastes so that they will be patriots by inclination, by passion, by
necessity. Upon opening its eyes a child ought to see the fatherland and until
death ought to see nothing but it. Every true republican imbibes the love of the
fatherland, that is to say, of the laws and of freedom along with his mother’s milk.
This love makes up his whole existence; he sees only the fatherland, he lives only
for it; as soon as he is alone, he is nothing: as soon as he has no more fatherland,
he no longer is, and if he is not dead, he is worse than dead.261, 262
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Again we see in Rousseau a clear and unshakable link between nationalism and
republicanism; a shared national identity and the love of nation are (along with FSM) the
necessary preconditions required for establishing a republican political community ruled
by the general will. Without a shared national identity and a strong love of nation,
citizens would not be capable of looking beyond their individual self-interest and
committing themselves to the common good. Rousseau’s cultural republicanism is
therefore intrinsically linked to nationalism, and his republican ideals cannot be
considered separately from his defense of nationalism. When Liah Greenfeld argues that
nationalism was the form in which democracy first appeared in the modern world
(embodied in the idea of the people as bearers of sovereignty), meaning that nationalism
originally developed as democracy, she is surely thinking of Rousseau. For Rousseau as
for Greenfeld, democracy and nationalism are “inherently linked, and neither can be fully
understood apart from this connection.”263
We know that Rousseau’s philosophical starting point is the nation as a prepolitical group with particular characteristics. The legitimate government and the social
institutions that support it must be built on the nation, because only within the nation is it
possible to develop the kind of passionate attachment to the political order that is required
for the general will to take shape. This type of attachment requires both nations and
politics; it leads to the establishment of a common will or opinion that is based on the
nation but expressed through politics (the general will).264 As Cohler observes:
Men were to be made to love their laws and the government to serve them
through good administration of the laws. This procedure assumes that the political
and national cores are there to be found by the good politician; his task is to seek
out and try to strengthen the cores with institutions designed to make men
attached to their nation and to establish good opinion.265
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The nation is the foundation for the legitimate social contract, and national attachments
which lead to a strong feeling of compassion for one’s fellow citizens (love of nation) are
a prerequisite for the general will. This is because in nations men share a certain character
and culture that exist prior to the social contract, including a common language, customs,
and manners. These men immediately recognize their similarities, such as their ability to
communicate in the same tongue, and as a result they form the strong bonds required for
willing generally. Cohler notes that “Rousseau did settle on nations, as we have seen in
the Considerations on Poland, for the pre-existing community upon which a free political
convention could be established,” adding that for Rousseau “the nation should be the
foundation for the social contract.”266 In order to be legitimate, the social contract must
reflect the general will of the governed, and only members of a national community are
capable of feeling enough compassion for each other to equate the fate of their fellow
citizens with their own fate as individuals, and to overcome narrow self-interest in the
name of the common interest. Thus, “the basis of a government or the social contract is a
certain kind of opinion, an attachment of the men in a political order to the whole,
grounded in their national similarities.”267 This does not mean that the nation will not
change over time, or that the national culture cannot accommodate new members, but it
asserts the existence of a common national culture that can survive independently of the
political system, which is why the Polish nation could endure the rule of foreign powers
and still remain distinct.
In the Discourse on Political Economy, Rousseau makes two claims: that the
government must be made to follow the general will, and that the citizens must be made
to love the laws. Simply put, particular wills must be made to agree with the general will,
but this can only be achieved once the people learn to love their nation, its laws, and its
ways of living. So we see that for Rousseau, forming a legitimate political order is
directly connected to the love of nation.268 The legitimate political community is
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grounded in the nation, a group of people defined by their pre-political characteristics,
but the will and character of the nation and its members is best expressed through
politics. Cohler explains:
In Rousseau’s understanding, the expression of men’s peculiar humanity can only
be achieved for most men through politics. He denies the possibility put forth by
the Enlightenment and by Kant that the universality of the arts and sciences is an
adequate substitute for political community. In order to be moral, men cannot act
merely on the basis of their freedom, or their capacity to create standards; rather
they must limit that freedom to some appropriate use. In national politics, the
expression of men’s peculiarity is carefully limited to a feeling of unity with some
other men. This feeling of unity, however, is based on common membership in a
nation whose criteria are nonpolitical.269
And while the nation is the starting point for the political community, we also know that
nations change over time. Rousseau acknowledges that all societies change; the chief task
of the political order is to allow the expression of these changes and to adapt to them. The
character and culture of the nation are not set in stone, and the content of the general will
changes over time. Nevertheless, the “adaptation” and “integration” of these changes can
only take place within a pre-existing national community.270
Once a legitimate political order is established around the nation, the next step is
to ensure that the republic remains free and virtuous in a world of rival states and
aggressive foreign powers. When it comes to international affairs, Rousseau advocates a
defensive form of nationalism that seeks to preserve the nation’s sovereignty and distinct
character and culture, while respecting the sovereignty and culture of other nations.
Unlike Machiavelli, Rousseau opposes all forms of military expansionism at the expense
of other nations, and unlike Madison, he wants to keep the republic small and selfsufficient. In Government of Poland, Rousseau famously states that “whoever wants to be
free ought not to want to be a conqueror.”271 At the same time, he claims that the best
way to keep a nation from itself being conquered is to ensure that all its citizens are
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endowed with civic virtue and the love of nation. With regards to Poland, Rousseau
proclaims that “a single thing is enough to make it impossible to subjugate; love of the
fatherland and of freedom animated by the virtues that are inseparable from it.”272 If its
citizens are honorable, virtuous, and fiercely patriotic, no foreign power will find it
profitable to invade the republican nation; invaders would not only be fighting a monarch
or an army, but an entire people, each individual citizen committed to defending every
inch of the fatherland with his life. Rousseau urges the Poles to cultivate that “patriotic
intoxication which alone can raise men above themselves, and without which freedom is
only a vain word and legislation only an illusion.”273 This is because only the love of
nation can compel men to look beyond their narrow self-interest and risk their very lives
in the name of the common interest; without this love, the general will cannot express
itself.
We can see that for Rousseau the strength of a nation depends on the virtue of its
citizens, not on military power or commercial success. In fact, Rousseau is a staunch
critic of the excessive inequality between the rich and poor that characterizes most
modern states (for more on this, see Chapter 3). Rousseau believes that a nation which
allows the love of country to be replaced by a love of money in the hearts of its citizens
becomes weaker and less prosperous; as individual citizens accumulate vast amounts of
wealth, they are no longer concerned with the common good, but only with their own
private interest. This threatens national solidarity and destroys the general will. As he
warns the Poles, “the immense distance between the fortunes that separate the Lords from
the petty nobility is a great obstacle to the reforms needed for making the love of the
fatherland the dominant passion. While luxury reigns among the Great, cupidity will
reign in all hearts.”274 Rousseau believes that all economic institutions must be
subordinate to the political: economics have no logic separate from the common good,
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and economic activities which are intended to benefit individuals at the expense of the
whole are to be discouraged because they take away from national patriotism.275
Once all of these aspects of Rousseau’s philosophy are taken into account, it
becomes clear that his understanding of FSM has three interconnected layers: individual
self-mastery, political self-rule (in the form of a participatory democracy), and national
self-determination. Referring back to McCallum’s typology, the agent for self-mastery is
the individual, and the goal is to overcome the obstacles of mere appetites and narrow
self-interests in order to realize one’s full potential and pursue the common good. The
agent for political self-rule is the citizen body, and the goal is for all citizens to
participate actively in politics in order to be governed by laws that they make for
themselves. Finally, the agent for national self-determination is the nation-state, and the
goal is to preserve and promote the sovereignty of the state within an international system
of rival powers. More will be said about these three layers of self-rule in the coming
chapters, but for now it is enough to emphasize that all three are interconnected and
critically important for Rousseau’s understanding of freedom: existing states can have
self-determination without political self-rule or individual self-mastery (e.g. authoritarian
states), or they can have both self-determination and some form of political self-rule
without individual self-mastery (e.g. modern liberal democracies). Theoretically, a state
could possess individual self-mastery and national self-determination without political
self-rule (e.g. some version of Plato’s ideal city). Nevertheless, for Rousseau the three
layers are interconnected, and they are inseparable from his understanding of FSM.
Rousseau is rightly considered the philosophical father of modern nationalism,
and there is a clear and unshakable connection between his republican philosophy
(cultural republicanism) and nationalism. Rousseau is a strong advocate for republican
and democratic political institutions, and he wants all citizens to take an active part in
shaping the laws that govern them. In addition, he believes that the legitimate political
community must be grounded in the nation, because only a common national identity and
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culture allows for the developments of the kind of strong social bonds that are required
for the general will to express itself. This is because only citizens who embrace both FSM
and the love of nation are capable of overcoming narrow self-interests in the name of the
common interest. It is therefore clear that we cannot separate Rousseau’s nationalism
from other aspects of his work without losing the essence of his philosophy. In the
following chapter, I consider the importance of Rousseau’s philosophy in the twenty-first
century, and I look at the connection between Rousseau’s cultural republicanism and the
work of contemporary republican thinker David Miller. I argue that Rousseau’s work
gives rise not only to a distinct strand of republican political theory, but also to a unique
strand of cultural nationalism which I call republican nationalism. I believe that
republican nationalism makes an important contribution to the current debate within
nationalist theory, and that it represents a defensible alternative to liberal nationalism.
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Chapter 5
5

Republican Nationalism
In the preceding chapters I argued at length that Rousseau is both the father of

modern nationalism and a major thinker of the republican political tradition. Rousseau
recognizes the importance of stable republican institutions and participatory democracy,
and he also defends the need for a shared national identity and love of nation. In this
chapter, I consider whether we can combine republican citizenship with nationalism as
Rousseau attempts to do. In so doing, I will pay special attention to the works of
contemporary political theorist David Miller, who embarks on a similar project to that of
Rousseau

5.1 Nationalist Theory Today
In the past two decades, the idea of liberal nationalism has emerged as an attempt
to bridge the divide between liberalism and nationalism. Will Kymlicka says that “the
failure of liberalism to understand nationalism is directly related to its failure to
acknowledge the inevitable connection between state and culture,” and liberal nationalists
along with other cultural nationalists have sought to address this problem.276 Liberal
nationalists seek to formulate a theory of nationalism that is neither too exclusive nor too
individualistic, and that takes the “illiberal sting” out of nationalism by making
nationalism compatible with liberal principles and practices.277 However, Ronald Beiner
worries that this proposed liberal compromise may rob nationalism of some of the things
that make it so philosophically interesting. According to Beiner,
The national idea has been such a potent force in the modern world, and opens up
a far-reaching philosophical alternative to liberal conceptions of the meaning of
life.… precisely because it involves profound ideas of national belonging,
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national destiny, rootedness in a community of experience, memories of a shared
past, and so on. These are powerful notions, and I am not sure that one is able to
do justice to them by seeking to split the difference between liberalism and
nationalism.278
I would argue that the liberal nationalism of someone like Tamir or Kymlicka amounts to
more than an attempt to merely “split the difference” between liberalism and nationalism,
but it is clear that the liberal nationalist project has its critics. In addition, theorists like
David Miller have challenged some proposed liberal compromises, such as Maurizio
Viroli’s patriotism as an alternative to nationalism. Miller asserts that “nationalism
helped to form an inclusive political community from people divided by attributes such
as class and religion. Since that is still our predicament today… we need the cement of a
common culture to underpin our democratic politics.”279 Miller wants to embrace the
values of republican citizenship as a form of politics and the values of nationhood as a
form of political identity, and he is interested in how to best implement these values in
the modern world. Miller links republican citizenship with a more participatory
conception of politics and with deliberative democracy, and he argues that republican
citizenship is better suited to bring diverse groups of people into public discourse than
alternative conceptions of citizenship.280 According to Miller, the types of virtues that are
required for republican citizenship can be cultivated only within the borders of a nation,
and a common national identity and culture are essential for producing the kind of
solidarity that is needed for a system of inclusive deliberative democracy to take shape. 281
Consequently, Miller posits that “political communities should as far as possible be
organized in such a way that their members share a common national identity, which
binds them together in the face of their many diverse private and group identities.”282
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Miller identifies four areas where liberals and nationalists will likely come into
conflict. These include 1) the question of whether national membership is freely chosen
or whether it is part of a cultural inheritance, 2) the question of whether the political
community is based on individual consent or whether political institutions ought to
express the collective will of the national community, 3) the question of whether public
life and political participation have intrinsic value (according to Miller, while liberals see
little intrinsic value in it, “nationalists, by contrast, are likely to attach intrinsic value to
public life, and to adopt a republican view of citizenship, according to which the citizen
should be actively engaged at some level in political debate and decision-making.”283),
and 4) the question of whether the state should be neutral with regards to culture (most
liberals tend to favor neutrality, but nationalists advocate non-neutrality with regards to
the shared national culture because an encompassing national culture gives the society its
distinct identity).284 Having identified four areas of likely contention, Miller maintains
that nationality is not in itself an illiberal idea. Our understanding of the principle of
nationality will undoubtedly affect how we think about important issues such as culture,
citizenship, education, minority rights, political boundaries, and so on, but Miller argues
that one can be a liberal and still value nationality. Miller appears to consider his own
perspective to be a variant of liberal nationalism, nevertheless, as Bhikhu Parekh points
out in his critical assessment of Miller’s theory, “although Miller is a liberal and wants
the nation to be constituted along liberal lines, he realizes that [liberalism and
nationalism] might conflict, and then he tends to privilege nationalism. Since the national
culture gives a society its distinct identity, he insists that the state cannot and ought not to
be neutral with respect to it.”285 Miller’s work constitutes an important contribution to the
current debate within cultural nationalism, and his project has clear parallels with
Rousseau’s work. Miller examines the relationship between republican citizenship and
nationality (shared national identity) in his three major works: On Nationality,
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Citizenship and National Identity, and National Responsibility and Global Justice. In the
following section, I consider Miller’s arguments and how they relate to the connection
that Rousseau makes between republican political theory and nationalism. Although
Miller tends to identify his own perspective as a variant of liberal nationalism, I suggest
that his theory points towards a distinctly republican approach to nationalism.

5.2 Republican Citizenship and the Nation
In Citizenship and National Identity, Miller looks at the meaning of citizenship in
the modern world, and he considers whether nationality continues to be a defensible
principle around which we should organize our politics. Miller believes that citizenship
and nationality are fundamentally connected; the conception of citizenship that he
advocates (he himself calls it “republicanism”) is feasible only where it can call upon the
ethical resources of the national community.286 Miller wants to “reassert the underlying
values of republican citizenship as a form of politics and nationhood as a form of political
identity, while simultaneously thinking about how to best implement these values in the
contemporary world.”287 Miller contrasts the republican model of citizenship with two
other models: liberal and libertarian. He claims that republican citizenship is better suited
to bring the diverse groups of people inhabiting modern nation-states into the public
discourse, and he advocates for a form of deliberative democracy that is more
participatory in nature than contemporary liberal democracy. Nevertheless, Miller
stresses that the types of virtues that are required by the republican model of citizenship
can only be cultivated within national borders, and that a shared national identity
constitutes a necessary precondition for achieving the solidarity necessary for a
functional system of deliberative democracy.288 We can already see that Miller’s project
has many parallels with Rousseau, who also believed that the moral republic had to be
grounded in the nation.
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Miller defines republican citizenship as follows:
The republican conception of citizenship conceives the citizen as someone who
plays an active role in shaping the future direction of his or her society through
political debate and decision-making. It takes the liberal conception of citizenship
as a set of rights, and adds to it the idea that a citizen must be someone who thinks
and behaves in a certain way. A citizen identifies with the political community to
which he or she belongs, and is committed to promoting its common good
through active participation in its political life.289
Proponents of republican citizenship believe that through open public discussion the
citizen body can arrive at a substantial degree of consensus on issues of common
concern, including the question of what constitutes the public good. Liberal critics of
republican citizenship would challenge this view and argue instead that in modern
political communities the search for consensus is incompatible with the fact of
plurality.290 As such, republican citizenship is more in line with Rousseau’s claim that a
moral consensus among citizens is possible, and that this consensus constitutes the
general will of the people. Miller argues that the republican conception of citizenship
places no limits on the types of demands that can be put forward in the political forum,
and it doesn’t discriminate between demands stemming from personal conviction or
demands stemming from group identity. Republican citizenship requires citizens to
provide reasons for what they are claiming, but it does not require them to give up their
potentially controversial conceptions of the good when entering the public sphere.
Furthermore, republican citizenship can be said to uphold a particular conception of the
good which may conflict with the private conceptions of individual citizens because it
clearly values a life of public participation over a strictly private life.
Miller believes that while the republican tradition has held up the active and
virtuous citizen as the model of good citizenship, one need not endorse active
participation in politics as the highest good in order to be a republican. According to
Miller, the republican view also supports the more modest position that politics
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constitutes a necessary part of the good life, but that individual citizens can assign
different weight to political participation depending on their own personal values.291
Miller is not always clear about whether he believes that political participation holds
intrinsic value, though he implies that this is the case when he says that nationalists are
“likely to attach intrinsic value to public life.”292 He states that it should “be part of each
person’s good to be engaged at some level in political debate,” indicating that
participation is a necessary part of the good life for everyone, but he maintains that this
“is consistent either with regarding political activity as intrinsically fulfilling or regarding
it as a necessary precondition for other activities which do have intrinsic value.”293 He
also states that those individuals who voluntarily exclude themselves from politics
(anarchists or religious fundamentalists, for instance) cannot be regarded as full citizens
on the republican view, even if they have the formal rights of citizenship. Moreover,
having such individuals living in a republican society would be “regrettable” and
republicans “may want to take steps to discourage the formation of such groups.”294 With
that said, it seems that Miller does personally believe that political participation holds
intrinsic value, but he also wants to stress that the republican conception of citizenship
can be embraced by those individuals who see participation as not holding intrinsic value
in and of itself, but believe that participation constitutes a necessary precondition for
carrying out other activities with intrinsic value. To further illustrate my claim, consider
what Miller says about the role of politics in the lives of republican citizens:
The republican citizen plays an active role in both the formal and informal arenas
of politics. Political participation is not undertaken simply in order to check the
excesses of government―voting out a corrupt administration―or in order to
promote sectional interests―lobbying for the producer group that you belong
to―but as a way of expressing your commitment to the community. Because the
citizen identifies with it, he or she wants to have a say in what it does. And he or
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she also wants as far as possible to reach an agreement with other citizens so that
what is done is done in the name of all of them.295
To me this says that Miller sees political participation as more than merely instrumentally
valuable; rather, just like Rousseau, Miller connects political participation with selfrealization, and his ultimate goal in politics is the expression of a general will.
Miller contrasts republican citizenship with the liberal model, arguing that “on the
liberal view to be a citizen just is to accept a certain set of principles, and to regulate your
private conduct within the boundaries set by those principles. This means that the liberal
has nothing to say to someone whose own conception of the good is not liberal except
that he must set that conception aside for political purposes.”296 As such, “groups who
wish to influence the parameters of politics, but attempt to do so by conceptions of the
good that are not already tailored to liberal requirements, are personae non gratae in this
perspective.”297 Consequently, Miller believes that the liberal view fails to address the
challenges of modern pluralism precisely because it excludes non-liberal political
arguments, thereby alienating those citizens whose very identity may depend on
expressing non-liberal views. Miller states that the republican view differs from liberal
citizenship in that it makes no such a priori demands, but demands only that citizens try
to persuade others of the truth of their claims through free and fair civil discourse. This
applies to both liberal and non-liberal political arguments; on the republican view each
citizen can try to convince others of the truth of his beliefs, be they liberal or not, as long
as he does it through civil discourse and not through the use of force. The only groups
that may be excluded from citizenship are those that exclude themselves voluntarily, such
as radical religious sects who reject all forms of state authority.298 Republicanism does
not set limits on the types of arguments that can be advanced in public, which means that
even such major questions as interpreting the constitution will be up for public debate and

295

Ibid, 84.

296

Ibid, 59.

297

Ibid.

298

Ibid.

125

discussion in a republican system (i.e. constitutional questions are not simply left up to
judges, but more will be said on this later). This is because the republican model of
citizenship holds that all rights, even the most fundamental ones, are ultimately grounded
in politics and public discussion. By contrast, some liberals believe that certain
constitutional rights, such as the right to property, are primary or “pre-political”, meaning
that they cannot be overridden by a democratic majority. Miller sums up the contrast
between republican and liberal citizenship as follows:
The contrast between republicanism and liberalism is not that the liberal
recognizes the value of entrenched rights whereas the republican does not, but
that the liberal regards these rights as having a pre-political justification while the
republican grounds them in public discussion. One institutional corollary is that
liberals will seek to make the judiciary the supreme arbiters of constitutional
rights – in effect the interpretation of liberal citizenship is entrusted to them –
while the republican gives this role to the citizen body as a whole.299
Thus, in the republican model, “there will be constitutional politics and not merely, as the
liberal would want, constitutional interpretation by judges.”300
Miller tends to describe himself as a defender of the “principle of nationality”
rather than a “nationalist.” Nonetheless, the two concepts appear to be synonymous, and I
will treat them as such for the purposes of this dissertation.301 Miller states that the
principle of nationality comprises three interlinked propositions: 1) a national identity is a
defensible source of one aspect of personal identity, 2) nations are ethical communities
that impose reciprocal obligations on members which are not owed to outsiders, and 3)
nations have a good claim to be politically self-determining (though not necessarily
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outright independent states).302 Although modern nation-states are not culturally or
ethnically homogeneous, Miller believes that the nation-state model can be adapted to
deal with this complex reality. He also believes that while there are certain limits to what
nation-states can do (limits which are set by the demands of global justice), nation-states
still have a wide range of options at their disposal, and the nation remains the primary
model of political organization in the modern world.303 In Chapter 1, I identified the five
elements that, according to Miller, distinguish nationality from other collective sources of
identity. In short, nations are imagined communities constituted by mutual belief,
extended in history, active in character, connected to a particular territory, and
distinguished from other communities by the distinct traits of their members. Although
the nation is an imagined community often founded upon national myths that are
historically inaccurate, it establishes a real common culture with substantive power and
influence over its members.304 Ideas of nationality are consciously created and recreated
by members of the national community, and nationalist ideas are diverse and have been
associated with left-wing movements as often as with movements on the right. With
strong echoes of Rousseau, Miller describes his defense of nationalism as follows:
I want to argue that nationality answers one of the most pressing needs of the
modern world, namely how to maintain solidarity among the populations of states
that are large and anonymous, such that their citizens cannot possibly enjoy the
kind of community that relies on kinship or face-to-face interaction. That we need
such solidarity is something that I intend to take for granted here. I assume that in
societies in which economic markets play a central role, there is a strong tendency
towards social atomization, where each person looks out for the interests of
herself and her immediate social network. As a result it is potentially difficult to
mobilize people to provide collective goods, it is difficult to get them to agree on
practices of redistribution from which they are not likely personally to benefit,
and so forth. These problems can be avoided only where there exists large-scale
solidarity, such that people feel themselves to be members of an overarching
community, and to have social duties to act for the common good of that
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community, to help out other members when they are in need, etc. Nationality is
de facto the main source of such solidarity.305
Miller rightly distinguishes between the types of nationalism that proclaim the superiority
of one nation over others (chauvinism), and the types of nationalism that are defensive in
character and recognize the equal claims of other nationalities.306 Like Rousseau, Miller
wants to defend this second conception of nationalism, which inherently rejects
expansionism, militarism, and imperialism. Also like Rousseau, Miller believes that this
second conception of nationalism can only take root within a republic that is limited in
size (not global), national in character, and that embraces republican citizenship and
deliberative democracy.307 Miller juxtaposes republican citizenship with two rival
conceptions of citizenship, liberal and libertarian. Although all three models of
citizenship attempt to accommodate the pluralism of modern nation-states, Miller
believes that republican citizenship is best equipped to deal with the challenges of
pluralism. He understands liberal citizenship as presupposing a set of rights enjoyed
equally by all members of society, including social, political, and civil rights. Liberal
citizenship establishes rights to a certain minimum of education, income, housing, and so
on that every citizen should have access to, but it does not include a direct obligation to
participate actively in politics.308 Miller goes on to address Rawls’ political liberalism in
some detail, and concludes that according to this model, as long as citizens acknowledge
shared principles of justice they are not required to participate in politics. Miller takes
issue with liberal citizenship’s lack of emphasis on direct political participation, and he is
also critical of the idea put forth by liberal neutralists like Rawls that citizens should
refrain from making appeals to controversial ideals of the good when engaging in public
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discourse. According to Miller, Rawls’ view does not allow for arguments that rely on the
truth of, for instance, a particular religious belief, even though a citizen’s identity may
depend precisely on that belief being true. As such, Rawls implies that all citizens must
first and foremost accept liberal principles about the justification and foundation of
rights, while agreeing to pursue their own particular visions of the good exclusively
through private and non-political means. However, some citizens may refuse to accept
the notion that fundamental questions about the justification and foundation of rights
should be off the table, or that one’s conception of the good is merely a private matter,
which will put them at odds with the liberal political order. Miller believes that in cases
such as these, liberalism’s only solution will be to assert the supremacy of the liberal
model, forcing all citizens to accept it.309 Miller concludes by claiming that “the liberal
conception of citizenship does not constitute a fully adequate response to pluralism”
because on this model “everyone is to be treated as a liberal citizen, and political claims
and demands which do not conform to the liberal model are simply ruled out as
inadmissible”; as such, “members of [non-liberal] groups will inevitably feel alienated
from the political realm.”310
On the other hand, Miller states that the libertarian model of citizenship tends not
to value citizenship for its own sake; citizenship is merely a means for individuals to
demand goods that require public provision. Miller believes this view to be expressed in
Robert Nozick’s Anarchy, the State and Utopia, “where the state is seen as originating in
the competition of protective associations to provide their customers with rightsenforcement services.”311 The state is seen as having a monopoly on the enforcement of
basic personal and property rights, and the citizens are regarded as parties to a universal
contract which gives the state that authority.312 Miller argues that the libertarian
conception of citizenship is ultimately unstable because there are certain public goods
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which will always be underproduced by the market, including cultural goods and nonprofitable goods such as roadways or streetlights. According to Miller, citizenship at its
core includes collective goods and rights enjoyed in common that are not adequately
provided for by the market; even though individuals living in the suburbs may not want
to pay taxes intended to address the problems of inner city neighborhoods, the well-being
of the society at large may require them to do so.313 Furthermore, even though individual
citizens may have no personal interest in advancing the cultural claims of certain
minorities (or the national culture at large, for that matter), the common good of the
community as a whole may require the use of taxpayer money for advancing common
cultural projects. Just like liberal citizenship, libertarian citizenship fails to address the
challenges posed by pluralism in modern nation-states; although libertarianism takes the
diversity of modern communities seriously, it fails to account for common rights and
goods that are enjoyed collectively rather than individually and that are not adequately
provided for by the market. Miller presents the republican conception of citizenship as a
superior alternative to both liberal and libertarian citizenship.

5.3 Miller’s Republicanism and Deliberative Democracy
Miller argues that the republican model of citizenship requires more than
representative political institutions as they exists in modern liberal democracies (where
political participation is optional, judges are the supreme interpreters of the constitution,
and so on). Republican citizenship requires a more participatory model of democracy―it
requires deliberative democracy. In recent decades the modern liberal state, which
functions within a system of competitive representation and embraces conventional forms
of rights-based constitutionalism, has come under attack by thinkers who advocate a
more participatory and deliberative approach to democracy, one that is more open and
engaging than liberal pluralism and competitive representation. These thinkers refer to
themselves as radical or deliberative democrats, and they call for rethinking interestbased politics in modern liberal societies. In essence, deliberative democracy combines
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elements of direct democracy and representative democracy in an attempt to develop a
more participatory political system that is feasible in the modern world. In this, radical
and deliberative democrats draw inspiration from Rousseau’s vision of the people as
sovereign, and his commitment to ensuring that all citizens take an active part in making
the laws that govern them. As Joshua Cohen and Archon Fung explain:
Radical-democratic ideas join two strands of democratic thought. First, with
Rousseau, radical democrats are committed to a broader participation in public
decision-making. Citizens should have greater direct roles in public choices or at
least engage more deeply with substantive political issues and be assured that
officials will be responsive to their concerns and judgments. Second, radical
democrats emphasize deliberation. Instead of a politics of power and interest,
radical democrats favour a more deliberative democracy in which citizens address
public problems by reasoning together about how best to solve them – in which
no force is at work, as Jürgen Habermas (1975: 108) said, “except that of the
better argument.”314
Deliberative democracy places greater demands on citizens than its liberal
counterpart. Liberal democracy requires citizens to, at the very least, abide by the law and
respect the autonomy of others and, at the very most, maintain vigilance over political
elites. Deliberative democracy, on the other hand, requires citizens to be well-informed
and educated, to be rational and open-minded, to engage actively in the democratic
process, to think critically about the views of their fellow citizens and about their own
views, and to sacrifice their own time and personal resources for the public good. As
Weinstock and Kahane emphasize:
Deliberative democracy in almost all of its forms requires a more active citizenry
and one with crucial dispositions, aptitudes, and virtues. Deliberative democratic
citizens must be disposed to seek agreement with other citizens, possess
deliberative traits that facilitate this process, and adopt a questioning, potentially
critical, attitude toward their own conceptions of the good. Plainly, the
development of the deliberative democratic personality requires an ambitious
educational project.315
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In many ways, modern theories of deliberative democracy are inspired by Rousseau’s
republican conception of citizenship and his emphasis on the need for overcoming narrow
self-interest in the name of the common good. Weinstock and Kahane explain:
Deliberative democracy clearly places moral demands on citizens. They cannot
simply press their self-interest but must be willing to exchange reasons with their
fellow citizens and to accept that the force of the better argument―the “balance
of reasons”―might lead to outcomes less favourable to their interests than could
have been obtained through a more confrontational politics.316
Therefore, its proponents “must remain alive to the possibility that deliberative
democratic politics will sometimes mean citizens doing less well by the standard of their
narrow self-interest.”317 Deliberative democracy depends directly on the citizens’ ability
to overcome their narrow self-interests and on their willingness to treat fellow citizens
with the same respect they afford themselves. This echoes Rousseau’s general will, a
fundamentally democratic vision of sovereignty that requires all voices to be heard and
always aims at the common good.
Miller defines the deliberative ideal as follows:
A democratic system is deliberative when the decisions it takes are arrived at
through a process of open discussion to which each participant is able to
contribute freely, but is equally willing to listen to and consider opposing views;
as a result, the decisions reached reflect not simply the prior interests or prior
opinions of the participants, but the judgments they make after reflecting on the
arguments made on each side, and the principles or procedures that should be
used to resolve disagreements.318
He argues that deliberative democracy rests on a different conception of ‘human nature in
politics’ from the liberal view. According to Miller, the liberal view “stresses the
importance of giving due weight to each individual’s distinct preferences,” while the
deliberative view “relies upon a person’s capacity to be swayed by rational arguments
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and to lay aside particular interests and opinions in deference to overall fairness and the
common interest of the collectivity.”319,320 Miller believes that public discussion has a
moralizing effect on citizens (if someone commits themselves to a particular position
publicly, it would be demeaning for them to then retreat to a more selfish posture), and he
cites a number of psychological studies (dealing with the behavior of juries and the
Prisoner’s Dilemma) which provide empirical evidence for this claim.321 Miller also
believes that engaging in public discussion makes citizens feel like they are a part of the
larger group and thus makes them more likely to cooperate with one another. Even those
citizens who ultimately disagree with the outcome of deliberation understand how and
why the outcome was reached, feel that they had the opportunity to have their voices
heard, and believe that they can contribute to more favorable outcomes in the future.
Miller argues that a major weakness in the liberal conception of democracy is the
vulnerability of preference-aggregating procedures to problems of social choice (standard
social choice theory invites us to pick a mechanism for aggregating preferences
regardless of the content of those preferences), and he claims that deliberative democracy
deals with this problem more effectively because it encourages people not only to express
their pre-existing political opinions through opinion polls, voting, and so on, but to form
their political opinions through political participation, including public debate and
discussion (because the content of people’s preferences emerges in the course of
deliberation, we can select the decision procedure most appropriate to the case in
hand).322 Miller also differentiates between deliberative democracy and epistemic
democracy; epistemic democracy holds that there is an objectively correct answer that
can be arrived at through majority rule. This epistemic view is sometimes attributed to
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Rousseau, but Miller argues that Rousseau’s view remains ambiguous between epistemic
and deliberative democracy. The epistemic view sets a standard that Miller believes is
unrealistically high, because in most cases democratic decision-making will deal with
questions that are not likely to have a single correct answer. Instead, deliberative
democracy aims at a consensus regarding substantive norms and procedures, but does not
necessarily aim for a single objectively correct answer. According to Miller, “the
emphasis in the deliberative conception is on the way in which a process of public
discussion in which all points of view can be heard may legitimate the outcome when this
is seen to reflect the discussion that has preceded it, not on deliberation as a discovery
procedure in search of a correct answer.”323
Having made the case for deliberative democracy, Miller goes on to claim that
democratic deliberation is most likely to take root in national communities whose
members share a common identity that transcends their group-specific identities. Simply
put, deliberative democracy is best realized in a political community with a shared
national identity.324 A shared national identity creates the kind of solidarity and mutual
trust among citizens that makes deliberative democracy possible; citizens in national
communities are more likely to look beyond their sectional interests in the name of the
common good. This means that they will be more willing to hear others out, to accept the
force of the better argument, and to potentially abandon a position they feel strongly
about in order to reach a compromise (as long as others are willing to reciprocate).
According to Miller, “among large aggregates of people, only a common nationality can
provide the sense of solidarity that makes this possible. Sharing a national identity does
not, of course, mean holding similar political views; but it does mean being committed to
finding terms under which fellow-nationals can agree to live together.”325 As such, Miller
believes that political communities should as much as possible strive to promote a
common national identity which will unite them as citizens in the face of their many
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diverse private and group identities. Miller strongly opposes identity politics (sometimes
referred to as politics of recognition), a perspective which holds that no single identity
should be privileged in the public sphere (not even the national identity), and demands
public endorsement and special treatment for sectional identities. By contrast, Miller
emphasizes that only an encompassing national identity can create the type of solidarity
that democratic politics requires, and he claims that republican citizenship asks citizens to
adopt an inclusive national identity which ultimately transcends their sectional identities
as women, religious minorities, and so on326 As Miller explains,
It is important for democratic politics that all perspectives should be represented
in the political arena, but in reaching policy decisions, citizens should set aside
their personal commitments and affiliations and try to assess competing proposals
in terms of shared standards of justice and common interest. (This aspect of the
model found its most extreme expression in Rousseau’s demand that all factions
must be banned from public assemblies if the general will was to emerge).327
In fact, the strong connection Miller draws between deliberative democracy and national
identity is very similar to Rousseau’s position. As we observed in the previous chapters,
Rousseau believes that a common national character and love of nation constitute a
necessary precondition for establishing the kind of participatory democracy that he
envisions. Without this precondition, Rousseau claims that citizens would be incapable of
looking beyond their narrow self-interests and committing themselves to the common
good. Just as Miller argues that a community without a shared national identity would
have a much harder time establishing deliberative institutions, Rousseau believes that a
community in which the citizens lack a common national character would not be ruled by
the general will (i.e. it would not be democratic in the participatory sense). Therefore, just
as Rousseau’s cultural republicanism is intrinsically linked to his nationalism, so too is
Miller’s conception of republican citizenship and deliberative democracy fundamentally
connected to his principle of nationality. As Miller explains,
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The principle of nationality points us towards a republican conception of
citizenship and towards deliberative democracy as the best means of making
political decisions. If a nation is to be self-determining, its members should aim as
far as possible to achieve consensus about the policies they wish to pursue, and
the only way to achieve this is through an open dialogue in which all points of
view are represented. The institutions of politics should be structured in such a
way as to maximize the chances for such an open dialogue.328
Ultimately, Miller argues that the principle of nationality and the continued existence of
the nation-state are the necessary preconditions for preserving and promoting republican
citizenship, deliberative democracy, political autonomy, and social justice. Miller sums it
up as follows:
Where a nation is politically autonomous, it is able to implement a scheme of
social justice; it can protect and foster its common culture; and its members are to
a greater or lesser extent able collectively to determine its common destiny.
Where the citizens of a state are also compatriots, the mutual trust that this
engenders makes it more likely that they will be able to solve collective action
problems, to support redistributive principles of justice, and to practice forms of
deliberative democracy. Together these make a powerful case for holding that the
boundaries of nations and states should as far as possible coincide.329
Like Rousseau, Miller believes that political communities which are national and
bounded (as opposed to transnational or global) are best suited for implementing the
principles of republican citizenship, including a system of deliberative democracy and
social and redistributive justice. The parallels between the two thinkers are substantial,
but there are also notable differences. For instance, Miller does not endorse Rousseau’s
ideas about the need for a Legislator, or his radical opposition to political factionalism
that seems to demand an outright ban on all political parties, lobbyists, and special
interest groups. Nevertheless, I argue that Miller’s approach is strongly influenced by
Rousseau’s work and constitutes a sophisticated attempt to modernize Rousseau’s
republican philosophy. In the following section I consider the connection between
Rousseau’s republicanism and Miller’s contemporary republican perspective in greater
detail. I argue that the type of republican citizenship that Miller advocates has its roots in
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Rousseau, and that the fundamental link that both thinkers make between republicanism
and nationalism points towards a distinct perspective which offers a defensible alternative
to liberal nationalism, and which I refer to as republican nationalism.

5.4 Rousseau, Miller, and Republican Nationalism
Miller argues that our understanding of citizenship must for the foreseeable future
remain within the boundaries of national political communities. He believes that genuine
and meaningful citizenship is impossible to achieve on a transnational or global level, and
that those who advocate for such proposals are either aspiring to utopian aims or
deliberately diluting the definition of citizenship to accommodate communities larger
than the nation. EU citizenship is an interesting example: despite the union’s
unprecedented economic integration, the vast majority of EU citizens still primarily
identify with their particular nation, and many complain that EU institutions suffer from
bureaucratic elitism and serious democratic deficits. According to Miller, Rousseau
admirably articulates the small-is-necessary perspective on citizenship; Rousseau argues
that active republican citizenship can take root only within a bounded national
community.330 To be clear, Rousseau’s ideal republic is much smaller than the modern
nation-state (the closest empirical example to his ideal is Corsica in 1765), but during his
lifetime Rousseau did advise the much larger nation of Poland on how to establish proper
republican and democratic institutions, so he clearly thought that the effort was
worthwhile even for larger nation-states. The republican tradition has historically
emphasized the importance of cultivating public virtue and combating corruption,
understood as putting private interests ahead of public responsibilities. Republican
thinkers like Rousseau emphasize that this requires strong patriotic loyalty, which was
best achieved in fairly small city-states.331 In the Social Contract Rousseau blames the
vastness of the state, along with the waning of patriotism and the pursuit of private over
public interests, for the decline of active citizenship. According to Rousseau, when the
close social bond between citizens is broken, “the general will becomes mute: everyone,
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guided by secret motives, expresses opinions no more like those of a citizen than if the
state had never existed, and iniquitous decrees which have no other end than the private
interest, are falsely passed under the name of laws.”332 As such, in the Discourse on
Political Economy and other works Rousseau specifically states that the first thing to be
done in order to make citizens virtuous is to make them love their homeland. Miller
points out that when confronted with the challenge of designing a constitution for a larger
state like Poland, Rousseau stresses the importance of common nationality even more
fervently, advising the Poles to actively promote the Polish national identity through the
mandatory wearing of national costumes, special sporting events and festivals, and a
system of education that emphasizes the importance of patriotism, common nationality,
and love of country.333
Rousseau’s discussion of Poland in particular, a relatively large state with a
distinct national character, is more applicable to modern nation-states than his discussions
of smaller city-states like Geneva, and Miller believes that in the modern world
“nationality has served as at least a partial replacement for the patriotic loyalty of the
city-state as a foundation for republican citizenship.”334 More effective methods of
communication and transportation made it possible for larger groups of people to identify
with a shared cultural character that set them apart from other groups, thus moving
beyond the city-state and turning the nation into the focus of identity and allegiance in the
modern world. If every citizen could no longer meet face-to-face to deliberate, some
other factor had to generate the kind of mutual trust and loyalty that citizenship requires.
According to Miller, “common nationality has served that purpose in the advanced
societies.”335 The modern conception of citizenship is no longer attached to small citystates, but at the same time it is not and has never been purely political or transnational in
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scope. As Miller points out, “all our experience of citizenship, then, has so far been of
bounded citizenship: initially citizenship within the walls of the city-state, later
citizenship within the cultural limits of the nation-state. These boundaries have been
actively policed. Admission to citizenship has always come with strings attached.”336
Miller states that the main rival of the republican conception of citizenship is the
liberal conception, which looks at citizenship as a set of rights and corresponding
obligations enjoyed equally by all citizens. Liberal citizens enjoy rights such as free
speech, voting in elections, and personal security, and have the responsibility to follow
the laws and to not interfere with the rights of others. As Miller observes, “central to the
liberal view is the idea of a fair balance of rights and obligations: we can find this
expressed in the now-classic exposition by T.H. Marshall and more recently in the work
of John Rawls.”337 The republican conception of citizenship also acknowledges the
importance of citizen rights, but it places more emphasis on active citizenship and the
idea of all citizens taking an active part in shaping the laws that govern them. Republican
citizenship is more than a legal status; it includes taking an active role in public debate
and deliberation. On the republican view, to be a citizen is both to have certain rights and
to think and behave in a certain way; to exhibit what republicans have traditionally
referred to as public virtue.338 Miller identifies four main components of republican
citizenship, including 1) a set of equal rights (regarding both private and public aims), 2)
a set of corresponding obligations (respecting the law, paying taxes, and so on), 3) a
willingness to take active steps to protect the rights of other members of the political
community and promote its common interests (public spirit), and 4) playing an active role
in both the formal and informal areas of politics (expressing commitment to the
community that goes beyond formal political institutions).339 Miller claims that while the
first two components are shared with liberalism, the third and fourth components are
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distinctly republican. This is because liberalism is satisfied with the first two components,
and although some liberals may sympathize with and even encourage the sentiments of
the third and fourth components, these are not considered necessary for the liberal
conception of citizenship. As such, republican citizenship is more demanding than liberal
citizenship. Republicanism imposes higher costs on an individual’s time because it
expects citizens to actively carry out the tasks that republican citizenship requires (it is
not enough to simply obey the laws and pay taxes while leaving all public matters to
elected officials). Furthermore, republicanism requires citizens to take responsibility for
promoting the common good, the content of which is more substantive than the liberal
good (for instance, it includes the duty to participate in politics and embrace a shared
national identity, but more on this in Chapter 6). This concern for a substantive common
good means taking a long-term view of the community’s interests and understanding that
tradeoffs and compromises have to be made in the name of the common good. As such,
“above all, [republican citizenship] involves being willing to set aside personal interests
and personal ideals in the interests of achieving a democratic consensus.”340 Miller adds
that “as Rousseau would have put it, you ask not ‘What is my particular or group will on
this matter?’ but ‘What is the general will on this matter’ which may require a very
considerable effort of self-discipline.”341
In expounding the concept of republican citizenship and contrasting it to its liberal
counterpart, Miller makes frequent references to Rousseau. This is because Rousseau is
an influential republican thinker who also stressed the fundamental importance of
national identity for citizenship. Miller further mirrors Rousseau’s view when he argues
that a purely political citizenship that is unsupported by a shared public culture and
national identity is unfeasible. It may at times be impossible for a state to appeal to a
shared national identity, such as in cases where members of the state see themselves as
belonging to rival nationalities that are openly hostile to one another, but such cases,
though unavoidable, must be regarded as a second best scenario by anyone who aspires to
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republican citizenship.342 Miller goes on to argue against the idea of cosmopolitan
citizenship, maintaining that cosmopolitan law does not amount to citizenship as we have
come to understand the term. Citizenship means taking an active part in making the laws
that govern us, and meaningful opportunities for exercising self-rule will, for the
foreseeable future, continue to exist only within the national community.343 Miller sums
up his understanding of republican citizenship as follows:
I take citizenship, especially in its republican form, to be an achievement of
immense value. It represents the best way in which people of diverse beliefs and
styles of life can live together under laws and institutions which they can endorse
as legitimate. It is a social practice that needs bolstering by institutional change
and civic education in the liberal democracies. But it has clear empirical
preconditions; it cannot simply be conjured up ex nihilo. These preconditions are
not as severe as Rousseau believed, but they exist none the less. International
peace, international justice and global environmental protection are very
important objectives, and we must hope that republican citizens will choose to
promote them externally. But this cannot be achieved by inventing in theory
cosmopolitan forms of citizenship which undercut the basis of citizenship
proper.344
Here Miller tries to distance himself from Rousseau by arguing that the preconditions for
republican citizenship are not as severe as Rousseau believed. As I argued in the previous
chapter, Rousseau’s two preconditions for establishing a society ruled by the general will
are freedom as self-mastery and a shared national identity. We know that Miller does not
take issue with the second precondition; he also believes that republican citizenship is
best suited for a political community with a shared national identity and strong love of
nation. Hence, Miller might be following liberal thinkers like Cohen in taking issue with
the first precondition, freedom as self-mastery or FSM, which states that citizens must
attain a degree of self-realization which will allow them to overcome their narrows selfinterests, and which will in turn make them capable of willing generally. Cohen and other
liberals have tried to distance themselves from the demanding preconditions that
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Rousseau establishes for forming the society of the general will by downplaying the
importance of self-realization and self-overcoming (Cohen calls it “saintly self-sacrifice”)
in Rousseau’s work.345 In the previous chapter, I argued that the attempt to downplay
self-realization and self-overcoming in Rousseau gives us an incomplete picture of his
philosophy; according to Rousseau, if citizens failed to attain a sufficient degree of selfrealization, the society ruled by the general will would be impossible to establish because
the citizens would be incapable of overcoming their narrow-self interests and willing
generally.
Nevertheless, from his discussion on republican citizenship and deliberative
democracy we know that Miller accepts that republicanism is a more demanding
conception of citizenship than the liberal and libertarian alternatives. Miller does in fact
believe that citizens must attain a significant degree of self-overcoming (he calls it “a
very considerable effort of self-discipline”346) in order to look beyond their narrow selfinterests and think in terms of long-term interests of the community as a whole (accepting
tradeoffs and compromises in the interest of achieving a democratic consensus). What’s
more, earlier in this chapter I argued that Miller sees political participation as intrinsically
valuable and connected to the idea of self-realization. When Miller claims that political
participation is a necessary element of the good life because deliberation has a moralizing
effect on citizens, he is clearly stating that participating in the deliberative process leads
directly to self-realization. So if Miller does not follow Cohen in downplaying the
importance of self-realization and self-overcoming, where exactly does Miller part ways
with Rousseau? He is not clear on this point, but it is possible that he disagrees with some
of the practical recommendations Rousseau makes for establishing a society ruled by the
general will. For instance, we know that in his discussion of deliberative democracy
Miller talks about the importance of the citizens’ willingness to set aside personal
commitments and affiliations in order to arrive at a political compromise that serves the
common interest. Miller mentions that the most extreme expression of this model is
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found in “Rousseau’s demand that all factions must be banned from public assemblies if
the general will was to emerge.”347 In the modern world, this would amount to banning all
political parties, interest groups, and lobbyists from politics, and Miller may find this too
stringent a precondition for republican citizenship. Nonetheless, if we accept that
deliberative democracy does require setting aside personal commitments and affiliations,
we can look for a practical compromise that will minimize factionalism in modern
democracies without banning political parties outright. For instance, firm steps can be
taken to curb the influence of money in politics, to limit the disparity between rich and
poor in order to prevent vote-buying and class-based factionalism, to make elected
officials more accountable to people rather than party leadership, to regulate the practice
of lobbying, and so on. In this sense, the distance between Miller and Rousseau may not
be very great at all, and it may simply amount to a need to modernize Rousseau’s ideas
and adapt them to the unique circumstances of contemporary political communities. In
many ways, Miller’s project amounts to a sophisticated attempt to bring Rousseau’s
republicanism into the twenty-first century.
In sum, Miller’s claim that deliberative democracy requires citizens to embrace a
republican model of citizenship, as well as his claim that a shared national identity and
common public culture are essential for creating the type of solidarity that republican
citizenship requires, make Miller a contemporary defender of Rousseau’s cultural
republicanism. Moreover, I argue that even though Miller at times describes himself a
liberal nationalist, his philosophy represents an important step towards the development
of a distinct republican strand of nationalism that is rooted in the works of Rousseau and
stands as a defensible alternative to liberal nationalism. Miller appears to make this
argument for me as he repeatedly distinguishes his republican citizenship (and his
defense of the principle of nationality) from the liberal conception of citizenship (and the
liberal understanding of nationality). For instance, he regularly uses terminology such as
“the liberal alternative” and “the liberal objection” to differentiate his own view from
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liberalism.348 Notwithstanding some obvious differences, such as Rousseau’s ideas about
the Legislator, it appears that Miller is a defender of what is essentially a modernized
version of Rousseau’s cultural republicanism, a philosophy that combines republican
citizenship with the principle of nationality.349 For this reason, I believe that Miller’s
view could more accurately be described as republican nationalism; his unique
perspective, firmly rooted in the works of Rousseau, should not be viewed as yet another
take on liberal nationalism but a distinct alternative to liberal nationalism that deserves
further consideration in its own right. Classifying Miller’s view as republican
nationalism represents an important step in moving the contemporary debate within
nationalist theory forward. By offering an academically sophisticated, philosophically
defensible, and historically rooted republican alternative to liberal nationalism, the debate
within nationalist theory can move beyond the general distinctions between ethnic, civic,
and cultural nationalism. As discussed in Chapter 1, there is no purely ethnic or purely
civic nationalism; all nationalisms have a fundamental cultural component, and all
nationalisms are at some level cultural nationalisms. Nevertheless, there are still major
differences and disagreements between the theorists of cultural nationalism. I have
argued that one point of distinction is the difference between liberal nationalism and
republican nationalism, two unique yet robust and defensible strands of cultural
nationalism. In the following chapter, I examine this distinction in greater detail and I
make the case for treating republican nationalism as an alternative to liberal nationalism.
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Chapter 6
6

Distinguishing Liberal and Republican Nationalism
Most theorists of nationalism now recognize that there is an inherent connection

between the state and culture, and they acknowledge that nationality has a key cultural
component. As Kai Nielsen points out, “all nationalisms are cultural nationalisms of one
kind or another. There is no purely political conception of the nation, liberal or
otherwise.”350 Tamir agrees, stating: “one thing that everyone knows but no one can quite
demonstrate, says Geertz, is that ‘a country’s politics reflect the design of its culture.’”351
As such, contemporary debates within nationalist theory are taking place within the wider
framework of cultural nationalism, and many modern theorists of cultural nationalism,
including Tamir herself, refer to themselves as liberal nationalists. Liberal nationalism is
a specific strand of cultural nationalism that seeks to bridge the divide between liberalism
and nationalism; it attempts to develop a nationalist theory that is neither too exclusive
nor too individualistic; a form of nationalism that is compatible with the tenets of
liberalism.352 In this chapter, I take an in-depth look at liberal nationalism by analyzing
the works of two of its most well-known proponents, Yael Tamir and Will Kymlicka. I
then consider the major differences between liberal nationalism and republican
nationalism, with emphasis on the republican theories of Rousseau and Miller. Finally, I
argue that the current debate within cultural nationalism would benefit from treating
republican nationalism as a distinct strand of cultural nationalism and an alternative to
liberal nationalism.
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6.1 Yael Tamir and the Right to Culture
Tamir has done much to expound the liberal nationalist view, and her 1993 book
Liberal Nationalism is one of the most important works on the subject. Tamir believes
that nationalism remains attractive in the modern world because “it captures the
importance of context, of cultural affiliations, of the need for roots, for belonging, for
human development and self-fulfillment, thereby illuminating a broad range of issues that
liberal theory tends to brush aside.”353 Liberal nationalism assumes that there is intrinsic
as well as instrumental value to living inside a national community; beyond solidarity and
social cohesion, living in a national community contributes to the self-fulfillment of
citizens. For this reason, questions of cultural belonging need to be taken seriously by
contemporary liberal theorists; beyond a concern for individual rights and autonomy,
liberals must recognize the importance of culture for an individual’s sense of identity. In
Liberal Nationalism, Tamir’s begins with propositions endorsed by contemporary liberal
theorists, including “a set of beliefs endorsing individual rights and liberties, affirming
the right of individuals to equal respect and concern, and presuming that governments
should be neutral and impartial vis-à-vis individual interests, preferences, and
conceptions of the good.”354 Tamir’s contribution to liberal theory is her emphasis on the
right to culture, which claims that individuals must be allowed “to live within the culture
of their choice, to decide on their social affiliations, to re-create the culture of the
community they belong to, and to redefine its borders.”355 The claim that individuals
have a right “to live within the culture of their choice” is problematic, but I will return to
this later.
Tamir believes that culture in its widest sense is what holds a nation together and
preserves its distinctiveness, and she argues that in order for the nation to exist as a
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distinct social unit it must rely on the presence of a public sphere where the national
culture is expressed.356 The demand for a public sphere in which the national culture can
be expressed also constitutes the essence of the right to national self-determination,
which Tamir distinguishes from the concept of political self-rule (more on this distinction
later). It is important to note that although Tamir stresses the importance of group
associations and cultural belonging, she has an individualistic understanding of the right
to culture: culture is important because of the value that individual members of the
community assign to it. Tamir claims that although they have at times been neglected in
the literature on liberalism, questions of culture and belonging are deeply rooted within
liberal political theory. She argues that along with its concern for such things as
individual autonomy, global justice, and universal human rights, liberalism also takes the
existence of nation-states for granted. In fact, liberalism already embodies many ideals
which are also embraced by nationalists. For instance, the majority of liberals begin with
the assumption that the world is made up of functional states inhabited by specific
populations, and debates about political participation, obligations, consent, distributive
justice, and social responsibility take place within this state-centric framework.
According to Tamir, “these moves have made modern liberal theory dependent on
national ideals and a national world order, thus leaving liberals little choice. Except for
some cosmopolitans and radical anarchists, nowadays most liberals are liberal
nationalists.”357
Tamir points out that holding citizenship in a state is indispensible for the wellbeing of modern individuals; stateless persons such as refugees are greatly disadvantaged
because they lack the protection of a state, they lack civil and welfare rights, their
movement is severely restricted, and so on. For this reason, Tamir believes that in the
modern world citizenship within a state amounts to a primary good for all, pointing out
that “modern states, even liberal ones, have adopted the conception of the nation-state,
and therefore see themselves as communities rather than as associations based on
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contract.”358 For this reason, questions of group association and cultural belonging are
crucially important for liberal political theory and cannot be neglected by contemporary
liberal thinkers. Regarding the nature of liberal nationalism, Tamir states:
We can now summarise the characteristics of a liberal national entity. This entity
will endorse liberal principles of distribution inwards and outwards; its political
system will reflect a particular national culture, but its citizens will be free to
practice different cultures and follow a variety of life-plans and conceptions of the
good. The political entity described here differs from the traditional liberal entity
in that it introduces culture as a crucial dimension of political life. Its unity rests
not only on an overlapping consensus about certain values essential to its
functioning, but also on a distinct cultural foundation.359
Tamir’s liberal nationalism takes cultural and national belonging seriously, but
her approach has faced some criticism; for instance, Ronald Beiner argues that it is
misleading to call her approach nationalism. According to Beiner, “a more accurate
description of her position is: liberalism, with an attention to the ways in which people
care about national identity and wish to see it expressed in some fashion.”360 Beiner says
that although Tamir assigns intrinsic value to one’s allegiance to a cultural group, and
though this distinguishes her from ardent liberal individualists such as George Kateb who
assign only instrumental value to group solidarity, seeing group membership as
intrinsically valuable does not require embracing any tenets of nationalist politics. Beiner
claims that Tamir’s position “is not any kind of nationalism, but rather, a form of
liberalism that is not indifferent to concerns about national identity.”361 I do not follow
Beiner in disputing Tamir’s nationalist credentials; I believe that despite the skeptical
reception it has received in some circles, liberal nationalism constitutes a valid and
defensible theoretical strand within nationalist theory. Nonetheless, Beiner goes on to
identify what he calls a decisive problem for the project of liberal nationalism, a problem
which he believes must force liberal nationalists to drop either the liberalism or the
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nationalism. According to Beiner, “the problem, in a nutshell, is how to privilege the
majority cultural identity in defining civic membership without consigning cultural
minorities to second-class citizenship.”362 He brings up the example of Israel as a Jewish
state and argues that the non-Jewish minorities inside Israel, including the sizable Arab
minority, will unavoidably be treated as second-class citizens in some sense, even if the
state is not actively trying to oppress or destroy their minority culture. Contrary to what
many critics of nationalism claim, it is possible to be a citizen in a nationalist polity
without embracing illiberalism, violent conflict, and oppression of others; an independent
Quebec or Flanders would still be relatively liberal political communities. However, an
expressly nationalist political community is fundamentally different from multicultural or
multinational communities; nationalist communities seek to foster and promote a single
shared national culture that all citizens are expected to embrace. Beiner thinks that this
could amount to reducing citizens who are not born into the majority culture to secondclass status, which is why liberal nationalists like Tamir attempt to resolve the problem
by embracing a form of liberal multiculturalism that recognizes cultural and group
belonging as intrinsically valuable, but assigns no special value or privilege to any single
culture over others. However, Beiner argues that “in Tamir’s statement of the liberalnationalist case, the nationalist side of the equation is so watered down that the
nationalism in her political theory is barely detectable. What nationalists want, typically,
is not a vaguely defined ‘public space’ for the display of their national identity, but
rather, control over a state as the vehicle for the furtherance of national selfexpression.”363 Tamir ultimately goes so far as to suggest that the ideal of the nation-state
should be abandoned altogether, and Beiner points out that a nationalist could not
possibly endorse this claim; nationalists tend to privilege nations and the idea of a
common national identity over other forms of group identity. Critics like Beiner argue
that the liberal nationalist project ultimately fails to bridge the gap between liberalism
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and nationalism; instead, it waters down nationalism until it becomes unrecognizable.364
Although I don’t agree with Beiner’s characterization of liberal nationalism as not being
nationalist enough, his critique of Tamir’s approach points to a number of issues that will
be considered later; for republican nationalists in particular, the notions of a shared
national identity and the nation-state as a vehicle for national self-expression are
absolutely crucial, and they represent important points of distinctions between liberal and
republican nationalism.

6.2 David Miller and Encompassing National Identity
Although David Miller has described himself as a liberal nationalist in the past, I
argue that there are major differences between his view and Tamir’s liberal nationalism.
In his discussion of the various forms of group identity, Miller argues that although
diverse subgroups may exist within the nation, including ethnic, racial, cultural, and
territorial minorities, meaningful democratic politics requires embracing an
encompassing national identity that is shared by all citizens and that engenders trust and
solidarity. Miller believes the republican model of citizenship to be incompatible with
“identity politics” or “politics of recognition” because the republican model asks all
people to adopt an inclusive identity as citizens which transcends their sectional identities
as racial, cultural, or territorial minorities.365 According to Miller, the politics of
recognition aims to solidify sectional identities and give them public expression, which
actually limits the choices of the bearers of those identities because it forces them to
accept a certain political definition of said identity. In practical terms, this means that the
politics of recognition must at some point stipulate which identities should be publically
privileged to the exclusion of others (for example, if disadvantaged groups in society are
to have veto power in political decision-making, should women have that power, or
lesbian women, or disabled lesbian women?). Furthermore, the politics of recognition
strive to give public expression to sectional identities, but it is not clear which identity an
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individual ought to identify with primarily (e.g. is a citizen primarily a woman, or black,
or Nigerian?).366 Finally, not all identities can be said to have equal social value. Some
citizens may consider “Islamic fundamentalist” to be their primary identity, and although
they may in some ways constitute a disadvantaged minority vis-à-vis the majority of
society, if their beliefs include a call to eradicate other religions they cannot expect their
identity to be valued and affirmed equally in society. We can only ask for recognition
from people whom we already see as members of a larger shared community, a national
community that transcends sectional interests. As such, a militant fundamentalist cannot
expect public recognition and affirmation of their identity in a secular society because the
very nature of their sectional identity denies the possibility of coexistence with those who
are different. According to Miller, “there is a general fallacy in regarding common
nationality as implying cultural homogeneity: there can be a shared public culture which
defines the national identity (including in most cases a national language) alongside a
plurality of private cultures (including perhaps minority languages).”367 Miller believes
that a plurality of private cultures can coexist alongside an encompassing national culture
within the nation-state. Individual citizens may have diverse sectional identities which
must not be suppressed by the rest of society, but all citizens must also actively
participate in a common public culture that shapes an encompassing national identity and
transcends sectional interests. So while he believes in respecting diverse private cultures,
Miller clearly privileges and assigns special value to a shared national identity that
transcends sectional interests.
This is significant because it distinguishes Miller’s nationalism from Tamir’s.
Tamir recognizes the intrinsic worth of cultural belonging but she does not appear to
privilege one type of cultural belonging over another. Although she talks about the need
for the political system to reflect a particular national culture, she does not say enough
about what exactly makes a culture national. She fails to adequately differentiate between
the national culture and the various subcultures that may exist within society but have no
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national aspirations, such as immigrant cultures. In reading Liberal Nationalism we
cannot tell where the national culture begins, what exactly makes it national, or what is
its relationship to non-national cultures. The only conclusion one can take away from
Liberal Nationalism is that there is no real difference between the national culture of a
state and the various minority subcultures that exist within the same state. In fact, Tamir
suggests that traditional nation-states will eventually wither away entirely, surrendering
their power to make economic, strategic, and ecological decisions to supranational
organizations such as the European Community/Union, while the power to form cultural
policies falls to smaller local national communities.368 According to Tamir, this will
allow smaller national communities such as the Scots or Catalonians to achieve greater
cultural autonomy under the umbrella of a larger regional organization, thereby
eliminating the need for secession. Tamir says that “although it cannot be ensured that
each nation will have its own state, all nations are entitled to a public sphere in which
they constitute the majority. The ideal of the nation-state should therefore be abandoned
in favour of another, more practicable and just.”369 This is drastically different from
Miller’s view which holds that functional systems of social justice and deliberative
democracy can only be achieved within nation-states, and that nation-states will remain
the primary method of human organization for the foreseeable future. Miller also
maintains that an encompassing national culture holds special value, and that the nationstate is justified in publically privileging a shared national identity over the various
subcultures and sectional identities in society.
As noted earlier, Beiner suggests that privileging a shared national identity over
sectional identities can reduce members of cultural and ethnic minorities to second-class
status. According to Miller, this need not be the case. Miller believes that it is not in the
interest of minority groups to simply advance their own particular identities at the
expense of a national identity; a society without a shared national identity would lack
shared standards for appealing to the common good, and there would be no reason for
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radically different groups to work together. Politics within a community that lacks an
encompassing national identity would amount to interest group politics with the gloves
off; a community where radically different groups with beliefs that are potentially
incompatible seek to advance their own particular agendas without a willingness to
compromise for the sake of common goods that transcend sectional identities. As Miller
notes, “confronting other groups with different perspectives and different demands does
not entail seeing the justice of those demands; it may simply have the effect of alienating
groups from each other. If citizens lack a sense of common identity that transcends the
particularity of their group identities, the prospects of achieving social justice are very
remote.”370 Miller argues that identity politics is essentially self-defeating because it
looks to politics to provide affirmation of sectional identities that the political sphere
simply cannot provide; no one can definitively say which identity should be primary for
which group of people (Black? Woman? Nigerian?), nor can they say which identities
should be privileged over others, or to what extent. Furthermore, “in encouraging groups
to affirm their singular identities at the expense of shared national identities, [identity
politics] undermines the very conditions in which minority groups, especially
disadvantaged groups, can hope to achieve some measure of justice for their demands.”371
In short, Miller rejects Tamir’s multiculturalism because it alienates sub-communities
from the greater whole, and he believes in equality through equal citizenship in a nationstate rather than affording special treatment to subgroups. He says that modern political
thinkers must find a way to generate a strong but inclusive political community, defend
equal citizenship in the face of economic inequality, and ensure that the self-governing
community is genuinely democratic.372 According to Miller, accomplishing this difficult
task is only possible if we embrace a robust republican conception of citizenship, and “in
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today’s world strong citizenship can only be made to work when it is supported by a
shared national identity.”373
In his critique of nationalism as a theory, Bhikhu Parekh clearly distinguishes
between the perspectives of Tamir and Miller. Parekh notes that although Miller claims
that he wants the nation to be constituted along liberal lines, he knows that liberalism and
nationalism may come into conflict, and when this happens he tends to privilege
nationalism. Miller assigns considerable ontological and moral significance to
nationhood; for members of the nation, national identity structures their moral world, is
constitutive of their identity, and gives them a context for making intelligent decisions.
For Miller, the state cannot be neutral with respect to the national culture; the national
culture must be assigned special value in society and privileged over other forms of
cultural belonging.374 Miller argues that political legitimacy comes from the political
community’s ability to “express the will of the national community” rather than from
consent of the individual, and, according to Parekh, Miller concedes that at times
“illiberal means” (which he does not specify) may have to be used to preserve the
national culture.375 In short, this means that an encompassing national identity that
transcends sectional identities must be privileged over other group identities in a way that
is incompatible with multiculturalism. Unlike Miller, Tamir tends to privilege liberalism
over nationalism. Whereas Miller sees the nation as a historical and political community,
Tamir sees it as a cultural community bound by a common language, common values,
myths, and symbols, and conscious of its distinctive collective identity. The value of
national identity is tied directly to the value of cultural membership; the ability to make
autonomous choices depends on the “presence of a cultural context.”376 Over time,
individuals can question these cultural contexts and voluntarily choose which culture they
wish to live in. This leads Tamir to conclude that nations do not necessarily need states of
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their own; they have a right to preserve their distinct culture, but nothing more. This line
of reasoning allows Tamir to ultimately advocate for moving beyond the paradigm of the
nation-state; according to her, as long as the right to culture is preserved in some way,
political institutions need not be strictly national, but can also be local, regional, and even
global.377 In line with what she believes to be the principles of liberalism, Tamir also
insists that national membership should be voluntary, in the sense that an individual may
freely choose to reject or leave outright their national community. However, Parekh
rightly notes that this is difficult to reconcile with her view that the nation constitutes and
shapes one’s identity.378 One’s national membership cannot be both constitutive of their
identity and therefore deeply rooted, and also malleable enough to be strictly voluntary.
Parekh believes that both Miller’s and Tamir’s nationalist projects fail, and in Tamir’s
case it appears that her attempt to defend a right to culture without assigning special
value to an encompassing national identity ultimately leads to the dissolution of the
nation as she understands it. According to Parekh,
Tamir wants strongly bonded nations to be happily nestled within a hospitable and
noninterfering larger unit, and that is impossible. If they are to live together
within a single community, they must loosen up, allow internal differences and
dissent, develop overlapping loyalties and affections, and cease to be the sole or
even the dominant sources of their members’ identity and values; in short, they
would stop being nations as Tamir defines them and become relatively open and
interactive cultural groups.379
Liberal nationalism appears to makes two important claims: individual well-being
requires some type of cultural belonging, and multiculturalism is desirable because
homogeneity is no longer possible, and because cultural diversity may actually benefit
society. As such, liberal nationalists do not believe that all cultures have a right to
statehood, and since the prospect of every culture having its own state is unfeasible,
diversity and pluralism are not only desirable but also necessary in the modern world.
Judith Lichtenberg says that the type of commitment to deep diversity that liberal

377

Parekh, Incoherence of Nationalism, 305-306.

378

Ibid, 307.

379

Ibid, 308.

155

nationalists like Tamir and Kymlicka espouse appears attractive, and that it would be nice
if it were sufficient for social unity. But if it isn’t, “then we must confront hard questions
about whether the state may or must privilege certain cultural practices, and disadvantage
others, in the interests of social unity.”380 While liberal nationalists like Tamir emphasize
the need for a healthy cultural context as a necessary precondition for the individual
autonomy and well-being of the members of a group, other types of nationalists
(including the kind of republican nationalist that I believe Miller to be) would appeal
instead to the importance of a common national identity that transcends sectional
identities, to shared historical memories, a common destiny, and rights of national selfdetermination.381

6.3 Self-determination and Self-rule
Looking back at Tamir’s distinction between national self-determination and
political self-rule, we see another major difference between her liberal nationalism and
republican nationalism. Tamir argues that the right to self-determination stakes a cultural
rather than a political claim and that it ultimately amounts to the right to preserve the
nation as a distinct cultural identity. This is the crux of her right to culture argument,
which she differentiates from the right to political self-rule. In her own words, she
“advances a claim that is central to the theory of liberal nationalism, namely, that national
claims are not synonymous with demands for political sovereignty.”382 This distinction
leads Tamir to conclude that nationalists need not concern themselves with nation-states,
and argues that nation-states will ultimately wither away. She cites Seton-Watson’s
definition of the state as “a legal and political organization with the power to require
obedience and loyalty from its citizens,” and juxtaposes it to the definition of the nation
as “a community of people, whose members are bound together by a sense of solidarity, a
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common culture, a national consciousness.”383 She blames Rousseau’s philosophy for
contributing to the conflation of the nation with the state, due to the fact that Rousseau
identified the state with the subjects as a collective rather than with its rulers.
Rousseau believes in the holistic character of the nation-state, identifying the
nation with the people (the citizens) and the people with the state (the political apparatus
of an organized community).384 This view that the state should be the “institutional
representation of the people’s will” formed the basis of the American and French
revolutions, and self-determination came to be seen as “a democratic ideal valid for all
mankind.”385 This brought about a “shift from a justification relying on democratic
principles to one based on national ones, from a belief in the right of citizens to self-rule
to one claiming support for the right of nations to self-determination.”386 Tamir disavows
this shift, and she argues that the existence of a nation as a distinct social unit requires not
political self-rule but merely the presence of a public sphere where the national culture
can be expressed. The demand for a public sphere in which the cultural aspects of
national life are brought to the forefront constitutes the essence of the right to national
self-determination for Tamir, which is distinct from the right to democratic self-rule.
Tamir believes that ensuring the ability of all nations to exercise their right to national
self-determination will lead to the withering away of the nation-state as economic,
strategic, and ecological decisions are relegated to the supranational level while cultural
policies are decided by local national communities.387 Tamir ultimately concludes that
once they are “sheltered” under a wider regional umbrella, all nations, regardless of their
size, geographical position, or economic viability, will be able to achieve cultural
autonomy without resorting to secession. She goes on to cite the European Community
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(now the EU) as an example of a successful regional organization that ensures that all
nations are cooperating on an equal basis and provides more cultural autonomy to nations
who may be too small to attain such autonomy otherwise.
There are many points of disagreement between these aspects of Tamir’s liberal
nationalism and republican nationalism. A republican nationalist would argue that her
view of regional organizations such as the EU is utopian; we know that the EU has not
been the democratic success that many had envisioned, with major controversies arising
around the perceived unequal treatment of newer and smaller member states by older and
more powerful ones, as well as the democratic deficit and lack of transparency and
accountability within the EU’s political institutions. A republican nationalist would also
argue that nationalism has an inalienable political component; on this view, nationalism
is both cultural and political, and national self-determination cannot be thought of as
separate from political self-rule. Republican nationalists would classify Tamir’s strictly
cultural rather than political version of nationalism not as nationalism in the fullest sense,
but as a liberal culturalism that ignores one of the fundamental aspects of what
constitutes the nation. For republican nationalists, a shared and encompassing national
culture must be expressed through politics, and through politics that take place within the
confines of a sovereign nation-state. For republican nationalists it is not enough to merely
express one’s national culture in a localized public sphere that only has the power to set
cultural policy and nothing more; instead, they believe that the national culture must be
expressed together with the general will of the nation. As such, political self-rule and
national self-determination are intrinsically linked: the reason we need a shared and
encompassing national culture in the first place is because we cannot have meaningful
democratic self-rule without it. Only this shared national identity and its cultural
expression through politics can establish the rule of the general will, and this point
constitutes the crux of the inherent connection that Rousseau makes between
republicanism and nationalism. In fact, both Rousseau and Miller would argue that shared
standards of the common good, accountable democratic institutions, and a robust system
of social and distributive justice can exist only within the nation-state, and that they
would be impossible to achieve within supranational organizations such as the EU.
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As previously noted, Tamir does not say enough about what exactly makes a
culture national, or where the national culture begins and where it ends in relation to nonnational cultures. In her summary of the characteristics of the liberal nationalist entity,
Tamir says: “This entity will endorse liberal principles of distribution inwards and
outwards; its political system will reflect a particular national culture, but its citizens will
be free to practice different cultures and follow a variety of life-plans and conceptions of
the good.”388 But if the nation-state withers away and is replaced by some sort of
localized public sphere whose powers do not extend beyond setting cultural policy while
all other powers are surrendered to supranational organizations, then how will the
political system of the liberal nationalist entity reflect a particular national culture?
Tamir’s argument appears to be incoherent here; if culture is not political, then how can
we expect the political system to reflect it? This constitutes the fundamental difference
between republican nationalism and Tamir’s liberal nationalism: republican nationalism
is inherently cultural and political; political self-rule goes hand in hand with national selfdetermination, and the national culture must be expressed together with the general will
within the confines of a nation-state. Whereas Tamir tries to define national selfdetermination in strictly cultural rather than political terms, and whereas she rejects
outright the idea of individual self-mastery (she calls her brand of nationalism
“antiperfectionistic”389), as I noted in Chapter 4, republican nationalists embrace
individual self-mastery, political self-rule, and national self-determination as three
interconnected layers of political freedom. According to republican nationalists, the
individual citizen must attain a significant level of self-realization in order to overcome
his narrow self-interests and to will generally for the common good (Rousseau’s first
precondition, FSM), and he must be part of a political community with a shared national
identity and an encompassing national culture which fosters trust and solidarity
(Rousseau’s second precondition, shared national identity and love of nation). Only when
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these two preconditions are met can citizens be seen as fully free and the political
community as fully democratic and self-determining in relation to other nations.

6.4 Will Kymlicka’s Multicultural Citizenship
Kymlicka is a liberal nationalist who believes that the narrow focus of some
contemporary liberals on individual rights has exacerbated ethnocultural conflict and
rendered cultural minorities vulnerable to injustices at the hands of the majority. He
asserts that minority rights cannot be subsumed under the general category of human
rights, and he argues that we must supplement human rights with minority rights.
According to Kymlicka, “a comprehensive theory of justice in a multicultural state will
include both universal rights, assigned to individuals regardless of group membership,
and certain group-differentiated rights or ‘special status’ for minority cultures.”390 A
comprehensive liberal theory of minority rights must explain how human rights can
coexist with minority rights (Kymlicka ultimately argues that ethnocultural minority
rights are the latest stage in the development of human rights), as well as how minority
rights are to be limited by the principles of democracy, social justice, and individual
liberty. Providing a comprehensive liberal account of cultural belonging is crucial for
Kymlicka because individual choice depends on cultural contexts. Like Tamir, Kymlicka
contends that most liberals are in fact liberal nationalists because they take for granted
that cultures or nations are the basic units of political decision-making.391 Kymlicka notes
that most people have a very strong bond to their culture, and that individual choice is
actually dependent on the presence what he calls a “societal culture,” defined by language
and history. Kymlicka believes that societal culture is particularly relevant to individual
freedom because it refers to the institutions and practices which cover the full range of
human activities, including both public and private life. Societal cultures are usually
associated with national groups, and individual freedom is intimately tied up with
membership in these cultures. As Kymlicka points out, “the liberal value of freedom of
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choice has certain cultural preconditions, and hence issues of cultural membership must
be incorporated into liberal principles.”392 He tells us that “societal culture” is “a culture
which provides its members with meaningful ways of life across the full range of human
activities, including social, educational, religious, recreational, and economic life,
encompassing both public and private spheres. These cultures tend to be territorially
concentrated, and based on a shared language.”393 Moreover, this type of culture involves
not just shared values or memories but also common institutions and practices. Societal
cultures help foster the type of solidarity that is necessary for sustaining the modern
welfare state, including a sense of common identity and membership facilitated by a
common language and history. This sense of commonality makes it possible for
individuals living in large modern states to feel solidarity with their fellow citizens and to
make important sacrifices for one another in the interest of society as a whole.394
We can see that like Tamir, Kymlicka takes the importance of cultural belonging
seriously. In Multicultural Citizenship, Kymlicka sets out to demonstrate that freedom of
choice is actually dependent on social practices, cultural meanings, and a shared
language, and that the capacity to form and revise conceptions of the good is closely tied
to one’s membership in a societal culture. Deciding how to live one’s life is a matter of
exploring the possibilities made available to us by our culture, and individual choice
actually amounts to a range of options passed down to us by culture. If they are to
provide this important cultural context for their members, minority cultures in
multicultural and multinational states may need protection from economic and political
interference by the majority culture. As such, Kymlicka argues that liberal thinkers ought
to accept a wide range of group-differentiated rights for ethnic groups and national
minorities, and that doing so will not require them to sacrifice their commitments to
social equality and individual freedom.395
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According to Kymlicka, most contemporary liberal theorists have argued that a
society motivated by the liberal principles of justice would not accord political
significance to the cultural membership of individual citizens. He argues that this is a
mistake and that liberal principles of justice are not only consistent with but also require
certain forms of special status for national minorities.396 He believes that the “politics of
difference” (also called “politics of recognition” and “identity politics”) need not be a
threat to liberalism, and that the issues they raise can be managed peacefully and fairly
through dialogue and compromise. Kymlicka concludes by saying that liberal theorists
cannot pretend to simply look at people as individuals because “political life has an
inescapably national dimension, whether it is in the drawing of boundaries and
distributing of powers, or in the decisions about the language of schooling, courts, and
bureaucracies, or in the choice of public holidays. Moreover, these inescapable aspects of
political life give a profound advantage to the members of majority nations.”397As such,
liberals must take steps to prevent the resulting injustices, steps which might include
polyethnic representation rights to accommodate ethnic and other disadvantaged groups
within the larger national group, and self-government rights which ensure the autonomy
of national minorities alongside the majority nation.398
With his comprehensive definition of what constitutes a societal culture,
Kymlicka offers a clearer picture of what exactly makes a culture national. Kymlicka
explains that the debate over minority rights is not about whether it is ever acceptable to
support “communities” or recognize “difference,” but about whether to support the
particular sort of community and cultural difference exhibited by national minorities (as
distinct from social movements and immigrant groups, which Kymlicka believes are not
entitled to the same special status as national minorities).399 Nevertheless, Kymlicka’s
distinction between immigrant communities and national minorities immediately raises a
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potential problem with his argument. Using the example of Canada, Kymlicka states that
French Canadians constitute a national minority within Canada, which entitles them to
special language rights such as court proceedings and education in their mother-tongue at
the public expense. Other minority groups, such as those whose mother-tongue might be
Greek or Swahili, are not entitled to these same rights because they are immigrant groups
rather than national minorities.400 Kymlicka justifies this by saying that there are
important differences between communities established through the process of
colonization, such as the English and French communities in Canada, and immigrant
communities. According to Kymlicka, “there was a fundamentally different set of
expectations accompanying colonization and immigration―the former resulted from a
deliberate policy aimed at the systematic re-creation of an entire society in a new land;
the latter resulted from individual and familial choices to leave their society and join
another existing society.”401 The main point he makes is that because colonists never
intended to integrate into another culture but rather intended to transplant their old one to
a new land, they constitute a national minority. On the other hand, because immigrants
chose to leave their homelands willingly, knowing that their success and the success of
their children will likely depend on integrating into the institutions of English and/or
French-speaking society, they cannot claim national minority status. Immigrants are thus
expected to integrate into the larger society whereas national minorities are not, and
Kymlicka claims that “the expectation of integration is not unjust, I believe, so long as
immigrants had the option to stay in their original culture,” adding that “in deciding to
uproot themselves, immigrants voluntarily relinquish some of the rights that go along
with their original national membership.”402 So while national minorities form societal
cultures, immigrant groups do not, and while immigrants do have some claims regarding
the expression of their identities, they cannot claim the same special status as national
minorities. The claims of immigrants can be met by adapting the institutions and
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practices of mainstream society so as to accommodate ethnic differences (Kymlicka calls
this ‘polyethnic rights’), but they are not to be met by setting up a separate societal
culture based on the immigrants’ mother tongue (this is reserved for national
minorities).403
It seems to me that the distinction that Kymlicka makes between colonists and
immigrants is incoherent. While his argument about immigrants willingly choosing to
uproot themselves may apply to nations that were not created as a direct result of
colonialism, there is no logical justification for granting special rights to descendants of
colonists while denying them to other immigrants and their children. For one thing,
colonists by and large also chose to uproot themselves willingly, just like immigrant
groups (excluding refugees). For another, colonists did not merely establish their
communities in the New World through peaceful means and on previously uninhabited
land. On the contrary, they often committed horrid atrocities and even genocide against
the Native American population in the process of establishing their communities, and in
many parts of the New World the economy relied heavily on slave labour. These horrible
violations of human rights were not isolated incidents but systemic practices that went on
for centuries, and it is worth noting that the last federally-operated Indian Residential
School in Canada closed in 1996 (Multicultural Citizenship was first published in 1995).
With all of this in mind, it seems clear that there is absolutely no moral justification for
granting any sort of special status to the descendants of colonists over immigrants and the
children of immigrants. If anything, colonists appear to have a weaker moral claim than
immigrants. Moreover, since Kymlicka tells us that it is the potentiality of societal
cultures that truly matters and not their current state, and since he believes that weakened
or oppressed societal cultures can enhance and regain their richness if given the
appropriate conditions, there is again no logical means by which Kymlicka could argue
that an immigrant group such as Italian Canadians cannot seek to establish a societal
culture of their own within Canada and go on to demand the status of a national
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minority.404 After all, Italian immigrants have lived in Canada for centuries and they
played an important role in making Canada what it is today. One argument to the contrary
might be the fact that Italians are not concentrated inside a clearly defined territory within
Canada, but if they (or any other immigrant group) ever did become sufficiently
concentrated within a particular territory, Kymlicka could not logically deny them the
status of a national minority. Kymlicka admits as much when he tells us that although he
himself believes that national minorities have societal cultures and immigrant groups do
not, ”there is of course no necessity about this.”405
All of this leaves us in a predicament: Kymlicka makes a strong argument for the
importance of a distinct “societal culture” in the lives of all citizens, and this leads him to
defend the right of national minorities to preserve their unique societal cultures from
encroachment by the majority culture. But in so doing, Kymlicka leaves the door open for
every immigrant community (at least in states established as a direct result of
colonialism) to form their own societal cultures and demand the special status of national
minorities. Since a societal culture plays such an important role in our lives (individual
choice itself depends on the presence of a societal culture), and since there is no moral
justification for granting special status to the descendants of colonists and not to
immigrants and their children, there is no moral argument for preventing dozens of
immigrant communities in a country such as Canada from seeking to establish their own
distinct societal cultures. Such a turn of events would have a major impact on the
integrity of modern nation-states, and republican nationalists would be deeply concerned
about the implications of Kymlicka’s arguments for citizenship and solidarity within
contemporary political communities. I have already considered the differences between
Tamir’s understanding of liberal nationalism and republican nationalism; in the sections
that follow, I identify the major differences between Kymlicka’s liberal nationalism and
republican nationalism.
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6.5 National Identity and National Minorities
The first important distinction between Kymlicka’s liberal nationalism and the
nationalism of someone like David Miller is their understanding of what constitutes the
national identity. Miller believes that we need to actively promote an encompassing
national identity that is shared by all citizens and transcends sectional interests and
identities. This means that minority ethnic, cultural, and territorial identities along with
other sectional identities such as gender and race would continue to exist and would not
be oppressed by the majority, but all citizens would also be expected to embrace a
common national identity and culture on top of their diverse sectional identities.
Kymlicka believes that imposing common citizenship on minorities which see themselves
as distinct peoples or nations may actually increase conflict in a multinational state, but
Miller argues that we can deliberately modify the national consciousness in order to
remove a minority’s desire to form a distinct national society within an existing nation.
Kymlicka summarizes Miller’s own view as follows:
We should not ‘regard cultural identities as given, or at least as created externally
to the political system’, but rather should have ‘a stronger sense of the
malleability of such identities, that is, the extent to which they can be created or
modified consciously.’ Since ‘subcultures threaten to undermine the overarching
sense of identity’ needed for a generous welfare state, the state should promote ‘a
common identity as citizens that is stronger than their separate identities as
members of ethnic or other sectional groups.’”406
Kymlicka disagrees with this, arguing instead that “it is no longer possible (if it ever was)
to eliminate the sense of distinct identity which underlies these groups’ desire to form
their own national societies. If anything, attempts to subordinate these separate identities
to a common identity have backfired, since they are perceived by minorities as threats to
their very existence, and so have resulted in even greater indifference or resentment.”407
But as noted earlier, in a country like Canada this same argument can be applied to all
sizable immigrant communities (all of whom have a distinct national identity that is

406

Ibid, 184.

407

Ibid, 185.

166

presumably important to them) because there is no moral justification for granting special
status to descendants of colonists and not to immigrant groups. Miller’s encompassing
national identity is an attempt to provide a solution to the problem of all sizable
minorities and immigrant groups demanding their own distinct societal culture and
national minority status. Miller concedes that if more than one distinct nation exists
within a state and those nations have no hope of ever developing a single national identity
that they can share in common, then secession and the establishment of multiple nationstates is a viable option. As such, Miller is the first to admit that the ideal environment for
republican citizenship and deliberative democracy is a relatively unified and stable
nation-state.
Miller argues that there are strong ethical reasons for making the bounds of
nationality and the bounds of the state coincide, stating:
Where a nation is politically autonomous, it is able to implement a scheme of
social justice; it can protect and foster its common culture; and its members are to
a greater or lesser extent able collectively to determine its common destiny.
Where the citizens of a state are also compatriots, the mutual trust that this
engenders makes it more likely that they will be able to solve collective action
problems, to support redistributive principles of justice, and to practice forms of
deliberative democracy. Together these make a powerful case for holding that the
boundaries of nations and states should as far as possible coincide.408
It is an encompassing national identity that creates the kind of solidarity required for
democratic politics. This shared national identity is not set in stone because all national
identities are ‘imagined’ identities, and the content of this imagination changes over time.
As noted in Chapter 4, even Rousseau acknowledged that all societies change and that the
chief task of the political order is to allow the expression of these changes and to adapt to
them. Even though at any given moment there will be something substantial that we call
our national identity, and even though we will have customs and institutions that
correspond to it, the nature of this identity is not beyond critical assessment.409 This
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means that the national identity can in fact encompass minority groups, including ethnic,
cultural, and territorial minorities (defined as ethno-cultural minorities concentrated
inside a specific territory within a larger nation-state), without granting the status of
national minority to all such groups.
If we consider Kymlicka’s native Canada, we see that even though its size and
colonial history make it a less than ideal model for the kind of nation-state that Miller has
in mind, it can still serve as an example of what Miller is trying to say about an
encompassing national identity. Kymlicka notes that Canada is made up of First Nations
peoples (original inhabitants), English and French Canadians (colonists), and a multitude
of diverse immigrant groups. In Multicultural Citizenship, he discusses the various ways
in which minority groups have been accommodated in Canada, including representation
rights (political rights for disadvantaged groups, such as visible minorities), polyethnic
rights (cultural rights for immigrant groups), and self-government rights (political selfrule for national minorities). Kymlicka differentiates self-government rights (accorded in
varying degrees to First Nation peoples and the Province of Quebec in Canada) from
other types of rights, explaining:
The basic claim underlying self-government rights is not simply that some groups
are disadvantaged within the political community (representation rights), or that
the political community is culturally diverse (polyethnic rights). Instead, the claim
is that there is more than one political community, and that the authority of the
larger state cannot be assumed to take precedence over the authority of the
constituent national communities. If democracy is the rule of the people, national
minorities claim that there is more than one people, each with the right to rule
themselves.410
Kymlicka acknowledges that creating overlapping political communities within a single
nation-state gives rise to a sort of dual citizenship and to potential conflicts about which
political communities citizens should primarily identify with. According to Kymlicka,
“self-government rights, therefore, are the most complete case of differentiated
citizenship, since they divide the people into separate ‘peoples’, each with its own
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historical rights, territories, and powers of self-government; and each, therefore with its
own political community. They may view their own political community as primary and
authority of the larger federation as derivative.”411 Kymlicka tells us that it might be
tempting to insist that citizenship ought to be a common identity shared by all
individuals, but he nonetheless claims that refusing demands for self-government will
aggravate alienation among national minorities and increase the desire for secession.412
Thus, Quebec is accorded a significant amount of self-government at the provincial level,
but it still remains a part of the Canadian federation. Separatists in Quebec held two
independence referendums (1980, 1995) in an attempt to secede from Canada, but both
attempts failed, and Kymlicka would argue that granting Quebeckers the special status of
a national minority convinced most inside Quebec that there was no need for outright
independence. In 2006 then Canadian Prime Minister Stephen Harper stated: “Do the
Québécois form a nation within Canada? The answer is yes.”413 Harper’s argument was
that Quebeckers form a nation within a nation, and that they should continue to do so
within a united Canada. Harper’s words in this case seem to be in line with Kymlicka’s
belief that national minorities such as Quebeckers can have dual citizenship and dual
loyalties as members of both the Québécois nation and the Canadian state. Kymlicka
notes that attempts to impose an artificial overarching national identity on existing
national identities often fail miserably, as in the case of Yugoslavia, and so he argues that
the only practical solution must be to make our peace with the existence of multiple
societal cultures and multiple nations within a single state.
But is this how things really work in practice, even in Canada? Kymlicka tells us
that members of a national community may view their own political community as
primary and the authority of the larger federation as derivative, and certainly there are
Quebeckers who feel this way. But does the Canadian state really treat Quebec as a
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distinct nation? The Canadian state is known as “Canada” and not the “Federation of
Canada and Quebec,” official documents list everyone’s citizenship as “Canadian,” and
federal policies such as Canada’s Broadcasting Act (which promotes the development of
Canadian content in programming and production) clearly state that their aim is to “build
and support our Canadian identity.”414 To continue with the Broadcasting Act example,
the Canadian Radio-television and Telecommunications Commission (CRTC) is
concerned with “equal rights of Canadian men, women, and children,” with “Canadian
attitudes, opinions, ideas, values, and artistic creativity,” and with “a Canadian point of
view.”415 The Broadcasting Act acknowledges “the linguistic duality and multicultural
and multiracial nature of Canadian society” and recognizes “the special place of
aboriginal peoples within our society,” but it makes no mention of Quebeckers as a
separate nation within Canada or to Canada as a multi-national state.416 In fact, while it is
true that English and French are both official languages in Canada, and while it is also
true that French-speakers have a right to receive government services in their mother
tongue across the country, federal government documents and communiqués hardly ever
refer to Quebeckers as a distinct nation; rather, the two largest groups in the country are
divided into English and French Canadians. Upholding cultural diversity is purported to
be one of the key goals of Canada’s Broadcasting Act, but in this case “cultural diversity
refers to how different groups – like ethno-cultural minorities, Aboriginal peoples and
persons with disabilities – are represented in broadcasting.”417 There is again no mention
of Quebeckers as a distinct nation or of Canada as a multinational state; instead, Canada
is described as a state with two official languages, consisting of various ethnocultural
minorities (not national minorities), and recognizing the special place of Aboriginal
peoples.
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It appears that even in Canada, a state whose vast size and colonial past make it a
less-than-ideal candidate for Miller’s republican nation-state, there is a clear and
deliberate policy at the federal level to create and promote a single and encompassing
Canadian identity. This identity requires the acceptance of two official languages, the
recognition of a special place for Aboriginal peoples on account of their unique history
(but Aboriginal peoples are still referred to as Canadian), and a respect for a myriad of
ethnocultural subcultures that make up Canadian society. Nonetheless, Canadian identity
is not a dual identity and there is certainly no official attempt to acknowledge or promote
a sense of dual or differentiated citizenship for Quebeckers. On the contrary, the
government of Canada is committed to fostering an encompassing Canadian identity that
includes English and French Canadians, Aboriginal peoples, and immigrant communities
under a common Canadian umbrella. It is unlikely that Canada or any other state would
encourage national minorities to view their own political community as separate and
primary, and the authority of the larger federation as secondary and derivative.
In a 2003 paper entitled “Being Canadian” Kymlicka considers the concept of a
wider Canadian identity. He ultimately stops well short of endorsing an encompassing
Canadian identity and suggests that the social glue that holds a country like Canada
together might simply be trustworthy political institutions. According to Kymlicka:
The success of political institutions in the modern age depends heavily on the
active and willing cooperation of citizens. Commentators have typically assumed
that this sort of active and willing cooperation will only arise if citizens have a
strong sense of identiﬁcation with the country. But this assumption may be
mistaken. Perhaps citizens will cooperate whenever they view political
institutions as trustworthy (i.e. even-handed between individuals and groups) and
effective (i.e., providing good services). The strength of identiﬁcation with the
country may not be the crucial variable. Many will ﬁnd this an unsatisfactory
account of the ‘social glue’ that enables diverse countries like Canada to function.
It may seem too provisional or contingent. No doubt there is more to be said about
the sources of social unity. However, whatever the answer to this question of
social unity, it is unlikely to be distinctive to Canada.418
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We see that Kymlicka acknowledges right away that many will find this to be an
unsatisfactory account of the social glue that keeps a country together, and he also
concedes that there is “more to be said” about the sources of social unity. As such, the
answer he offers is anything but definitive, and by suggesting that a strong sense of
identification with the country may not be a crucial variable, he seems to move closer to
Tamir’s view that states are unnecessary and may eventually be replaced by regional or
even global political organizations. All the potential problems with such projects
notwithstanding, from the actual policies of the Canadian federal government it seems
clear that their goal is not to promote a regional or global identity but an encompassing
Canadian identity. What’s more, although Kymlicka’s point about the dangers of
imposing an overarching identity on existing nations (as in the case of Yugoslavia) is
valid, the idea of promoting a dual citizenship in which two distinct nations willingly
come together to form a single state without embracing an encompassing national identity
has not proven particularly successful either, as the examples of Czechoslovakia or
Sweden-Norway attest. Nations that are so distinct that they cannot embrace a common
national identity tend to go their separate ways, and Canadian government policy is
clearly intended to promote unity by promoting an encompassing Canadian national
identity. As Miller argues, in order to achieve long-term stability “political communities
should as far as possible be organized in such a way that their members share a common
national identity, which binds them together in the face of their many diverse private and
group identities.”419 It still remains to be seen whether Quebec will ultimately remain a
part of Canada or secede, but if Canada does stay united it will be through a shared
national identity that transcends sectional identities, not through Kymlicka’s notion of a
dual citizenship that treats national minorities as entirely separate peoples within a larger
federal state.
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6.6 Democratic Self-rule and Political Community/ies
This brings us to a second major difference between Kymlicka and Miller.
Kymlicka claims that states like Canada are made up of separate peoples with their own
distinct societal cultures and special rights to self-government, meaning that there are
multiple distinct political communities operating within the larger state. As such,
Kymlicka believes that minority groups that can be said to form a distinct societal culture
within the larger state must be granted self-government rights, even while acknowledging
that such rights may lead to dual citizenship and dual loyalties. National minorities
should have their own political institutions and a significant amount of political
autonomy at the sub-state level (i.e. provincial level in the case of Quebec within
Canada), and they should also have some form of political representation at the state or
federal level. Kymlicka believes that embracing this type of multicultural and multinational citizenship is the only way to preserve stability in a pluralistic world, and he
warns that attempts to force an overarching and unitary notion of citizenship on national
minorities is likely to lead to conflict and secession. Kymlicka’s notion of multicultural
citizenship is very different from the type of republican citizenship that Miller advocates.
As I discussed at length in the previous chapter, Miller’s republican model of citizenship
presupposes a more participatory and deliberative form of democracy than can be found
in modern liberal democracies. Miller is adamant in his claim that the types of virtues that
are required for republican citizenship can only be cultivated within national borders, and
he further emphasizes that an encompassing national identity that is shared by all citizens
constitutes a necessary precondition for establishing a functional system of deliberative
democracy.420 This is because Miller holds that democratic deliberation is most likely to
take root within political communities whose members share a common identity that
transcends their group-specific identities. Only an encompassing national identity that is
shared by all citizens can create the kind of solidarity and mutual trust that makes
deliberative democracy possible.421
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Republican citizenship asks citizens to adopt an inclusive and encompassing
national identity which transcends their sectional identities as women, racial minorities,
ethnocultural minorities, and territorial minorities.422 This is extremely important for
Miller because he believes that deliberative democracy and politics of social justice can
only be fully realized when the shared national culture is also expressed through politics
(self-rule), and through politics that take place within the confines of a sovereign nationstate. In short, the national culture must be expressed together with the general will of the
nation, and we cannot have meaningful democratic self-rule without an encompassing
national culture that is privileged over the many private subcultures in society. Only this
shared national identity and its expression through politics makes it possible for citizens
to will generally, thus allowing them to establish systems of deliberative democracy and
social justice. In the section on Tamir’s liberal nationalism, I argued that republican
nationalism is inherently cultural and political; political self-rule goes hand in hand with
national self-determination, and the national culture must be expressed together with the
general will within the confines of a sovereign nation-state. Tamir believes that cultural
self-determination can be separated from political self-rule, which is a view that Miller
and republican nationalists reject. Kymlicka does not make the same claim as Tamir
because he argues that it is not enough for national minorities to be able to set their own
cultural policies; rather, they are also entitled to substantial rights of self-government.
However, Kymlicka believes that national minorities form separate political communities
within the larger state, and that these political communities may at times be at odds with
other political communities within that same state. As such, Kymlicka’s view is just as
unacceptable to republican nationalists as Tamir’s attempt to separate cultural selfdetermination from political self-rule. Put simply, by arguing that the state is not made up
of a single ‘people’ with a shared national identity but of multiple ‘peoples’ with distinct
identities inhabiting separate political communities, Kymlicka splits the general will and
removes all hope of establishing the kind of deliberative democracy that republican

422

I define “territorial minorities” as ethnocultural minorities primarily inhabiting a particular
territory within a larger state. Kymlicka appears to automatically equate territorial minorities with national
minorities, but this need not be the case (e.g. the Bretons and Occitans in France).

174

nationalists like Rousseau and Miller are committed to. The rule of the general will is
simply not possible in a state made up of separate political communities (which are at
times openly antagonistic towards each other); in such states, there is no general will to
speak of, and the political system amounts to a constant struggle between competing
particular wills, each representing a specific faction within society.
With reference to Rousseau’s model of participatory democracy, Miller argues
that democratic politics requires all the diverse perspectives within society to be
represented in the political arena, but he firmly states that in reaching policy decisions
citizens have to set aside their personal commitments and affiliations (be they racial,
ethnocultural, or territorial) and assess competing proposals in terms of shared standards
of justice and common interest. 423 In a society made up of separate political communities
without an encompassing national identity to unite them in the face of their diverse
sectional identities, it is extremely difficult if not outright impossible to establish
meaningful shared standards of justice and common interest. Just as Rousseau argues that
a community in which citizens lack a common national character could not be ruled by
the general will, Miller maintains that a community without an encompassing national
identity would have a much harder time establishing deliberative institutions. For
instance, the common good of the community as a whole may require the use of taxpayer
money for advancing shared cultural projects, but individual citizens who belong to the
majority may have no personal interest in advancing the cultural claims of certain
minorities (and members of a minority may have no interest in the national culture at
large). As such, Miller argues that a society which lacks a shared national identity would
also lack shared standards for appealing to the common good, and there would be no
reason for radically different groups to work together. Why should members of separate
political communities within a larger state contribute tax dollars and other goods for the
benefit of a rival political community? For instance, why should the citizens of Quebec
for whom ‘Quebecker’ is their primary identity agree to pay federal taxes that largely
benefit English Canadians outside of Quebec, especially when those resources could be
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used to address the needs of Quebeckers instead (to say nothing of the fact that many in
Quebec view English Canadians as oppressors)? What can unite these separate political
communities, which are at times openly hostile to one another, if not a shared national
identity? In some cases, the answer may be “nothing at all” and the state may dissolve
into multiple smaller states. Miller would accept this option in cases where there is no
hope of ever establishing a shared national identity that transcends sectional interests, but
Kymlicka seems to believe that a larger state made up of multiple nations, all of which
form distinct political communities, can survive without a shared identity.
But what then is the glue that holds these separate nations together in one state? If
Quebeckers are a distinct nation with a separate political community, and if there is no
encompassing national identity that unites them with other Canadians, then the glue
holding the Canadian state together at the federal level must be purely political; common
political principles, practices, and institutions. We know that Kymlicka rejects the idea of
a purely civic or political nationalism as unfeasible and stresses that nationality always
involves a richer cultural component (see Chapter 1), but he seems to believe that in cases
where states are made up of multiple nations, citizenship at the state or federal level can
be sustained by purely political means (no encompassing national identity, no single
national citizenship). Miller rejects this outright, stating that a purely political citizenship
that is unsupported by a shared public culture and national identity is indeed
unfeasible.424 For Miller, any state in which members see themselves as belonging to
rival national communities must be regarded as a less-than-ideal scenario, and if
establishing an encompassing national identity in the long term proves to be impossible,
then secession may be the best solution. That said, Miller stresses that “there can be a
shared public culture which defines the national identity (including in most cases a
national language) alongside a plurality of private cultures (including perhaps minority
languages).”425 What’s more, the national identity changes and evolves over time; it can
become more inclusive and learn to accommodate new cultures, and this process of
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change should take place as part of a collective national conversation. Miller believes that
this deliberative approach to national identity is the future of nationality, stating:
The main elements in the revitalization of nationality will be the same
everywhere: an open debate about national identity and its redefinition to
accommodate cultural and territorial minorities; the constitutional embodiment of
the resulting principles; and the transmission of national identity through a civic
education with a unitary core but a periphery that is flexible enough to serve the
needs of minorities.426
So how would Miller’s perspective deal with the specific circumstances of
Quebec within Canada? Unlike Kymlicka, who treats Quebeckers as a distinct nation that
forms a separate political community, Miller would promote an encompassing Canadian
identity that treats Quebeckers as a territorial minority within Canada (i.e. an
ethnocultural minority that has a clearly defined territory within the larger state).
Canada’s unique historical context means that the specific content of the Canadian
national identity has to make special accommodations for Quebeckers and First Nations
peoples; thus, a Canadian national identity includes both English as French as official
languages (while having a single national language would be less complicated,
Switzerland has four official languages and remains a unified nation), and it also includes
a special respect for First Nations peoples because of the complex historical
circumstances under which the Canadian state was established. In short, a republican
nationalist would view Canada as one nation with a single national identity, political
community, and public culture. Canada may be a nation with ethnocultural and territorial
minorities who have shaped and continue to shape the specific content of its national
identity, but it is a nation nonetheless, not a state made up of multiple nations and
political communities and held together by purely political bonds at the federal level. If it
turns out that Quebeckers are truly so different from other Canadians that promoting a
shared national identity is impossible in the long term, then secession may well occur
sometime in the future, but in order to prevent this from happening republican
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nationalists maintain that our best bet is not to treat Quebeckers as a separate people, but
rather to treat them as an integral part of the larger Canadian nation.

6.7 The Sources of Political Legitimacy
Another major difference between republican nationalism and liberal nationalism
can be found in their understanding of the sources of political legitimacy. Liberal
nationalists like Tamir and Kymlicka believe that cultural belonging is important only
because it is valuable to individual citizens, and they argue that political legitimacy must
come from the consent of the individual. Miller, on the other hand, assigns substantial
moral and ontological significance to nationhood, arguing that national identity structures
the moral world of the nation’s members and is constitutive of their identity. As such, the
national culture must be assigned special value in society and be privileged over other
forms of cultural belonging.427 Furthermore, a republican nationalist “views the issue [of
political legitimacy] in less individualistic terms; political institutions are legitimate when
they serve to express the will of the national community” rather than the consent of the
individual.428 As such, political institutions are not merely concerned with the well-being
of individuals; rather, they ought to express the collective will of the national
community.429 In his own comparison of republican and liberal citizenship, Miller tells us
that “liberals will seek to make the judiciary the supreme arbiters of constitutional rights
– in effect the interpretation of liberal citizenship is entrusted to them – while the
republican gives this role to the citizen body as a whole.”430
As noted earlier in this chapter, Tamir blames Rousseau for conflating the nation
with the state by identifying the state with the subjects as a collective rather than with its
rulers. Rousseau argues that the nation-state has a holistic character, and that the nation is
synonymous with the people, and the people with the state. Tamir rejects the view that
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the state should be the “institutional representation of the people’s will” and she
distinguishes between political self-rule and national self-determination, arguing that the
national community is not necessarily a political community.431 Kymlicka’s view differs
from Tamir’s in that he believe that nations (including national minorities) have a right to
both cultural self-determination and political self-rule, but he argues that multiple peoples
and political communities can exist within a single state (e.g. Quebeckers as a separate
people and Quebec as a separate political community within Canada). Republican
nationalists like Miller restate Rousseau’s holistic conception of the nation-state, and they
reject both Tamir’s and Kymlicka’s views because a community ruled by the general will
demands that both national self-determination and political self-rule be expressed at the
highest level of the state (at the federal level in the case of Canada, rather than provincial
or local levels). In order for the state to have political legitimacy, the national will must
be expressed at the highest level and the general will cannot be divided into multiple
separate and competing wills representing smaller political communities within the state.
The state itself must be the vehicle for furthering national self-expression; for republican
nationalists, both the national will and the encompassing national culture must be
expressed through politics, and through politics that take place at the highest level of the
nation-state. Anything less would violate the principle of democratic self-rule as
republican nationalists understand it.

6.8

The Public Good and Democratic Consensus
Whereas liberal nationalists believe that decisions about substantive conceptions

of the good (especially beyond the ideal of autonomy) should be left up to individuals,
republican nationalists assume that political participation and an encompassing national
identity hold both intrinsic and instrumental value, and that they are therefore essential
aspects of the good life. Because political participation and an encompassing national
identity constitute fundamental preconditions for establishing the community ruled by the
general will, the decision about whether they hold intrinsic value is not left up to
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individuals; rather, it is taken as a given in a republican nationalist community.
Furthermore, republican nationalists believe that meaningful democratic consensus is
possible and that the political community can privilege certain conceptions of the public
good over others (beyond the ideal of autonomy). As Miller points out, “above all,
[republican citizenship] involves being willing to set aside personal interests and personal
ideals in the interests of achieving a democratic consensus.”432 Although it does not
necessarily aim at a single objectively correct answer, the system of deliberative
democracy that republican nationalists advocate does aim at a consensus regarding
substantive norms and procedures. Liberal nationalists like Tamir and Kymlicka reject
this view, arguing that the fact of plurality makes it impossible to achieve meaningful
consensus on what constitutes the good. As such, liberal societies must allow individuals
to pursue their own conceptions of the good (within the constraints imposed by the
demands of reasonable disagreement), and to revise them at their own discretion.433 By
contrast, republican nationalists reject the “reasonable disagreement” limitation and hold
that even appeals to controversial moral doctrines are acceptable in public deliberation;
so long as the discussion itself is free, open, and civil, every citizen can have an
opportunity to persuade their fellow citizens using the force of the better argument. If
enough people are convinced by a particular vision of the public good and a democratic
consensus emerges, then privileging that particular vision of the good over others is
justified.434
It is important to note that the public conception of the good for republican
nationalists is not set in stone; in fact, it is up for debate, discussion, and revision through
the process of active participation in a system of deliberative democracy. This means that
the good of a republican political community will be formed and revised through active
political participation, national referenda, and so forth, but there is still assumed to exist
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at any given time a substantive democratic and moral consensus on what constitutes the
public good.435 A republican nationalist begins by arguing that an encompassing national
identity and active political participation are necessary components of the good, not only
for individual citizens but for the community as a whole. What’s more, the actual content
of the public good can be even more substantive in republican nationalist communities;
those liberals who are perfectionists only go so far as to support the public promotion of
the ideal of autonomy, but republican nationalists can promote other ideals as well, as
long as they are supported by a democratic consensus that emerges through the process of
deliberation.
For instance, a republican community may collectively decide that the public
good requires promoting a belief in a higher power (a position which clearly violates the
“reasonable disagreement” limitation). This does not mean that the community has to
endorse any particular religious denomination; it may simply mean that encouraging
belief in a higher power is considered important for society because it teaches citizens to
look beyond their own narrow self-interests, to adopt a more far-reaching perspective, to
act more responsibly towards their fellow citizens, and so forth. If through the process of
deliberation the community determines that a belief in a higher power constitutes part of
the public good, then the political community can actively encourage this belief through
official documents and communiqués, national symbols such as the anthem and flag, the
national system of education, state-owned media, and so on. For instance, the Canadian
national anthem features the words “God keep our land glorious and free” and the official
motto of the United States is “In God We Trust,” words which are also featured on US
coins and paper currency. These are non-denominational references to a higher power,
but they are still clear references made on official national symbols, and some have taken
issue with them. Because reasonable people will disagree about the existence of a higher
power, it seems that there is no way to defend these references from a liberal perspective;
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a liberal must endorse their removal from official national symbols and documents
because some citizens will inevitably reject the belief in a higher power. However, these
references can be defended from a republican nationalist perspective: if through the
process of deliberation the community decides that a belief in a higher power constitutes
part of the public good, the state can actively promote this belief and feature references to
a higher power on official symbols and documents. On the republican nationalist view,
those who refuse to believe in a higher power would not be coerced into adopting the
preferred view because every citizen is an autonomous moral agent, but the dissenters
would also have to accept that promoting the belief in a higher power through noncoercive means is a legitimate state policy.436
Dissenters may actively try to overturn this policy through the deliberative
process, but they would have to do so by offering compelling arguments about why the
belief in a higher power should not be considered a part of the public good. As such,
dissenters would be expected to respect the decision of the community as long as it was
made fairly by their fellow citizens through the process of democratic deliberation, and as
long as they continued to have public avenues for voicing their own dissenting views.
Dissenters in a republican community could not simply appeal to the standard of
“reasonable disagreement” and demand that all religious symbols and judgments about
the validity of beliefs be removed from the public sphere because reasonable people may
disagree about them. After all, those citizens who consider their belief in a higher power
to be an essential aspect of their identity could argue that a society which refuses to
reference these beliefs is actively denying them the ability to publically express a
fundamental part of themselves. Republican nationalism therefore rejects the idea of state
neutrality towards potentially controversial doctrines and actively promotes a particular
conception of the public good, the specific content of which is not determined or revised
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by each citizen individually but by the community collectively through the process of
political participation and deliberation.
We know that while there are prominent liberals who advocate state neutrality,
there are also liberals who believe in promoting the ‘ideal of autonomy’ as the public
good in liberal communities. In Multicultural Citizenship, Kymlicka accepts the ideal of
autonomy as an integral aspect of liberalism, and he criticizes Rawls’s claim that
embracing this ideal would make liberalism sectarian. Like Mill before him, Kymlicka
accepts the ideal of autonomy as an integral aspect of the liberal good, thereby rejecting
state neutrality.437 The difference between Kymlicka’s liberal good and a republican
nationalist conception of the good is not that one view embraces strict state neutrality
while the other does not; rather, the difference is in the content of the good.438 While the
content of the good according to a liberal nationalist like Kymlicka is the broad ideal of
autonomy, republican nationalists can accept a more substantive understanding of the
good, one that begins with the assumption that political participation and an
encompassing national identity hold both intrinsic and instrumental value (and are
therefore essential elements of the good life), but one that also holds that the content of
the public good can extend to include ideals beyond participation and shared national
identity (the specific content is ultimately determined by public deliberation).
Although all republican nationalists accept that political participation and an
encompassing national identity are integral elements of the good life, their specific
understanding of these ideas, as well as additional ideas about the good (such as whether
or not to promote a belief in a higher power, for instance) will be subject to debate and
discussion. In liberal societies ideas about the good (apart from the ideal of autonomy)
are left up to the individual citizen, and they are formed and revised at the level of the
individual. By contrast, in a republican society ideas about the public good will be
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defined and revised by all citizens collectively through the deliberative process. In order
to revise the conception of the public good, republican citizens will have to come
together at the national level and go about revising the community’s definition of the
public good through political participation and deliberation. Put simply, because
republican nationalists believe that our conception of the public good reflects the general
will of the citizens, our understanding of the public good cannot be revised by individual
citizens at their own discretion. Instead, all citizens must come together and revise the
conception of the public good collectively through participation and deliberation. A
political community ruled by the general will is more than an aggregate of individuals
with equal rights and equivalent legal status; citizens of a political community ruled by
the general will must form a single sovereign body (Rousseau’s moi commun), and
decisions about what constitutes the public good must be made by the whole body
through the mechanism of democratic politics.
The question then becomes: why do republican nationalists want to publically
promote a particular conception of the good, even though modern political communities
are by and large diverse and pluralistic? Critics have argued that expecting a democratic
consensus on questions of the good and actively promoting one conception of the public
good over others would be impractical at best, and discriminatory at worst. Nevertheless,
republican nationalists believe that democratic consensus is possible (the content of
which emerges through deliberation),439 and they argue that the political community
(through the vehicle of the state) can do far more good for its citizens by adopting a
shared conception of the public good and actively promoting it, than by leaving the
process of defining and revising conceptions of the good entirely up to the individual. By
actively privileging certain conceptions of the good over others, the community teaches
us that certain ways of life are more productive than others, that certain activities are
more beneficial for society than others, and that certain qualities are nobler than others,
which makes faster and more meaningful progress towards equality and social justice
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possible. To use the example of political participation, we know that many liberals
encourage active participation, but ultimately they feel that the decision about whether or
not to participate in politics must be left up to the individual. As Kymlicka states, because
there are many different conceptions of the good, “a liberal democracy must respect such
diverse conceptions of the good life, as far as possible, and should not compel people to
adopt a conception of the good life which privileges political participation as the source
of meaning or satisfaction.”440 But because republican nationalists believe that
participation has both intrinsic and instrumental value, they would argue a) that those
individuals who do not participate in politics are unable to realize their full potential as
citizens and be free in the most meaningful sense (FSM), and b) that the troubling decline
in political participation in many modern liberal democracies along with the disturbing
rise in the influence of money in politics threaten the very integrity of the democratic
system. As such, they would stress that in order to preserve democracy we must not only
encourage political participation as a worthy cause, but also actively promote it as an
integral element of the good life through the vehicle of the state.
To reiterate, a republican nationalist would argue that political participation is an
essential aspect of the good life because a) it allows individuals to realize themselves
fully as citizens and be free in the most-meaningful sense (intrinsic worth), and b) it
ensures that citizens are more engaged in the political process, which in turn ensures the
preservation of meaningful democracy in the face of such fundamental threats as the
growing influence of money in politics (instrumental worth). Although liberal nationalists
believe that political participation has instrumental value for citizens, liberals do not think
that political participation has any intrinsic value, and they mostly reject the idea that
political activity should be a requirement of democratic citizenship. By contrast,
republican nationalists believe that political participation has intrinsic value and they hold
that all citizens must therefore take an active part in governing themselves. According to
Miller, although the republican tradition holds up the active and virtuous citizen as the
exemplar of good citizenship, one need not endorse active participation in politics as the
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highest good to be a republican. However, a republican nationalist is required to embrace
the more modest position that politics constitutes a necessary element of the good life.441
In modern liberal democracies political participation is optional and judges are
often the supreme arbiters of constitutional rights, but the republican model of democracy
requires more than our contemporary representative political institutions have to offer.
Republican citizenship requires a more participatory model of democracy that makes
political participation a requirement, which is the only way to establish a meaningful
system of deliberative democracy. Miller believes that public discussion has a moralizing
effect on citizens and that political participation leads to self-realization (thus, it has
intrinsic value), and he holds that engaging in public discussion makes citizens feel as
though they are a part of a larger whole, which makes them more likely to cooperate with
one another. When everyone takes an active part in public discussions, citizens who
ultimately disagree with the outcome of deliberation understand how and why the
outcome was reached, they feel that they had the opportunity to have their voices heard,
and they believe that they can contribute to more favorable outcomes in the future. This
builds trust, mutual understanding, and solidarity, which leads to a stronger and more
unified political community (hence, participation also has instrumental value).
Republican citizens are not only encouraged but required to play an active role in both
the formal and informal arenas of politics, even if that means sacrificing their own time
and resources, because the goal of republican citizenship goes beyond promoting
sectional interests and involves actively seeking consensus and compromise in the name
of the common good.442 The belief that political participation has both intrinsic and
instrumental value, and that it constitutes an integral element of the good life, represents a
clear distinction between republican nationalism and the liberal nationalism of both
Tamir and Kymlicka.
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A liberal would likely argue that republican nationalists want to restrict the
freedom of individuals by not allowing each citizen to decide whether political
participation is part of their own personal conception of the good life. However,
republican nationalists would counter by stressing that a community in which citizens are
not engaged in politics is itself less free because it does not offer citizens adequate
opportunities for self-realization, and because it is dominated by special interests and
therefore not democratic in the most meaningful sense. This is the essence of Rousseau’s
famous statement that citizens must be “forced to be free”; by teaching citizens that
political participation is an integral aspect of the good life instead of leaving each
individual citizen to make that decision for himself, we are ensuring that all individuals
have the opportunity to fully realize themselves as citizens, and that special interests will
not take advantage of political apathy and a lack of vigilance on the part of the citizenry
in order to gain undue influence over the political system. In short, by actively promoting
political participation as a necessary element of the good life, we are ensuring that the
republican community remains fully free and meaningfully democratic, and we are
therefore preserving, not infringing upon, the freedom of citizens (including the
dissenters themselves).

6.9 Liberal vs. Republican Nationalism: Six Major
Distinctions
To sum up, the republican nationalism of someone like Rousseau and Miller
differs from the liberal nationalism of Tamir and Kymlicka in six major ways: 1)
republican nationalists hold that political participation has both intrinsic and instrumental
value, and they believe that participation constitutes a necessary (though not necessarily
the highest) aspect of the good life, whereas liberal nationalists refuse to privilege
political participation as a source of meaning or satisfaction. 2) Republican nationalists
believe in promoting an encompassing national identity that is shared by all citizens,
including minorities, at the level of the nation-state, while liberal nationalists claim that
nearly all modern states will inevitably be multicultural and multinational. The
encompassing national identity that republican nationalists endorse has both intrinsic and
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instrumental value, and it must be privileged over sectional identities. 3) In order for the
political community to be ruled by the general will and be fully democratic, republican
nationalists argue that there must exist a single overarching political community at the
level of the nation-state (rather than multiple separate political communities as argues
Kymlicka, or a separation of national self-determination from political self-rule as argues
Tamir). In a republican political community, both the national identity and the general
will must be expressed through politics. 4) The source of political legitimacy for
republican nationalists comes not from the consent of each individual but from the
general (or national) will of the political community as a whole. 5) Republican
nationalists argue that a shared conception of the good and a substantial democratic and
moral consensus between citizens are possible even in a pluralistic world, and they
maintain that the political community ought to actively promote a particular conception
of the public good. Republican nationalists begin with the assumption that political
participation and an encompassing national identity are integral elements of the good life,
and that they form the fundamental preconditions for establishing the community ruled
by the general will (the decision about whether or not this is true is not left up to
individuals).443 Moreover, the content of the public good in the republican nationalist
community can extend beyond participation and shared national identity. The specific
content of the public good is up for debate and revision through the process of political
participation and deliberation, but decisions about what constitutes the public good must
be made by all citizens collectively. Finally, 6) the mechanism for political decisionmaking in republican nationalist communities will be different from their liberal
counterparts because the ultimate interpreters of republican rights and obligations will be
the people themselves rather than constitutional judges or politicians. This means that
major political decisions, such as amendments to the constitution, will have to be
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approved in national referenda, and if there is disagreement between the different
branches of government on a contentious issue, the ultimate decision will not be left up to
constitutional courts but to the general will of the people. To achieve this, political
mechanisms will need to be put in place in order to ensure that elected representatives are
maximally accountable to their constituents, and if decisions are made by politicians or
judges that are widely unpopular among the general public, citizens will need to have
avenues available to them for challenging these decisions democratically, including
demanding a national referendum on a particular issue (for example, a referendum could
be called if the opponents of a decision collect a set amount of valid signatures from
fellow citizens in support of the motion).
With these distinctions in mind, it becomes clear that liberal and republican
nationalism represent two different strands within nationalist theory, and that they should
be treated as such in the literature. Distinguishing between liberal and republican
nationalism helps to clarify and further advance the current debate within nationalist
theory, while insisting that these two very different perspectives fall under the same
liberal nationalist umbrella muddies the debate and renders the very concept of liberal
nationalism meaningless. In the final chapter, I argue for treating liberal and republican
nationalism as two separate strands of cultural nationalism, and I consider the importance
and relevance of republican nationalism as a distinct theoretical approach in the twentyfirst century.
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Chapter 7
7

Moving the Debate Forward
In the final chapter, I restate my main claims and arguments, I discuss the

contributions that I hope my work has made to the current debates in the literature, and I
talk about the continuing relevance of nations, nationalism, and nationalist theory in the
twenty-first century. I have argued that by taking a closer look at the works of JeanJacques Rousseau, who is the father of modern nationalism and an important thinker of
the republican political tradition, we can fill in some important gaps in the vast bodies of
literature on nationalism and republicanism. Rousseau’s ultimate project was to bring
nationalism and republican democracy together in a way that allows citizens to become
free in the most meaningful sense by attaining self-realization, by taking part in a shared
national identity and culture, and by playing an active role in shaping the laws that
govern them. This is a worthy project, and one that still has its contemporary adherents,
most notably David Miller. As Miller states, “the guiding ideal here is that of a people
reproducing their national identity and settling matters that are collectively important to
them through democratic deliberation.”444 This is also a project that is deeply rooted in
history, because, as Liah Greenfeld points out, nationalism not only defines modernity
and the modern nation-state system, but nationalism originally developed as democracy,
in that it embodied the modern democratic ideal that the people are the true bearers of
political sovereignty.445 Both democracy and nationalism remain important ideas in the
modern world, and the issues they bring up are unlikely to go away. For this reason, I
hope that through developing the concept of republican nationalism I have managed to
shed light on some of the gaps in the literature, and that I have succeeded in contributing
to the important contemporary debates on republicanism, nationalism, and democracy.
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7.1 Main Claims and Arguments
In Chapter 1 I argued that the debate within nationalist theory has moved beyond
the civic vs. ethnic divide, and that all theorists of nationalism are cultural nationalists to
some degree. However, I also noted that there is a great deal of diversity within cultural
nationalism, and that even those theorists who identify as cultural nationalists have
endorsed very different views. Most of the debate within cultural nationalism has been
taking place between liberal nationalists like Tamir and Kymlicka on the one hand, and
non-liberal nationalists like Roger Scruton on the other (the specific parameters of “nonliberal” nationalism have not been clearly established, but non-liberal nationalists have
been alternatively referred to as conservative, communitarian, or simply illiberal). I have
suggested that another strand of cultural nationalism exists, one that is neither liberal nor
conservative: republican nationalism is rooted in the republican principles of JeanJacques Rousseau, and it is present in the works of David Miller. Although Miller has
referred to himself as a liberal nationalist in the past, I argued that the brand of
nationalism that he is advocating constitutes a distinct republican strand of nationalist
theory and a defensible alternative to liberal nationalism.
In Chapter 2, I looked at the development of republican political theory, and I
tried to show that there was no single theory of republicanism to speak of. Rather,
republicanism is a theoretical framework that has given rise to a number of diverse
perspectives, each claiming the historical legacy of classical republican thinkers such as
Aristotle, Cicero, Machiavelli, and Harrington. The main debate within contemporary
republican theory has taken place between instrumental republicans like Philip Pettit and
Quentin Skinner on the one hand, and civic humanists like Hannah Arendt and Iseult
Honohan on the other. I identified a third strand of republican theory, one which takes the
concepts of culture and national identity seriously, and one which also traces its roots
back to Rousseau. I emphasized that this cultural republicanism is firmly grounded in the
wider republican tradition, and that it ought to be treated as a distinct strand of republican
political theory.
In Chapter 3 I took a closer look at Rousseau’s unique brand of republicanism. I
argued that Rousseau made important contributions to republican political theory with his
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ideas about the two social contracts and the problem of inequality, as well as his notions
about the people as sovereign, the general will, and the moral republic. Rousseau was the
first modern thinker to connect republican theory with a fundamentally democratic
conception of sovereignty and with participatory democracy. In Chapter 4, I considered
whether Rousseau’s political theory could be classified as liberal, or whether his
perspective was in fact distinctly republican. I identified two necessary preconditions for
establishing a political community ruled by the general will: (1) citizens who embrace
freedom as self-mastery and are capable of rediscovering a sense of amour de soi while
using natural compassion (directed toward the national community) to channel their
amour-propre in more constructive ways, and (2) citizens who have a shared national
identity and a strong love of country, which engender fraternity and solidarity. I argued
that the importance of these preconditions for Rousseau could not be downplayed without
losing the essence of his philosophy, and as these two preconditions appear unacceptable
to most liberals, I concluded that Rousseau is not a liberal but a distinctly republican
thinker―a cultural republican. I also argued that Rousseau is the founder of modern
nationalism, and that the intrinsic connection that he makes between republicanism and
nationalism points towards a distinct strand of nationalist theory that I call republican
nationalism.
Chapter 5 delved deeper into the concept of republican nationalism through a
comparison of Rousseau’s writings to the theories of contemporary republican thinker
David Miller. While there are notable differences between them, Rousseau and Miller
embark on very similar projects; in fact, I tried to show that Miller accepts the
fundamental aspects of Rousseau’s republicanism, and that his theory amounts to a
sophisticated attempt to modernize Rousseau’s philosophy. In Chapter 6, I juxtaposed the
liberal nationalism of Yael Tamir and Will Kymlicka to republican nationalism, and I
argued that the two approaches are sufficiently distinct to warrant separate classifications
within nationalist theory. I identified six major ways in which liberal nationalism differs
from republican nationalism, including: 1) Liberal nationalists refuse to privilege political
participation as a source of meaning or satisfaction; republican nationalists hold that
political participation constitutes a necessary aspect of the good life. 2) Liberal
nationalists claim that modern nation-states will inevitably be multicultural and
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multinational; republican nationalists endorse an encompassing national identity that is
shared by all citizens, including minorities, at the level of the nation-state. 3) The liberal
nationalism of Kymlicka holds that multiple separate political communities will exist
within a single nation state, while the liberal nationalism of Tamir calls for a separation
of national self-determination from political self-rule; republican nationalists argue that if
the political community is to be fully democratic (i.e. ruled by the general will), there
must exist a single overarching political community at the level of the nation-state (both
the national identity and the general will must be expressed through politics at the highest
level). 4) The source of political legitimacy for liberal nationalists lies in the consent of
each individual; for republican nationalists, the source of political legitimacy comes from
the general (or national) will of the community as a whole. 5) Liberal nationalists believe
that decisions about substantive conceptions of the good (especially beyond the ideal of
autonomy) should be left up to individuals; republican nationalists begin with the
assumption that political participation and an encompassing national identity are integral
aspects of the good life, and that they form the fundamental preconditions for establishing
the community ruled by the general will (the decision about whether or not this is true is
not left up to individuals). Moreover, the content of the public good in the republican
nationalist community can extend beyond participation and shared national identity; the
specific content of the public good is up for debate and revision through the process of
political participation and deliberation, but decisions about what constitutes the public
good must be made by all citizens collectively. 6) Lastly, liberal nationalists hold that the
judiciary is the supreme arbiter of constitutional rights; republican nationalists give this
role to the citizen body as a whole. As such, the mechanism for political decision-making
in a republican nationalist community will be distinct from its liberal counterpart: major
political decisions, such as amendments to the constitution, will have to be approved in
national referenda, and if there is disagreement between the different branches of
government on a contentious issue, the ultimate decision will not be left up to
constitutional courts but to the people as a whole.
When laid out in this way, one would be hard-pressed to maintain that the strand
of thought which I refer to as republican nationalism can be subsumed under the liberal
nationalist umbrella; the two appear very different, and they are clearly at odds with one
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another regarding some of their most fundamental principles. Even though Miller has
described himself as a liberal nationalist in the past, it seems incoherent to argue that
liberal nationalists can simultaneously hold that political participation has no intrinsic
value and yet has both intrinsic and instrumental value, that modern nation-states should
be multinational and yet have a single encompassing national identity, that they can be
made up of multiple separate political communities and yet constitute a single
overarching political community, that political legitimacy comes from the consent of
each individual and yet from the general will, that decisions about substantive
conceptions of the good (including the view that political participation and an
encompassing national identity hold intrinsic value) must be left up to individuals and yet
are presupposed and actively promoted by the state, and that both the judiciary and the
citizen body as a whole can be the supreme arbiters of constitutional rights. It is therefore
clear that liberal and republican nationalism represent two distinct strands within
nationalist theory, and that they should be treated as such in the literature. Insisting that
these two perspectives fall under the same liberal nationalist umbrella muddies the debate
and renders the very concept of liberal nationalism meaningless, while clearly
distinguishing between liberal and republican nationalism helps to clarify and further
advance the current debate in nationalist theory.

7.2 Contributions to the Literature
There are three significant gaps in the literature that I tried to address with this
project. The first gap was in the literature on republican political theory; the two major
strands of republicanism represented in the literature are instrumental republicanism and
strong republicanism. Instrumental republicans like Pettit and Skinner see citizenship as a
means of preserving individual freedom and not a relationship or activity with intrinsic
value, while strong republicans like Hannah Arendt and Iseult Honohan stress the
intrinsic value of participating in self-government and realizing common goods as
citizens. Nevertheless, the main debate within contemporary republican theory has been
taking place between instrumental republicans and those strong republicans like Honohan
who are most often classified as civic humanists. Civic humanists accept the intrinsic
value of participation, but they also actively dismiss what they consider to be “more
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communitarian” versions of strong republicanism which hold that politics will inevitably
involve extra-political elements. I argued that along with instrumental republicanism and
civic humanism there exists a third strand of republican theory; cultural republicanism.
Along with civic humanists, cultural republicans recognize the intrinsic value of
participation, but unlike both instrumental republicans and civic humanists, cultural
republicans stress the fundamental importance of a shared national identity and culture,
including the extra-political elements that go along with them. I tried to show that
although cultural republicanism differs from both instrumental republicanism and civic
humanism, it remains an integral part of the wider republican tradition.
Grounded in the 18th century writings of Rousseau and clearly present in Miller’s
contemporary work, cultural republicanism holds that the virtues required by republican
citizenship can be cultivated only within the borders of a nation, and a common national
identity and public culture are essential for producing the kind of solidarity that is needed
for a system of republican democracy to take shape.446 This common public culture
should not be so all-embracing that it destroys private subcultures, but it should have
substantial content and meaning for members of the national community.447 Cultural
republicanism is the least prominently represented strand within republican theory; most
contemporary contributors to the debate on republicanism (including republicans like
Pettit and Honohan, but also liberal critics of republicanism such as Robert E. Goodin
and Alan Patten) tend to vaguely refer to this third strand of republicanism as a “more
communitarian” perspective that is rooted in “pre-political” culture. I tried to draw out
cultural republicanism as a distinct strand of republican theory with a clear set of
principles and a firm grounding in the wider republican tradition. Whereas the vast
majority of contemporary republican literature neglects the importance of culture and
nationality for politics, cultural republicanism sees them as inseparable elements of the
political process.
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The second gap in the literature is related to the first, and it shares the same
historical foundation in the works of Rousseau. I argued that there exists a gap in
contemporary literature on nationalism because while the debate within nationalist theory
has largely moved beyond the civic vs. ethnic divide and there is now a general
understanding among nationalist thinkers that all nationalisms are to some extent cultural
nationalisms, more work needs to be done to delineate the distinct strands of thought
operating within the framework of cultural nationalism. The most prominent strand of
cultural nationalism is liberal nationalism, advocated by such thinkers as Yael Tamir and
Will Kymlicka, and much of the literature has revolved around liberal nationalists
defending the position that liberalism and nationalism are compatible against those
liberals like Bhikhu Parekh and Judith Lichtenberg who are more skeptical about
nationalism. Meanwhile, alternative approaches to cultural nationalism have been broadly
described as illiberal, communitarian, or conservative; associated with such thinkers as
Roger Scruton, they have met with little to no sympathy from liberals and liberal
nationalists. With this in mind, it is no surprise that David Miller has identified as a
liberal nationalist in the past; for a nationalist thinker, claiming to be anything other than
a liberal nationalist is sure to be met with suspicion, or to be dismissed outright as a form
of rightwing/conservative/communitarian extremism. I challenged this assumption by
suggesting that Miller’s work points towards a distinct republican strand of nationalist
theory, one that is rooted in the works of Rousseau. In order to prove my assertion, I
sought to show the stark differences between the liberal nationalism of Tamir and
Kymlicka on the one hand, and Miller’s republican nationalism on the other. My goal
was to demonstrate that republican nationalism forms a distinct theoretical strand of
nationalist theory and constitutes a defensible alternative to liberal nationalism. In so
doing, I sought to move the discussion within nationalist theory forward by arguing that
there is still an important debate to be had between liberal and republican nationalism,
but the first step must be to classify them as two distinct perspectives.
Whereas much of the literature on republicanism neglects the significance of the
extra-political aspects of culture and nationality for politics, republican nationalism
combines cultural republicanism and political nationalism; it recognizes the inherent
connection between culture and politics, including the importance of an encompassing
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national identity and culture. And while liberal nationalism recognizes the importance of
national belonging but holds that modern states can be multinational or even transnational
entities, republican nationalism holds that all members of the nation must share a
common identity and culture and be active participants in the democratic process so that
the general will, the source of political legitimacy, can be expressed at the highest level
(the level of the nation-state). In her account of the relationship between republicanism
and nationalism that is drawn from the current literature, Catherine Frost states the
following:
The difference between republicanism and nationalism, therefore, is that
nationalism reveals that an important link runs between the political and cultural
(or pre-political) life of a population, a link that plays a fundamental role in the
conditions for representation in both areas. The question is whether patriotism or
republicanism can assume the role that nationalism once played in terms of
particularist political attachments without also coming to terms with the
connection between the political and cultural aspects of membership. It seems
reasonable to conclude that this dynamic will persist regardless, but neither a
patriotic nor a republican approach seems prepared to respond to it, preferring to
sideline the issue while addressing more classically political matters.448
This is precisely the challenge that republican nationalism answers: republican
nationalism recognizes the connection between culture and politics, including the extrapolitical aspects of culture, while stressing the importance of republican citizenship and
participatory democracy. As such, republican nationalism comes to terms with the
connection between the political and cultural aspects of membership and fills an
important gap in the literature on republican political theory and on nationalism.
The third significant contribution that this project makes is that it offers a fuller
account of Rousseau’s freedom as self-mastery or FSM. In Chapter 2 I outlined the
various competing conceptions of freedom that have been represented in the literature on
republicanism, including freedom as non-interference, freedom as non-domination, and
freedom as political autonomy (see table in Chapter 2). However, the idea of FSM has
been largely unexplored in contemporary debates on republican theory, mostly because
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modern republicans tend to dismiss FSM as a “more communitarian” and therefore
unattractive conception of freedom.449 Rousseau’s understanding of FSM is not directly
related to communitarianism; instead, it is a fundamentally republican and democratic
conception of freedom that I have tried to explain more fully. I argued that Rousseau’s
FSM presupposes three interconnected layers: (1) individual self-mastery, where the
agent is the individual and the goal is to overcome mere appetites and narrow self-interest
in order to achieve one’s full potential as a man and citizen, (2) political self-rule, where
the agent is the citizen body and the goal is for all citizens to actively shape the laws that
govern them through a system of participatory democracy, and (3) national selfdetermination, where the agent is the nation-state and the goal is to preserve and promote
the sovereignty of the state within an international system of rival powers. All three
aforementioned layers of freedom hold intrinsic value because self-realization and
freedom in the fullest sense depend on them.450 As Miller notes, referring to the intrinsic
value of national self-determination and its connection to increasing the freedom of
citizens, “self-determination for groups is valuable in much the same way as selfdetermination for individuals” because “the group as a whole can achieve much more
than I as an individual can achieve, so by belonging I have a smaller say over a bigger
range of issues than I have as a private person.”451 This three-fold understanding of
freedom clearly distinguishes republican nationalism from alternative approaches,
including liberal nationalism (endorses self-determination and a less direct form of
political self-rule but not individual self-mastery) and all forms of authoritarian
nationalism (endorses national self-determination but not necessarily political self-rule or
individual self-mastery).
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I feel that the concept of republican nationalism which I have developed
throughout this project effectively addresses gaps in the literature regarding the
connection between culture/nationality and politics in republican theory, the connection
between republican citizenship/participatory democracy and nationalism in nationalist
theory, and the general confusion about the full meaning of FSM. Much of this project
has relied on the writings of Rousseau, and this is because his work provides the common
thread between republicanism and nationalism. Rousseau was a major thinker of the
republican tradition and the father of modern nationalism, and he was also one of the few
modern thinkers to take the “ancient” conception of freedom as self-mastery seriously.
As such, I have argued that a closer study of Rousseau’s contributions to political
philosophy can provide valuable insights for theorizing about such important concepts as
republicanism, nationalism, democracy, and freedom, and I hope that this project can
serve as a step in that direction. Moreover, I believe that the concept of republican
nationalism as an alternative to liberal nationalism constitutes a fruitful avenue for future
research in nationalist theory, and in the following section I consider some of the
important questions that defenders of republican nationalism will have to grapple with in
the future.

7.3 Questions for the Future
This project sought to develop republican nationalism as a distinct theoretical
framework by arguing that it constitutes a separate strand of nationalist theory and one
that is clearly different from liberal nationalism, that has a firm grounding in the
republican political tradition (especially in Rousseau), and that maintains a contemporary
relevance in the works of David Miller. I argued that republican nationalism addresses
major gaps in the literature on republican political theory and on nationalism, and I tried
to show that there is merit in paying more attention to this approach in the future.
Nevertheless, there is much work to be done for republican nationalism to go from a mere
theoretical framework to the kind of serious approach to politics that liberal nationalism
has become. There are many important questions to address about the implications of
republican nationalism in the real world, questions whose scope extends beyond this
project. Nevertheless, in this section I will explore three important issues that republican
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nationalism raises and that need to be given more consideration in the future. In
particular, I will consider whether republican nationalism upholds a sufficient degree of
respect for individuals and for minorities, and what the actual practical policies that a
republican nationalist might endorse would look like.
Regarding the question of upholding a sufficient degree of respect for individuals,
critics of republican nationalism may claim that because political participation and a
shared national identity are assumed to hold both intrinsic and instrumental value (and
are thus seen as essential elements of the good life), and because decisions about what
constitutes the public good must be made collectively through the process of deliberation
rather than individually by each citizen for himself, republican nationalism fails to accord
appropriate respect to each individual. On the republican nationalist view, there exists a
substantive conception of the good that reflects the general will of the political
community. This conception will include assigning intrinsic value to political
participation and a shared national identity, but it may include other aspects as well. As
such, republican nationalists argue that the public understanding of the good cannot be
revised by individual citizens at their own discretion; instead, all citizens must come
together and revise the public conception of the good collectively through participation
and deliberation. This is because the citizens of a political community ruled by the
general will must form a single sovereign body (Rousseau’s moi commun), and decisions
about what constitutes the good must be made by the whole body through the mechanism
of democratic politics. Individual citizens may disagree with certain aspects of what is
considered to be the public good, but in order to revise the public conception of the good
they will have to make their case through the deliberative process and convince their
fellow citizens using the force of the better argument. If they fail to do so, they will be
free to maintain their personal dissent, but they will also be obliged to accept that the
state has the right to actively promote this particular conception of the good until such
time as it is revised. Dissenters would be expected to respect the decision of the
community so long as it was made fairly by their fellow citizens through the process of
democratic deliberation, and so long as they continue to have public avenues for voicing
their own views.
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Liberal critics might argue that the republican nationalist perspective restricts the
freedom of individuals by not allowing each citizen to form his own personal conception
of the good without interference from the state. This is an important criticism, and one
that calls for serious consideration. In broad terms, a republican nationalist would
respond by arguing that all laws are grounded in politics and public discussion, and that if
the political community arrives at a democratic decision about the need to actively
promote a particular conception of the public good, then the state can legitimately
promote it. Republican nationalists would also argue that the political community can do
more good for its citizens by adopting a shared conception of the public good and by
actively promoting it than by leaving all decisions about the good up to individuals
(especially when this means that many citizens may ultimately decide to lead lives which
are devoid of meaning and purpose). Lastly, republican nationalists would challenge the
claim that their perspective restricts the freedom of individuals by obliging all citizens to
participate in politics, rather than leaving the decision up to each individual citizen. A
republican nationalist would argue that political participation is an integral component of
the public good because a) it allows individuals to realize themselves fully as citizens and
be free in the most-meaningful sense (self-realization), and b) it ensures that citizens are
more engaged in the political process, which in turn ensures the preservation of
meaningful democracy in the face of such fundamental threats as the growing influence
of money in politics. Republican nationalists contend that a community in which citizens
are not actively engaged in politics will inevitably be less free because it will constrain
each citizen’s opportunities for self-realization, and because it will be dominated by
special interests that take advantage of the lack of citizen participation and vigilance in
order to gain undue influence in politics.
A community in which the citizens are not obliged to actively participate and
maintain constant vigilance over the political process will not be fully democratic;
citizens in these communities may have a wide variety of choices about where to shop or
which television programs to watch, but this is not freedom in the fullest sense (it is not
moral freedom, as Rousseau would put it). Freedom in the most meaningful sense is not
about the quantity of choices but about their quality; to be free, citizens must realize
themselves in the fullest sense by becoming active members of a democratic community
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and by taking a direct part in shaping the very laws that govern them, not merely in
shaping their shopping practices or television viewing habits. This is what Rousseau
meant when he made the much-debated claim that citizens must be “forced to be free”:
by obliging citizens to participate in politics, we are ensuring that more options for selfrealization are available to them, and that special interests do not take advantage of
political apathy and a lack of vigilance on the part of the citizenry in order to gain undue
influence at the expense of meaningful democracy. By actively promoting political
participation as a necessary element of the good life even though some citizens might
disagree, we are ensuring that the republican community remains meaningfully free and
democratic, and we are therefore preserving, not infringing upon, the freedom of all
citizens (including the dissenters themselves). Nevertheless, this is only a brief sketch of
a debate that has been raging for centuries, and one that has major implications for
democratic theory and for our understanding of what it means to be free. A
comprehensive account of the liberal criticisms of the republican nationalist
understanding of freedom and the public good, and the potential republican responses to
those criticisms, would require entire volumes of their own. My goal has been to bring
this debate to the forefront and identify the major points of contention between the two
sides, in the hopes that more work will be done on the subject in the future.
Another important question about republican nationalism is whether it accords a
sufficient degree of respect for minorities. Kymlicka and other liberal nationalists take
the issues of inclusiveness and accommodation of minority groups very seriously, and
their goal is to develop a version of nationalism that is inclusive of racial, social, cultural,
and national minorities. Chapter 6 includes a detailed account of the liberal nationalist
approach to minority rights and how it compares to the republican nationalist approach
expressed by Miller. Kymlicka distinguishes between minority groups such as social
movements or immigrant groups, and national minorities; he believes that national
minorities form separate political communities within the state and deserve special rights
of representation. Kymlicka warns that imposing common citizenship and an
encompassing national identity on minorities which see themselves as distinct peoples
may actually increase conflict in a multinational state, but Miller argues that we can
deliberately modify the national consciousness and promote a single encompassing
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national identity in order to remove a minority’s desire to form a distinct national society
within an existing nation. Republican nationalists accept Miller’s view, and while
acknowledging that secession may be inevitable in cases where rival nations have no
hope of ever developing a common national identity, they hold that what Kymlicka refers
to as national minorities (ethnocultural groups with a particular homeland that form a
separate political community within the state) should instead be referred to as territorial
minorities (ethnocultural groups that inhabit a clearly defined territory within the larger
state, but remain part of a shared national political community). Republican nationalists
would argue that groups like the Bretons and Occitans in France are better classified as
territorial rather than national minorities; they are groups with distinct ethnocultural
characteristics and clearly defined territorial homelands that are nevertheless still part of a
single French national community. Miller argues that such minority groups by and large
want to be part of the national community rather than separate from it, and he makes a
strong case for why his republican approach is better able to accommodate the claims of
minority groups than liberal and libertarian conceptions of citizenship.452 Miller’s
republican approach rests on the idea that meaningful democratic politics depends on a
sense of common nationality that is threatened whenever special rights are granted for
groups over and above what equal treatment requires, and this includes minorities.453 In
Chapter 6 I argued in defense of Miller’s view, and I noted that even in a country like
Canada, which is far from the ideal republican nation-state due to its vast size and
colonial history, practical government policies seem to be geared towards promoting an
encompassing Canadian national identity rather than a dual Canadian-Quebecois identity
or a multinational identity.
The final minority-related issue that I will address is the concept of the “tyranny
of the majority” and potential claims that republican nationalism is vulnerable to this type
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of problem. It is true that republican nationalism includes obligations which liberalism
does not, including the obligation to participate in the political process and in a shared
national culture. These obligations are more demanding than those endorsed by liberal
nationalism, and in order to guarantee meaningful political participation in the first place,
republican nationalists must establish rights of citizenship that will ensure that all citizens
are able to participate in both the political process and the shared national culture. These
rights will share commonalities with liberal rights (free speech and expression, freedom
of conscience, voting and running for office, security of the person), and they may also
go beyond liberal rights by endorsing firm limits on economic inequality in order to
ensure that every citizen thinks only his own thoughts, and that no citizen is wealthy
enough to buy another or so poor as to have to sell himself.454 This is because the general
will includes the will of every citizen, not simply the will of the majority or any other
faction, and so all citizens, including those who may be in the minority on a given issue,
will enjoy the same rights (and obligations) of citizenship and the protections and
assurances that go along with them. Nevertheless, the questions that are being raised here,
including the issue of what type of minority group accommodation is appropriate within
modern nation-states and the question of how to ensure that all voices are being heard in
public discussion, are far from resolved. This debate will continue, and my hope is that
the framework of republican nationalism will offer a fresh perspective on these important
questions; a perspective which, when pitted against the liberal nationalist approach, can
provide new solutions that move the debate forward.
Some critics of nationalism in general and republican nationalism in particular
may claim that nationalist projects such as these will inevitably become hostile to
outsiders and seek to assert their superiority over rival nations. However, throughout this
dissertation I have made it a point to emphasize that the type of nationalism that
republican nationalists endorse, and the type of nationalism that Rousseau himself
endorsed, is defensive in character and limited in scope. Republican nationalism rejects
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all forms of military expansionism and imperialism because the larger the state becomes,
the less democratic it becomes, and the less free its citizens will be. Furthermore, in
recognizing the intrinsic value of culture and nationality, republican nationalists must
agree to respect the value of all national cultures along with their own. Just as Rousseau
states that he who wants to be free must not want to be a conqueror, so too Miller argues
that:
In advancing the claims of our own national community to security and selfdetermination, we also recognize that other communities may make equally
legitimate claims on their own behalf. The overall aim is a world in which
different peoples can pursue their own national projects in a spirit of friendly
rivalry, but in which none attempts to control, exploit, or undermine any of the
others. Besides the barriers this erects to overt or covert imperialism, it also
creates a general obligation to ensure that nation-states have adequate resources to
remain economically viable.455
The last issue that I will address in this section is the question of what kind of
practical policies republican nationalists might endorse, and how these may differ from
policies preferred by liberal nationalists. The first obvious difference will revolve around
political participation; for liberal nationalists participation is encouraged but not
mandatory, whereas for republican nationalists taking an active part in both the informal
and formal aspects of public life are a necessary element of the good life. What’s more,
because republican nationalists believe that citizens cannot be fully free unless they take
an active part in shaping the laws that govern them, a republican nationalist must endorse
laws that make political participation mandatory. The question then becomes what these
laws will look like, and how they will be enforced. In countries like Australia, Greece,
Belgium, and a number of Latin American nations, participating in elections is
compulsory; all citizens are obliged to vote, and those who fail to do so without an
acceptable justification are most often fined, although in some countries multiple
violations can result in losing the right to vote for a number of years or having public
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services such as passports and other documents revoked.456 A republican nationalist
would certainly endorse some of these measures, but which measures should be
implemented and how severe the punishment should be for failing to participate is up for
debate. I think that the fees for not participating would have to be substantial enough that
they couldn’t be ignored, especially for repeat offenders, and they would likely have to be
determined based on income (like speeding tickets in Finland) in order to ensure that
those with money to spare cannot simply buy their way out of democracy. I am also
inclined to endorse denying select public services, such as the ability to renew a passport,
to those who willingly and repeatedly refuse to participate, but republican nationalists
will likely hold different views on what types of measures should be taken to ensure
participation. Moreover, since political participation for republican nationalists involves
more than simply voting in elections, other civic responsibilities, such as attending public
events or taking part in various forms of civil service, may need to become mandatory as
well (similar to the way that jury duty is mandatory in the United States). But this again
raises questions about which activities should be mandatory, and how compliance will be
enforced. Other than noting that all policies should be designed to promote efficient
political participation without placing undue or unequal burdens on individual citizens, I
cannot yet offer definitive answers to the many questions that come with these
propositions. More research is needed, including empirical research that aims to
determine which public policies would be the most effective in achieving the desired
results, and I intend to pursue this type of research in the future.
The fact that republican nationalism sees participation and a shared national
identity as necessary elements of the good life means that steps will have to be taken
beyond the political system in order to effectively promote these goods. This means
developing a national system of education that seeks to teach citizens from a very young
age about the intrinsic value of these goods, and it also means providing incentives for
both public and private institutions to promote these goods within the informal spheres of
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public life. Moreover, the republican nationalist emphasis on participation and
deliberation requires its proponents to develop political mechanisms that are more
participatory than those of modern liberal democracies. This is not a simple proposition,
and there are large bodies of literature on radical and deliberative democracy that deal
with this very question.457 The specific policies will be up for discussion, but the rapid
advances in information technology in recent decades have made the idea of active largescale political participation in modern nation-states more feasible. Republican nationalists
will want to explore these new options for participation and deliberation, but they will
also want to promote existing mechanisms of direct democracy, such as referenda. On the
republican nationalist view, the people as a whole must have the final say on major
political decisions (rather than leaving these decisions up to judges or even elected
representatives), and the referendum will be the ultimate mechanism of political decisionmaking in the republican nationalist community. This is a clear difference from
contemporary liberal constitutionalism: major political decisions, such as amendments to
the constitution, will have to be approved in national referenda, and if there is
disagreement between the different branches of government on a contentious issue, the
ultimate decision will not be left up to constitutional courts but to the people as a whole.
As such, avenues will have to be available to citizens in order to challenge democratically
those political decisions that a significant number of them disagrees with, and this would
include the ability to demand a national referendum on the issue (referenda would be
called if those opposing a decision are able to collect a significant amount of valid
signatures from fellow citizens in support of the motion).
Republican nationalists will also endorse more restrictions on the disparity
between the rich and poor, they will support eliminating the influence of money in
politics by imposing controls on campaign financing and by minimizing the impact of all
forms of special interest lobbying, and they will demand more accountability and
transparency from politicians. Again, the policies that are implemented to promote these
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goals will be up for debate and discussion; some may feel that stricter laws on campaign
financing will have the desired effect, and this view is compatible with the views of many
liberals, while others may go as far as Rousseau and argue that all political factions
should be eliminated completely, so that every citizen can think only his own thoughts
and so that every elected official will be accountable directly to his constituents instead of
the leadership of a political party. These and other questions will have to be answered
before republican nationalism can become the kind of serious theoretical approach that
liberal nationalism has become, and while some important work has been done on the
subject by Miller and other deliberative democrats, more empirical research and practical
analysis is needed. After all, many contemporary states see themselves as liberal
democracies, but no contemporary state identifies as a “republican democracy” or claims
to be committed to the principles of republican nationalism. As such, the ultimate goal of
this project has been to begin the conversation on republican nationalism and its
distinctness from liberal nationalism rather than resolve it altogether.

7.4 Contemporary Relevance: Nationalism in the Twentyfirst Century
Nationalism has been a powerful political force throughout the twentieth century,
and it has not lost much of its vigor. Despite the expanding phenomenon of globalization,
which promises to open up borders and tear down the boundaries between peoples,
nationalism remains a potent factor in world politics. Between separatists struggles in
places like Sri Lanka, Turkey, and Ukraine and national rivalries which have the potential
to escalate into serious conflicts (the tensions between China and Japan over the Senkaku
islands, or the sectarian and geo-political tensions between Iran and Saudi Arabia), no
student of politics can afford to ignore the practical implications of nationalism. As long
as nationalism remains a critical aspect of world affairs, it is necessary to give the
academic study of nationalism, its theory and practice, the attention it deserves. The
question of why nationalism still remains such a significant idea in a globalized world is
a complex one, but Neil MacCormick offers a compelling answer. As MacCormick
observes,
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It is only through our membership of significant groupings that we can transcend
the constraints of place and time… A “nation” (but not only a nation) can provide
a conceptual framework that allows us to comprehend our own existence as
belonging within a continuity in time and a community in space…. Consciousness
of belonging to a nation is one of the things that enable us as individuals in some
way in this earthly existence to transcend the limitations of space, time, and
mortality, and to participate in that which had meaning before us and will
continue to have meaning beyond us.458
The concept of nationalism may be so potent precisely because it speaks to an inherent
human desire to transcend mortality and participate in something that is bigger than
ourselves. While other groupings such as the family can have a similar significance,
national identity remains essential for the self-understanding of a great many people in
the modern world. As Nielsen explains,
National identity is indeed a very important identity, an identity essential for very
many people to give meaning to their lives, vital for their secure sense of selfrespect, essential for their sense of belonging and security: all things of
fundamental value to human beings. They are things that would be a central part
of a good life for people in any society. Still, however important, national identity
does not exhaust their identity and should not be their deepest loyalty.459
Many people believe that national identities are constitutive of the self; they feel
that national belonging holds both intrinsic and instrumental value. As such, they would
want to preserve their unique national identity even if all the instrumental benefits that
come with national belonging could be secured independently.460 National belonging may
not be the highest human good nor is it the only form of collective belonging that has
intrinsic value (belonging to one’s family, neighborhood, and church community is also
valuable), but national belonging is one of the important human goods that holds intrinsic
value for many individuals around the world.461 As Miller points out:
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A national identity helps to locate us in the world; it must tell us who we are,
where we have come from, what we have done. It must then involve an essentially
historical understanding in which the present generation are seen as heirs to a
tradition which they then pass on to their successors. Of course the story is
continually being rewritten; each generation revises the past as it comes to terms
with the problem of the present. None the less, there is a sense in which the past
always constrains the present: present identities are built out of the materials that
are handed down, not started from scratch.462
National belonging is also a unique form of belonging because in a world where political
decision-making still predominantly takes place in a system of sovereign nation-states, it
is only through the vehicle of the nation-state that people can fully realize and preserve
their freedom, and have their voices heard and their interests represented in a world full
of rival states and conflicting interests. In a globalized and interdependent world, it is no
longer possible to protect one’s interests and escape the problems of the wider world by
relying solely on one’s family, village, or even city. National identity is the main focus of
collective loyalty in modern nation-states because it makes individual, political, and
national self-determination possible: “it provides the wherewithal for a common culture
against whose background people can make more individual decisions about how to lead
their lives; it provides the setting in which ideas of social justice can be pursued,
particularly ideas that require us to treat our individual talents as to some degree a
‘common asset’, to use Rawls’s phrase; and it helps to foster the mutual understanding
and trust that makes democratic citizenship possible.”463
Despite claims to the contrary, nationalism does not represent a return to premodern, primitive tribalism. Modern nationalism is often philosophically sophisticated,
rational, and inclusive of immigrants, as long as they consent to participating in a
common national culture, which includes learning the language, history, customs, and
laws of the nation in question. As such, nationalism represents a complex and
quintessentially modern concept that will remain a potent force in world politics for the
foreseeable future. Because nationalism remains so important in the modern world, the
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study of nationalist theory represents a crucial challenge for contemporary political
philosophers. The debate surrounding nationalism has moved beyond the civic vs. ethnic
divide as theorists of nationalism come to appreciate the essential component that culture
plays in the life of a nation. Nonetheless, the debate within nationalist theory is far from
over, as there are major differences between even those theorists who accept the
theoretical framework of cultural nationalism. I have suggested that within the framework
of cultural nationalism exists a clear distinction between liberal nationalism, which is
established and prominent in the literature, and republican nationalism, which is still
being developed but finds clear expression in the works of Rousseau and David Miller.
As such, I argued that treating republican nationalism as a defensible alternative to liberal
nationalism represents a fruitful new avenue of research within nationalist theory.
I end by reiterating the continuing relevance of nationalism in the modern world,
and by stressing that although many are quick to point out the potential “downsides” of
nationalism, it is important to also remember the very real “upsides” of national
belonging in the twenty-first century. In the words of David Cannadine, responding to
those who claim that nations are losing their significance in the face of globalization and
supranational organizations such as the EU:
The majority of people in Europe still live their lives in the context of the national
community, and continue to view their past and future in that political framework.
Nations may indeed be inventions. But like the wheel, or the internal combustion
engine, they are endowed, once invented, with a real, palpable existence which is
not just to be found in the subjective perceptions of their citizens, but is embodied
in laws, languages, customs, institutions―and history.464
Nations may be imagined communities, but they hold real meaning for their members and
they wield real power on the world stage; predictions about their downfall and the
impending end of nationalism as a major force in global politics have been wrong over
and over again. Nations remain the most important actors on the world stage, and they
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will continue to be for the foreseeable future. As such, the study of nations and of
nationalism must be taken seriously by the scholars of the twenty-first century.
Miller makes a powerful point when he suggests that critics of nationalism may
want to think twice before supporting the erosion of national identities in the name of
wider regional or even global identities. Miller observes that the modern welfare state and
programs and institutions that protect minority rights have always been national projects,
grounded in the belief that members of a national community owe certain goods to their
fellow citizens that they could not possibly extend to all of humanity. If national
identities disappear, what replaces them may not be a more inclusive and compassionate
worldview, but rather a worldview that stresses the primary importance of economic
profits and market efficiency. As citizens lose a sense of shared national identity and
allegiance to their particular community, they become less likely to participate in
common projects and pursue common goods, which would make it easier for political
and economic elites to gain undue influence over politics and eliminate the types of
welfare programs and economic and cultural subsidies that are seen as restricting the
efficiency of global markets.465 As Miller warns,
If national identities are indeed being eroded, what is likely to take their place is
not rich cultural pluralism for everyone, but the world market as the distributor of
cultural resources. And this will be bad news for the non-elite, on two counts.
First, they will no longer have ready access to a rich common culture of the kind
that is still available in most European and other Western states through publicly
funded television stations, museums, and art galleries, educational programmes,
and the like. Second, their economic position will increasingly be determined by
the workings of the global market, as national solidarity declines and people are
no longer willing to allow redistributive policies to interfere with economic
competitiveness.466
For this reason, academics of the twenty-first century should be careful about relegating
nations and nationalism to the dustbin of history, as Marxists and radical cosmopolitans
have done in the past. Nations remain the primary actors on the world stage, and
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nationalism continues to be a powerful force that merits our time and consideration. And
perhaps that’s a good thing.
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